https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/25/europe/netherlands-china-xinjiang-genocide-intl-hnk/index.html

Dutch parliament becomes second in a week to accuse China of genocide in Xinjiang

The Dutch parliament on Thursday passed a non-binding motion saying the treatment of the Uyghur Muslim minority in China amounts to genocide, the first such move by a European country.

Activists and United Nations rights experts say at least one million Muslims are being detained in camps in the remote western region of Xinjiang. The activists and some Western politicians accuse China of using torture, forced labor and sterilizations.
China denies any human rights abuses in Xinjiang and says its camps provide vocational training and are needed to fight extremism.

“A genocide on the Uyghur minority is occurring in China,” the Dutch motion said, stopping short of directly saying that the Chinese government was responsible.
The Chinese Embassy in The Hague said on Thursday any suggestion of a genocide in Xinjiang was an “outright lie” and the Dutch parliament had “deliberately smeared China and grossly interfered in China’s internal affairs.”

Canada passed a non-binding resolution labeling China’s treatment of the Uyghurs genocide earlier this week.
The Dutch motion said that actions by the Chinese government such as “measures intended to prevent births” and “having punishment camps” fell under United Nations Resolution 260, generally known as the genocide convention.
Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s conservative VVD party voted against the resolution.

Foreign Minister Stef Blok said the government did not want to use the term genocide, as the situation has not been declared as such by the United Nations or by an international court.
“The situation of the Uyghurs is a cause of great concern”, Blok told reporters after the motion was passed, adding that the Netherlands hoped to work with other nations on the matter.

I like you can burn some Jews and it’s heinous but do it to another ethnic group and it’s politics…

poikilotherm said:

I like you can burn some Jews and it’s heinous but do it to another ethnic group and it’s politics…

I think that was mainly the germans rather than dutch.

poikilotherm said:

I like you can burn some Jews and it’s heinous but do it to another ethnic group and it’s politics…

While the Nazis were busily ‘interning’ Jews and other minorities and political opponents prior to the actual outbreak of war, the extermination campaigns didn’t begin until after the war was well under way.

There’s no evidence (yet) that the Chinese are actually killing these people, but as circumstances may and can change….

Fuck the Chinese Communist Party!

I’ll read the rest of the thread tomorrow, I’m on FNDC duties tonight.

so what we’re saying is that more specifically, in contrast to other recent similar titles here, this is politics with regard to CHINA and not much of politics in CHINA, staying out of it

SCIENCE said:

so what we’re saying is that more specifically, in contrast to other recent similar titles here, this is politics with regard to CHINA and not much of politics in CHINA, staying out of it

The National People’s Congress is meeting tomorrow. If all the votes aren’t unanimous it will be big news!

> China denies any human rights abuses in Xinjiang and says its camps provide vocational training

That’s OK then.

mollwollfumble said:

> China denies any human rights abuses in Xinjiang and says its camps provide vocational training

That’s OK then.

Even Yoda agrees with training

“Good for the mind, training, it is.”

Tau.Neutrino said:

mollwollfumble said:

> China denies any human rights abuses in Xinjiang and says its camps provide vocational training

That’s OK then.

Even Yoda agrees with training

“Good for the mind, training, it is.”

That vocational training is so good that they need high walls, razor wire, and guard towers to keep out the swarms of people who’d like to enrol.

captain_spalding said:

Tau.Neutrino said:

mollwollfumble said:

> China denies any human rights abuses in Xinjiang and says its camps provide vocational training

That’s OK then.

Even Yoda agrees with training

“Good for the mind, training, it is.”

That vocational training is so good that they need high walls, razor wire, and guard towers to keep out the swarms of people who’d like to enrol.

Indeed, I tried to travel to China to try some re education and they wouldn’t let me citing security concerns.

Tau.Neutrino said:

captain_spalding said:

Tau.Neutrino said:

Even Yoda agrees with training

“Good for the mind, training, it is.”

That vocational training is so good that they need high walls, razor wire, and guard towers to keep out the swarms of people who’d like to enrol.

Indeed, I tried to travel to China to try some re education and they wouldn’t let me citing security concerns.

I heard that their re training is way cheaper than other places.

Genocide is a crime against humanity.

China is segregating these people, when they could be working in society, not locked up in a de-facto prison.

Tau.Neutrino said:

Genocide is a crime against humanity.

China is segregating these people, when they could be working in society, not locked up in a de-facto prison.

https://img-9gag-fun.9cache.com/photo/abVzxPE_460sv.mp4

https://www.sbs.com.au/news/us-eu-britain-and-canada-sanction-chinese-officials-for-uighur-human-rights-abuses

The United States, the European Union, Britain and Canada imposed sanctions on Chinese officials on Monday for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, in the first such coordinated Western action against Beijing under new US President Joe Biden.

Beijing hit back immediately with punitive measures against the EU that appeared to be broader, blacklisting European politicians, diplomats and think tanks, including families, and banning their businesses from trading with China.

dv said:

https://www.sbs.com.au/news/us-eu-britain-and-canada-sanction-chinese-officials-for-uighur-human-rights-abuses

The United States, the European Union, Britain and Canada imposed sanctions on Chinese officials on Monday for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, in the first such coordinated Western action against Beijing under new US President Joe Biden.

Beijing hit back immediately with punitive measures against the EU that appeared to be broader, blacklisting European politicians, diplomats and think tanks, including families, and banning their businesses from trading with China.

Meh.

China has passed an anti–food waste law that bans diners at restaurants from ordering more than they need, a sweeping and somewhat confusing piece of legislation that could upend the experience of eating out for millions.

The law, which came into effect last week, was part of an anti-food waste campaign that swept across the country last year after Chinese President Xi Jinping called food waste a “distressing” problem that threatened China’s food security. Filming or sharing videos of binge-eating, a type of eating shows known as mukbang, is also prohibited.

https://www.vice.com/en/article/jg88kp/china-bans-food-waste-mukbang

dv said:

China has passed an anti–food waste law that bans diners at restaurants from ordering more than they need, a sweeping and somewhat confusing piece of legislation that could upend the experience of eating out for millions.

The law, which came into effect last week, was part of an anti-food waste campaign that swept across the country last year after Chinese President Xi Jinping called food waste a “distressing” problem that threatened China’s food security. Filming or sharing videos of binge-eating, a type of eating shows known as mukbang, is also prohibited.

https://www.vice.com/en/article/jg88kp/china-bans-food-waste-mukbang

Best of luck with that Xi.

Consider this.
You have to go down a long long way in the Worldometre chart to find China.

dv said:

China has passed an anti–food waste law that bans diners at restaurants from ordering more than they need, a sweeping and somewhat confusing piece of legislation that could upend the experience of eating out for millions.

The law, which came into effect last week, was part of an anti-food waste campaign that swept across the country last year after Chinese President Xi Jinping called food waste a “distressing” problem that threatened China’s food security. Filming or sharing videos of binge-eating, a type of eating shows known as mukbang, is also prohibited.

https://www.vice.com/en/article/jg88kp/china-bans-food-waste-mukbang

Governing a country must be so easy when you can just ban stuff by decree.

I see that there is a huge electricity crisis in China. Rolling blackouts, factories being asked to close or scale back, aluminium smelters being shut down etc. Part of the reason seems to be a massive spike in coal and gas prices as the world economy struggles to get going again after Covid.

Their ban on Australian coal seems to be exacerbating to issue. They are paying higher prices for lower quality coal, meanwhile were just selling all of our good quality coal to other countries, who are all eager to snap it up given the global supply issues. It is turning into a bit of an own goal by China.

party_pants said:

I see that there is a huge electricity crisis in China. Rolling blackouts, factories being asked to close or scale back, aluminium smelters being shut down etc. Part of the reason seems to be a massive spike in coal and gas prices as the world economy struggles to get going again after Covid.

Their ban on Australian coal seems to be exacerbating to issue. They are paying higher prices for lower quality coal, meanwhile were just selling all of our good quality coal to other countries, who are all eager to snap it up given the global supply issues. It is turning into a bit of an own goal by China.

Serves them right.

roughbarked said:

party_pants said:

I see that there is a huge electricity crisis in China. Rolling blackouts, factories being asked to close or scale back, aluminium smelters being shut down etc. Part of the reason seems to be a massive spike in coal and gas prices as the world economy struggles to get going again after Covid.

Their ban on Australian coal seems to be exacerbating to issue. They are paying higher prices for lower quality coal, meanwhile were just selling all of our good quality coal to other countries, who are all eager to snap it up given the global supply issues. It is turning into a bit of an own goal by China.

Serves them right.

This is what i said months back.

It’s all very well for China to say that they’re not going to play with us any more, but there is the fact that until Deng Xiao Ping came along with his policies of opening up China to the world, the world got along fairly well without China.

If they’re not careful, the rest of the world may rediscover some of the was that they managed that.

captain_spalding said:

roughbarked said:

party_pants said:

I see that there is a huge electricity crisis in China. Rolling blackouts, factories being asked to close or scale back, aluminium smelters being shut down etc. Part of the reason seems to be a massive spike in coal and gas prices as the world economy struggles to get going again after Covid.

Their ban on Australian coal seems to be exacerbating to issue. They are paying higher prices for lower quality coal, meanwhile were just selling all of our good quality coal to other countries, who are all eager to snap it up given the global supply issues. It is turning into a bit of an own goal by China.

Serves them right.

This is what i said months back.

It’s all very well for China to say that they’re not going to play with us any more, but there is the fact that until Deng Xiao Ping came along with his policies of opening up China to the world, the world got along fairly well without China.

If they’re not careful, the rest of the world may rediscover some of the was that they managed that.

Was=ways

I think my wireless keyboard might need new batteries.

captain_spalding said:

captain_spalding said:

roughbarked said:

Serves them right.

This is what i said months back.

It’s all very well for China to say that they’re not going to play with us any more, but there is the fact that until Deng Xiao Ping came along with his policies of opening up China to the world, the world got along fairly well without China.

If they’re not careful, the rest of the world may rediscover some of the was that they managed that.

Was=ways

I think my wireless keyboard might need new batteries.

Doesn’t it have a cable to recharge?

roughbarked said:

captain_spalding said:

captain_spalding said:

This is what i said months back.

It’s all very well for China to say that they’re not going to play with us any more, but there is the fact that until Deng Xiao Ping came along with his policies of opening up China to the world, the world got along fairly well without China.

If they’re not careful, the rest of the world may rediscover some of the was that they managed that.

Was=ways

I think my wireless keyboard might need new batteries.

Doesn’t it have a cable to recharge?

No, just takes a couple of AAA batteries. They last a long time.

captain_spalding said:

roughbarked said:

captain_spalding said:

Was=ways

I think my wireless keyboard might need new batteries.

Doesn’t it have a cable to recharge?

No, just takes a couple of AAA batteries. They last a long time.

Yes it doesn’t use a lot of power.

party_pants said:

I see that there is a huge electricity crisis in China. Rolling blackouts, factories being asked to close or scale back, aluminium smelters being shut down etc. Part of the reason seems to be a massive spike in coal and gas prices as the world economy struggles to get going again after Covid.

Their ban on Australian coal seems to be exacerbating to issue. They are paying higher prices for lower quality coal, meanwhile were just selling all of our good quality coal to other countries, who are all eager to snap it up given the global supply issues. It is turning into a bit of an own goal by China.

Good one.

:)

party_pants said:

I see that there is a huge electricity crisis in China. Rolling blackouts, factories being asked to close or scale back, aluminium smelters being shut down etc. Part of the reason seems to be a massive spike in coal and gas prices as the world economy struggles to get going again after Covid.

Their ban on Australian coal seems to be exacerbating to issue. They are paying higher prices for lower quality coal, meanwhile were just selling all of our good quality coal to other countries, who are all eager to snap it up given the global supply issues. It is turning into a bit of an own goal by China.

we’re

party_pants said:

party_pants said:

I see that there is a huge electricity crisis in China. Rolling blackouts, factories being asked to close or scale back, aluminium smelters being shut down etc. Part of the reason seems to be a massive spike in coal and gas prices as the world economy struggles to get going again after Covid.

Their ban on Australian coal seems to be exacerbating to issue. They are paying higher prices for lower quality coal, meanwhile were just selling all of our good quality coal to other countries, who are all eager to snap it up given the global supply issues. It is turning into a bit of an own goal by China.

we’re

Yes, we certainly are.

captain_spalding said:

party_pants said:

party_pants said:

I see that there is a huge electricity crisis in China. Rolling blackouts, factories being asked to close or scale back, aluminium smelters being shut down etc. Part of the reason seems to be a massive spike in coal and gas prices as the world economy struggles to get going again after Covid.

Their ban on Australian coal seems to be exacerbating to issue. They are paying higher prices for lower quality coal, meanwhile were just selling all of our good quality coal to other countries, who are all eager to snap it up given the global supply issues. It is turning into a bit of an own goal by China.

we’re

Yes, we certainly are.

My keyboard is fine, I just need new fingers.

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html

Some are just psychopaths’: Chinese detective in exile reveals extent of torture against Uyghurs

dv said:

SCIENCE said:

party_pants said:

SCIENCE said:

Very few of those polled see China as a threat to their way of life and most see Russia as a greater challenge. And while Australia is doubling down on the American alliance, Europeans question the need for America as the big defender.

Yes, this is why the EU or France are a bad choice for a strategic partner for Australia, if they don’t share the same strategic outlook for our region as we do. If they want to avoid the possibility of confronting China or creating a deterrence framework for containing Chinese aggression they are not going to be a good partner for us. If they want to pursue their own Indo-Pacific policy not aligned to the US that’s fine, but they are not really a player with the nations that live here.

oh c’m‘on what’s with all the oppositional defiance, they’re just an overpopulated funny-sounding version of us

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58313387

Rape case sparks fury over nation’s work drinking

A high-profile rape allegation at national tech giant company has sparked a social media storm in recent weeks about the “toxic” work culture of pressuring employees to drink at work gatherings. As public scrutiny of corporate misbehaviour grows in nation, can the age-old tradition of business drinking be dropped forever?

According to a female employee’s 11-page account of the incident, which went viral on microblogging platform media last month, she was allegedly raped while unconscious after a “drunken night” on a work trip. Accusing her superiors of ordering her to drink excessively at a business dinner, she said she had woken up later in her hotel room naked, with no recollection of the evening’s events. After obtaining security footage, she said that the manager had gone into her room four times during the night.

But national prosecutors have since dropped the case, with lawyers saying that the “forcible indecency” committed by the man was not a crime. Police said he would remain under detention for 15 days “as punishment”, but the investigation was closed.

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html

Some are just psychopaths’: Chinese detective in exile reveals extent of torture against Uyghurs

so it’s true, they really are just an overpopulated funny-sounding version of us

dv said:

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html

Some are just psychopaths’: Chinese detective in exile reveals extent of torture against Uyghurs

You offend China speaking the truth, we threaten you or withdraw trade

Cymek said:

dv said:

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html

Some are just psychopaths’: Chinese detective in exile reveals extent of torture against Uyghurs

You offend China speaking the truth, we threaten you or withdraw trade

Meh. Let them withdraw trade. They’ll be back and we can renegotiate terms.

Dark Orange said:

Cymek said:

dv said:

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html

Some are just psychopaths’: Chinese detective in exile reveals extent of torture against Uyghurs

You offend China speaking the truth, we threaten you or withdraw trade

Meh. Let them withdraw trade. They’ll be back and we can renegotiate terms.

Yes
I wonder if some nations are irony impaired, they are shitted off we are getting nuclear powered subs but its seemingly OK for them to build up militarily quite likely including nuclear weapons

Cymek said:

dv said:

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html

Some are just psychopaths’: Chinese detective in exile reveals extent of torture against Uyghurs

You offend China speaking the truth, we threaten you or withdraw trade

They stopped buying Oz coal, it has worked out magnificently for them.

sibeen said:

Cymek said:

dv said:

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html

Some are just psychopaths’: Chinese detective in exile reveals extent of torture against Uyghurs

You offend China speaking the truth, we threaten you or withdraw trade

They stopped buying Oz coal, it has worked out magnificently for them.

Yes. Like a hole in the head.

Michael V said:

sibeen said:

Cymek said:

You offend China speaking the truth, we threaten you or withdraw trade

They stopped buying Oz coal, it has worked out magnificently for them.

Yes. Like a hole in the head.

¿ so … they can breathe the air naturally again ?

https://www.theage.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/evergrande-s-fight-for-survival-is-a-threat-to-china-s-shadow-banking-system-20211005-p58xcy.html

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-05/india-facing-coal-shortage-could-run-out-of-power-explainer/100516332
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/blackall-wool-scour-could-save-industry-china-power-restrictions/100515678

Apparently When CHINA Shoot Themselves In The Feet With Armour Piercing Rounds Their Legs Are Pointed In The Direction Of Western Pseudodemocracies

SCIENCE said:

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-05/india-facing-coal-shortage-could-run-out-of-power-explainer/100516332
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/blackall-wool-scour-could-save-industry-china-power-restrictions/100515678

Apparently When CHINA Shoot Themselves In The Feet With Armour Piercing Rounds Their Legs Are Pointed In The Direction Of Western Pseudodemocracies

I have no idea what you’re talking about.

Witty Rejoinder said:

SCIENCE said:

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-05/india-facing-coal-shortage-could-run-out-of-power-explainer/100516332
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/blackall-wool-scour-could-save-industry-china-power-restrictions/100515678

Apparently When CHINA Shoot Themselves In The Feet With Armour Piercing Rounds Their Legs Are Pointed In The Direction Of Western Pseudodemocracies

I have no idea what you’re talking about.

+1

quick now’s our chance ¡ kick ‘em while they’re down

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/china-turns-to-stranded-australian-coal-to-combat-power-crun/100518440

SCIENCE said:

quick now’s our chance ¡ kick ‘em while they’re down

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/china-turns-to-stranded-australian-coal-to-combat-power-crun/100518440

I’d bet that that story isn’t getting a big run in China.

captain_spalding said:

SCIENCE said:

quick now’s our chance ¡ kick ‘em while they’re down

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/china-turns-to-stranded-australian-coal-to-combat-power-crun/100518440

I’d bet that that story isn’t getting a big run in China.

well supposedly it would last all of 1 day so who knows

maybe West Taiwan should have saved their fossil fuels for The Economy (Must Grow) instead of flying mosquitoes over the tropical Taiwan mainland

SCIENCE said:

captain_spalding said:

SCIENCE said:

quick now’s our chance ¡ kick ‘em while they’re down

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/china-turns-to-stranded-australian-coal-to-combat-power-crun/100518440

I’d bet that that story isn’t getting a big run in China.

well supposedly it would last all of 1 day so who knows

maybe West Taiwan should have saved their fossil fuels for The Economy (Must Grow) instead of flying mosquitoes over the tropical Taiwan mainland

I wonder under what circumstances you could fire missiles at them, your likely within your sovereign rights to do so but risk a war if you are the little person

Cymek said:

SCIENCE said:

captain_spalding said:

I’d bet that that story isn’t getting a big run in China.

well supposedly it would last all of 1 day so who knows

maybe West Taiwan should have saved their fossil fuels for The Economy (Must Grow) instead of flying mosquitoes over the tropical Taiwan mainland

I wonder under what circumstances you could fire missiles at them, your likely within your sovereign rights to do so but risk a war if you are the little person

From what I can gather from listening to the Beeb these so called incursions are actually into international air space.

Peak Warming Man said:

Cymek said:

SCIENCE said:

well supposedly it would last all of 1 day so who knows

maybe West Taiwan should have saved their fossil fuels for The Economy (Must Grow) instead of flying mosquitoes over the tropical Taiwan mainland

I wonder under what circumstances you could fire missiles at them, your likely within your sovereign rights to do so but risk a war if you are the little person

From what I can gather from listening to the Beeb these so called incursions are actually into international air space.

hold on there what are we saying ¿ that the Murder Media are trying to start a war in the South China Sea, there’s some deal going on with stealth boats, and military assets are in a location that is being misrepresented ?

SCIENCE said:

Peak Warming Man said:

Cymek said:

I wonder under what circumstances you could fire missiles at them, your likely within your sovereign rights to do so but risk a war if you are the little person

From what I can gather from listening to the Beeb these so called incursions are actually into international air space.

hold on there what are we saying ¿ that the Murder Media are trying to start a war in the South China Sea, there’s some deal going on with stealth boats, and military assets are in a location that is being misrepresented ?

The Chinese aircraft entered the Taiwanese Air Defence Identification Zone. They did not enter Taiwanese national air space. They were 200 – 300 kms from Taiwan.

Taiwan and China have overlapping ADIZs. These are zones in which aircraft should identify themselves when requested to, and state there purpose for being there when asked.

Australia and a number of other countries also have ADIZs, which extend over ‘international’ air space.

If the Chinese aircraft should enter Taiwanese ‘national’ airspsace (i.e. the airspace above the ‘twelve-mile-limit’ area’) , without invitation or clearance, or without a stated purpose, then the Taiwanese would be within their rights to fire on them.

The Chinese air force has behaved aggressively to aircraft within its ADIZ, with a Chinese fighter colliding with a US EP-3 Orion some years back. This resulted in the loss ofthe Chinese aircraft and pilot, and the emergency landing or the Orion in China.

captain_spalding said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

SCIENCE said:

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-05/india-facing-coal-shortage-could-run-out-of-power-explainer/100516332
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/blackall-wool-scour-could-save-industry-china-power-restrictions/100515678

Apparently When CHINA Shoot Themselves In The Feet With Armour Piercing Rounds Their Legs Are Pointed In The Direction Of Western Pseudodemocracies

I have no idea what you’re talking about.

+1

captain_spalding said:

SCIENCE said:

Peak Warming Man said:

From what I can gather from listening to the Beeb these so called incursions are actually into international air space.

hold on there what are we saying ¿ that the Murder Media are trying to start a war in the South China Sea, there’s some deal going on with stealth boats, and military assets are in a location that is being misrepresented ?

The Chinese aircraft entered the Taiwanese Air Defence Identification Zone. They did not enter Taiwanese national air space. They were 200 – 300 kms from Taiwan.

Taiwan and China have overlapping ADIZs. These are zones in which aircraft should identify themselves when requested to, and state there purpose for being there when asked.

Australia and a number of other countries also have ADIZs, which extend over ‘international’ air space.

If the Chinese aircraft should enter Taiwanese ‘national’ airspsace (i.e. the airspace above the ‘twelve-mile-limit’ area’) , without invitation or clearance, or without a stated purpose, then the Taiwanese would be within their rights to fire on them.

The Chinese air force has behaved aggressively to aircraft within its ADIZ, with a Chinese fighter colliding with a US EP-3 Orion some years back. This resulted in the loss ofthe Chinese aircraft and pilot, and the emergency landing or the Orion in China.

so

Taiwan and China have overlapping ADIZs. These are zones in which aircraft should identify themselves when requested to, and state there purpose for being there when asked. Australia and a number of other countries also have ADIZs, which extend over ‘international’ air space.

following protocol is news now, we suppose that’s good news, saves a few faces it seems

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/biden-xi-jinping-agree-to-abide-by-taiwan-agreement/100518846

hahahahahahahahaha oh look CHINA ran out of power hahahahahahaha they screwed themselves hahaha oh wait fuck fuck

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-27/magnesium-shortage-in-europe-and-us-china-slows-down-supply/100570048

China’s state-run tabloid Global Times says it is “unrealistic” for China to meet the urgent demand for magnesium from Europe, where stocks of the raw material could run out next month. The paper said the magnesium shortage was not a simple issue that could be resolved by increasing production from China. The European market is almost entirely (95 per cent) dependent on China for the supply of magnesium, a key ingredient in aluminium, which is used to make cars and in building supplies, among other things. Magnesium is also used in iron and steel producing.

A magnesium shortage could have widespread impacts across autos, aerospace, iron or steel, chemicals, beer and soft drinks, and consumer goods. “Magnesium’s light weight and strengthening properties make it essential for aluminium alloys (eg sheet used in autos, beverage cans),” they wrote. “It is also used for die-casting auto parts, as a desulphurising agent in steel, to make ductile iron, in chemicals and more.”

guess they’ll need to rely on some other export to bring that money in hmm funnily enough

CHINA, The World’s Biggest Capitalist

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-10/how-did-china-singles-day-become-the-biggest-shopping-event/100605768

Knew It, Comrade Keating Has Been In CHINA’S Palm The Whole Time

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-10/paul-keating-plays-down-china-invasion-taiwan/100610102

SCIENCE said:

Knew It, Comrade Keating Has Been In CHINA’S Palm The Whole Time

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-10/paul-keating-plays-down-china-invasion-taiwan/100610102

He’s less a China lover and more an American hater.

Damn These Capitalist Companies From CHINA And Their … wait

https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/former-tiktok-moderator-asked-to-leave-up-disturbing-violence/13613958

don’t worry seems like this information technology abuse and cyberespionage and treatment of a disenfranchised Muslim population is coming from Israel, it’s probably a good thing then

Witty Rejoinder said:

SCIENCE said:

Knew It, Comrade Keating Has Been In CHINA’S Palm The Whole Time

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-10/paul-keating-plays-down-china-invasion-taiwan/100610102

He’s less a China lover and more an American hater.

Keating is a paid advisor on the board of the China Development Bank.

Bubblecar said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

SCIENCE said:

Knew It, Comrade Keating Has Been In CHINA’S Palm The Whole Time

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-10/paul-keating-plays-down-china-invasion-taiwan/100610102

He’s less a China lover and more an American hater.

Keating is a paid advisor on the board of the China Development Bank.

Sure I was being facetious but I reckon he’s got a chip on his shoulder about America and likes to see it challenged.

Witty Rejoinder said:

Bubblecar said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

He’s less a China lover and more an American hater.

Keating is a paid advisor on the board of the China Development Bank.

Sure I was being facetious but I reckon he’s got a chip on his shoulder about America and likes to see it challenged.

Has a longer memory than most, probably still resents various US govts and the CIA doing all they could to undermine the ALP in the 60s and 70s.

captain_spalding said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Bubblecar said:

Keating is a paid advisor on the board of the China Development Bank.

Sure I was being facetious but I reckon he’s got a chip on his shoulder about America and likes to see it challenged.

Has a longer memory than most, probably still resents various US govts and the CIA doing all they could to undermine the ALP in the 60s and 70s.

The DLP weren’t a CIA plot.

Witty Rejoinder said:

Bubblecar said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

He’s less a China lover and more an American hater.

Keating is a paid advisor on the board of the China Development Bank.

Sure I was being facetious but I reckon he’s got a chip on his shoulder about America and likes to see it challenged.

As he’s effectively an employee of the Chinese government, I don’t pay much heed to his opinions on Chinese matters.

Witty Rejoinder said:

captain_spalding said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Sure I was being facetious but I reckon he’s got a chip on his shoulder about America and likes to see it challenged.

Has a longer memory than most, probably still resents various US govts and the CIA doing all they could to undermine the ALP in the 60s and 70s.

The DLP weren’t a CIA plot.

No, they were the Vatican. B.A. Santamaria and his Wild and Wacky Point of View.

Bubblecar said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Bubblecar said:

Keating is a paid advisor on the board of the China Development Bank.

Sure I was being facetious but I reckon he’s got a chip on his shoulder about America and likes to see it challenged.

As he’s effectively an employee of the Chinese government, I don’t pay much heed to his opinions on Chinese matters.

Didn’t know that.

ABC should probably give it a mention when they give him some free air time.

In Latest Round Of World Domination Stakes CHINA Social Media Company Infects Brains Of Australian Teenagers

We Knew It¡ Soon You’ll All Wish You Blocked ‘Tic’Tok Along With The 5G Huawei Mind Control

https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/why-are-teen-girls-in-australia-developing-tics/13618744

SCIENCE said:

In Latest Round Of World Domination Stakes CHINA Social Media Company Infects Brains Of Australian Teenagers

We Knew It¡ Soon You’ll All Wish You Blocked ‘Tic’Tok Along With The 5G Huawei Mind Control

https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/why-are-teen-girls-in-australia-developing-tics/13618744

imagine some of the force of culture self-amplified its influence by target absorption of a learning theory (loosely a theory of learning, but consider theory of mind, and motivational theory, or lack of) that elevated imitation, associative learning and other wonderful views, nice bridging for marginals, used to wash out that native

transition said:

SCIENCE said:

In Latest Round Of World Domination Stakes CHINA Social Media Company Infects Brains Of Australian Teenagers

We Knew It¡ Soon You’ll All Wish You Blocked ‘Tic’Tok Along With The 5G Huawei Mind Control

https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/why-are-teen-girls-in-australia-developing-tics/13618744

imagine some of the force of culture self-amplified its influence by target absorption of a learning theory (loosely a theory of learning, but consider theory of mind, and motivational theory, or lack of) that elevated imitation, associative learning and other wonderful views, nice bridging for marginals, used to wash out that native

do you consider the internet and associated phenomena (social media) to be generating swathes of monocultural human activity and furthermore do you have a value judgement made on such an outcome

SCIENCE said:

transition said:

SCIENCE said:

In Latest Round Of World Domination Stakes CHINA Social Media Company Infects Brains Of Australian Teenagers

We Knew It¡ Soon You’ll All Wish You Blocked ‘Tic’Tok Along With The 5G Huawei Mind Control

https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/why-are-teen-girls-in-australia-developing-tics/13618744

imagine some of the force of culture self-amplified its influence by target absorption of a learning theory (loosely a theory of learning, but consider theory of mind, and motivational theory, or lack of) that elevated imitation, associative learning and other wonderful views, nice bridging for marginals, used to wash out that native

do you consider the internet and associated phenomena (social media) to be generating swathes of monocultural human activity and furthermore do you have a value judgement made on such an outcome

I know there are more natural environments, likely to give perhaps a more ‘balanced’ experience of the biology of the world, the organic world, and the physics of the world

though i’d need explain what balanced might mean there, which would be more like philosophy

the forces of culture tend to incline what humans do as more natural, amplified by there being more humans, there’s less escaping that each day

are human more captive each day (generalizing, risky perhaps) of human ways, human views, as their good work proliferates, including numbers of own kind?

absolutely

is it all good, I doubt it

transition said:

SCIENCE said:

transition said:

imagine some of the force of culture self-amplified its influence by target absorption of a learning theory (loosely a theory of learning, but consider theory of mind, and motivational theory, or lack of) that elevated imitation, associative learning and other wonderful views, nice bridging for marginals, used to wash out that native

do you consider the internet and associated phenomena (social media) to be generating swathes of monocultural human activity and furthermore do you have a value judgement made on such an outcome

I know there are more natural environments, likely to give perhaps a more ‘balanced’ experience of the biology of the world, the organic world, and the physics of the world

though i’d need explain what balanced might mean there, which would be more like philosophy

the forces of culture tend to incline what humans do as more natural, amplified by there being more humans, there’s less escaping that each day

are human more captive each day (generalizing, risky perhaps) of human ways, human views, as their good work proliferates, including numbers of own kind?

absolutely

is it all good, I doubt it

I’m afraid that pholosophy has nil effect.
Nothing to do with it at all.

roughbarked said:

transition said:

SCIENCE said:

do you consider the internet and associated phenomena (social media) to be generating swathes of monocultural human activity and furthermore do you have a value judgement made on such an outcome

I know there are more natural environments, likely to give perhaps a more ‘balanced’ experience of the biology of the world, the organic world, and the physics of the world

though i’d need explain what balanced might mean there, which would be more like philosophy

the forces of culture tend to incline what humans do as more natural, amplified by there being more humans, there’s less escaping that each day

are human more captive each day (generalizing, risky perhaps) of human ways, human views, as their good work proliferates, including numbers of own kind?

absolutely

is it all good, I doubt it

I’m afraid that pholosophy has nil effect.
Nothing to do with it at all.

I think it a good philosophical question, what is a natural environment, for or of humans, an important proposition, if that’s what you were responding to

but whatever, probably wandering way away from what the thread is about, off topic

transition said:

roughbarked said:

transition said:

I know there are more natural environments, likely to give perhaps a more ‘balanced’ experience of the biology of the world, the organic world, and the physics of the world

though i’d need explain what balanced might mean there, which would be more like philosophy

the forces of culture tend to incline what humans do as more natural, amplified by there being more humans, there’s less escaping that each day

are human more captive each day (generalizing, risky perhaps) of human ways, human views, as their good work proliferates, including numbers of own kind?

absolutely

is it all good, I doubt it

I’m afraid that pholosophy has nil effect.
Nothing to do with it at all.

I think it a good philosophical question, what is a natural environment, for or of humans, an important proposition, if that’s what you were responding to

but whatever, probably wandering way away from what the thread is about, off topic

The equilibrium never required our philosophical perspective. It was getting along fine before we came along.

roughbarked said:

transition said:

roughbarked said:

I’m afraid that pholosophy has nil effect.
Nothing to do with it at all.

I think it a good philosophical question, what is a natural environment, for or of humans, an important proposition, if that’s what you were responding to

but whatever, probably wandering way away from what the thread is about, off topic

The equilibrium never required our philosophical perspective. It was getting along fine before we came along.

what might have been the first proto-philosophy do you think, of our ancestors back half a million years or more, whatever, way back before the bipedal thing even

perhaps it all started with nurturing

transition said:

roughbarked said:

transition said:

I think it a good philosophical question, what is a natural environment, for or of humans, an important proposition, if that’s what you were responding to

but whatever, probably wandering way away from what the thread is about, off topic

The equilibrium never required our philosophical perspective. It was getting along fine before we came along.

what might have been the first proto-philosophy do you think, of our ancestors back half a million years or more, whatever, way back before the bipedal thing even

perhaps it all started with nurturing

I wasn’t here back then. However, it was probably Mochus whose influenced both Indian and Greek cultures, I can’t read this because firefox tells me:
http://www.commonsensescience.net/pdf/articles/mochus_the_proto-philosopher_fos_v18n3.pdf

Ask yourself, does a baby bird ask why it is being fed? Even after it can fly a little and feed itself a little, does it ask why it needs more food than it can find itself? Does it ask its parents why they stuff food in until It can’t open its beak to let more in for a bit?

roughbarked said:

transition said:

roughbarked said:

The equilibrium never required our philosophical perspective. It was getting along fine before we came along.

what might have been the first proto-philosophy do you think, of our ancestors back half a million years or more, whatever, way back before the bipedal thing even

perhaps it all started with nurturing

I wasn’t here back then. However, it was probably Mochus whose influenced both Indian and Greek cultures, I can’t read this because firefox tells me:
http://www.commonsensescience.net/pdf/articles/mochus_the_proto-philosopher_fos_v18n3.pdf

Ask yourself, does a baby bird ask why it is being fed? Even after it can fly a little and feed itself a little, does it ask why it needs more food than it can find itself? Does it ask its parents why they stuff food in until It can’t open its beak to let more in for a bit?

do birds explore, does a chick in the nest explore the nest, and nearest surrounds

does or has the parent explored its territory

is philosophy exploration

How Dare CHINA Censor Social Media Abuse

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-07/beverly-zhu-yi-china-figure-skater-beijing-winter-olympics/100809564

When These Olympians And International Committees Lie Through Their Masks

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-07/peng-shuai-winter-olympics-denies-accusation-sexual-assault/100810310

Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai has told a French newspaper that international concern over her wellbeing is based on “an enormous misunderstanding”, as the International Olympic Committee confirmed a face-to-face meeting and said she would be attending several Winter Olympics events in Beijing.

SCIENCE said:

How Dare CHINA Censor Social Media Abuse

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-07/beverly-zhu-yi-china-figure-skater-beijing-winter-olympics/100809564

When These Olympians And International Committees Lie Through Their Masks

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-07/peng-shuai-winter-olympics-denies-accusation-sexual-assault/100810310

Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai has told a French newspaper that international concern over her wellbeing is based on “an enormous misunderstanding”, as the International Olympic Committee confirmed a face-to-face meeting and said she would be attending several Winter Olympics events in Beijing.

How Dare People Migrate To CHINA And How Dare Countries Exercise Discretion Over Their Borders ¡

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-13/china-recruits-foreign-born-athletes-to-boost-gold-medal-tally/100818506

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/11/china/hong-kong-cardinal-zen-arrested-intl-hnk/index.html
Hong Kong (CNN)Hong Kong’s national security police on Wednesday arrested Cardinal Joseph Zen, a 90-year-old former bishop and outspoken critic of China’s Communist Party, drawing concern from the Vatican and condemnation from the United States.
Zen is among four high-profile pro-democracy activists arrested by police — the other three are Cantopop star Denise Ho, former lawmaker and prominent barrister Margaret ​Ng and academic Hui Po-keung, according to the US State Department.

No Media Stirring Here

Chinese Defence Minister says nuclear arsenal ‘for self-defence’, in warning to Taiwan

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-12/china-nuclear-weapons-taiwan-relationship-defence-chief-us/101146278

We’re Warning You, We’re Only Ever Going To Defend

Analysis: Xi shushes party elders as he marches toward 3rd term
New expression ‘Eternal leader’ emerges ahead of Beidaihe summer conclave

KATSUJI NAKAZAWA, Nikkei senior staff writer
JUNE 9, 2022 04:00 JST

Katsuji Nakazawa is a Tokyo-based senior staff writer and editorial writer at Nikkei. He spent seven years in China as a correspondent and later as China bureau chief. He was the 2014 recipient of the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist prize.

A political document released in a rural part of China has raised eyebrows for including an unprecedented expression to praise President Xi Jinping.

It was a combination of the word “eternal” and “lingxiu” (leader).

A communique issued after a Communist Party meeting in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region noted that it is necessary to be loyal to the core leader, “support the leader forever, defend the leader and follow the leader.”

“Forever” has connotations of a lifetime leadership. “Linxiu” was a title used only by Mao Zedong.

The April 17 document was not issued in Beijing, the capital and political center, but in Guangxi, a southern region bordering Vietnam.

In praising Xi, who is also the party’s general secretary, the communique uses language that defies conventional party wisdom, not to mention the party constitution banning personality cults.

There was a clear reason for all the adoration. The party’s Guangxi regional congress on April 22 unanimously elected Xi as a delegate to the all-important, quinquennial party national congress, to be held this autumn.

There are no rules regarding which region the top party leader represents at the national congress. At the last national congress held five years ago, Xi was a delegate from the landlocked and poor Guizhou Province in the southwest.

Back then, Chen Min’er, widely known as a close aide to Xi, was serving as the province’s top official. Chen later moved to Chongqing to take over from the disgraced Sun Zhengcai as the municipality’s top official and was promoted to the party’s 25-member Politburo.

Guangxi, which is now at the vanguard of efforts to pave the way for Xi to become an eternal leader, also broadcast a documentary TV series praising the leader.

At the party’s upcoming national congress in Beijing, Xi will attend the Guangxi regional session alongside delegates from the region. Guangxi, therefore, has become closely intertwined with Xi’s political fortunes.

The title of lingxiu, leader, had been all but monopolized by founding father Mao. In Mao’s case, it was more commonly used as the “great leader.”

The use of phrases such as “eternal leader” and “people’s leader,” suggest that Xi is aiming to acquire the status of “party chairman,” which Mao retained for life.

In another development, a chorus of praise for Xi was heard in Heilongjiang, a northeastern province bordering Russia.

On May 2, at its regional congress, the party adopted a resolution that also smacks of a personality cult. It pledges to turn loyalty to the lingxiu into living practice for prosperity and development.

Liu Ning, the top official of Guangxi, and Xu Qin, who holds the same position in Heilongjiang, are relatively young, at least in terms of Chinese politics. Born in the 1960s, they have science and engineering backgrounds.

Analysts have noted that since the Xi Jinping era began, many officials with engineering background have been appointed to key positions. They are more politically obedient, the conventional wisdom goes.

But have such communiques strengthened Xi’s position? It may not be so easy.

There apparently has been push back from various wings of the party — old cadres, those who do not belong to Xi’s faction and liberal intellectuals.

In one case, the propaganda division of the party in Nanning, the capital of Guangxi, published a red booklet to help people study Xi’s eponymous ideology, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

But the booklet evoked memories of “Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong,” also known as the “Little Red Book,” the reading of which was advocated by radical Red Guard student supporters of Mao during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).

The series of Xi-praising activities in Guangxi had the blessing of Xi aide, Huang Kunming, head of the party’s Publicity Department. But he may have tried too hard to score points.

Photos of the red booklet are currently unavailable on Chinese search engines; they have been completely deleted.

It is believed that the top official in charge of ideology and propaganda, Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Huning had a hand in reining in the excessive moves, in full communication with Xi.

This is not the first time that the drive to upgrade Xi’s status has seesawed.

Five years ago, at the national congress of 2017, Cai Qi, a close aide to Xi and Beijing’s top official, praised his boss a “wise leader.”

Although there were not many party members who noticed back then, Cai’s remarks were part of preparations for the revision of the national constitution in March 2018. The eventual revision scrapped the limit of two five-year terms for Chinese presidents, thus paving the way for Xi to be leader for life.

Following the term-limit scrapping, a brief campaign to refer to Xi as the “people’s leader” emerged in the summer of 2018.

But it quickly fell out of use. Lying behind the turn of events were widespread concerns among party elders and non-mainstream factions about a personality cult; such cults are clearly banned by the party’s constitution.

The same cycle is repeating itself, but this time Xi’s aides have grown alarmed that the effort to upgrade and establish Xi’s status is not necessarily progressing smoothly. They have now taken an unusual step.

The General Office of the Chinese Communist Party, the secretariat that supports Xi’s duties, issued an aggressive notice telling retired party elders to, in effect, watch what they say in the lead up to the national congress. It was on May 15 that state-run media revealed the notice as “a recent event.”

It was an attempt to silence the elders — former members of the Politburo Standing Committee and other retired cadres. An official from the party’s Organization Department gave a detailed explanation about the directive.

“They must not argue about major political policies of the Party Central Committee without good reason … must not spread politically negative opinions must not participate in illegal social organization activities.”

Those who violate discipline “will be severely punished.”

The notice, which made the front page of the People’s Daily, the party’s mouthpiece, is a warning from the Xi administration that opinions will be monitored and controlled — even those of party elders.

One interpretation is that Xi had no choice but to take the step, even at the risk of giving the public a glimpse into the vicious tug-of-war going on in the party, in the hope of tipping the balance in his favor.

Around the time the notice was issued, Xinhua News Agency and other state-run media outlets relaunched a campaign linking Xi’s name with the title of “people’s leader.”

The rapid succession of political developments shows that an annual summer ritual is drawing near: the closed-door “Beidaihe meeting,” when current party leaders listen to retired elders at a seaside resort.

It is not known how this year’s gathering will take place, with COVID-19 still prevalent.

The party’s General Office, which issued the notice for retired generations to shush, is headed by Ding Xuexiang, a reportedly competent official Xi ran into during his time in Shanghai.

Ding is supposed to play a key role in Xi’s labored dialogue with party elders, who have strong opinions. If he is successful in this role, he could put himself in line for a promotion, perhaps to the Politburo Standing Committee.

Xi is still aiming for a title that bestows greatness, and many close aides are competing to help him succeed in his quest. They are engaged in a fierce power struggle for survival. Naturally, they will be divided into winners and losers.

Who prevails will be decided in the coming weeks.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Xi-shushes-party-elders-as-he-marches-toward-3rd-term?

crazy i’n‘it, if Marketing had led Corruption into a third term he’d‘ve been hailed as a fucking god

SCIENCE said:

crazy i’n‘it, if Marketing had led Corruption into a third term he’d‘ve been hailed as a fucking god

We must be grateful for what mercies come our way.

Can you imagine just how venal, piratical, pandering, partisan and supercilious a L/NP government would have been had they won, knowing full well that this was it, kids, even if Jesus Christ himself comes down and hands out HTV guides at every polling booth, we CANNOT win a fourth election in a row?

remember when all the cool dudes were expected to laugh at West Taiwan falling behind in population growth and fertility rates but oh wait now Mainland Taiwan is having some doubts it’s all concern and problem in need of an urgent fix

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-13/taiwan-races-to-fix-low-birthrate-before-possible-china-war/101137970

it begins

https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/xi-expands-china-s-military-powers-to-defend-interests-abroad-20220614-p5atmc.html

Chinese President Xi Jinping has authorised an expansion of his country’s military capabilities, giving the defence forces the power to protect its interests abroad.

SCIENCE said:

it begins

https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/xi-expands-china-s-military-powers-to-defend-interests-abroad-20220614-p5atmc.html

Chinese President Xi Jinping has authorised an expansion of his country’s military capabilities, giving the defence forces the power to protect its interests abroad.

Any such move will do more self-harm than good. The more belligerent China gets the less foreign investment and trade they will get. The democratic world is already decoupling from China because of the sovereign risk. More belligerence increases the sovereign risk and drives away more business. Without foreign trade the Chinese economy shrinks. They don’t have the domestic market to maintain the economy on their own.

party_pants said:

SCIENCE said:

it begins

https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/xi-expands-china-s-military-powers-to-defend-interests-abroad-20220614-p5atmc.html

Chinese President Xi Jinping has authorised an expansion of his country’s military capabilities, giving the defence forces the power to protect its interests abroad.

Any such move will do more self-harm than good. The more belligerent China gets the less foreign investment and trade they will get. The democratic world is already decoupling from China because of the sovereign risk. More belligerence increases the sovereign risk and drives away more business. Without foreign trade the Chinese economy shrinks. They don’t have the domestic market to maintain the economy on their own.

but the article specifically focuses on unbelligerent language

power to protect

operations other than war

peacetime activities to protect

troops without fighting is the supreme state

cooperation

cooperative relationships

counterterrorism, protecting

disaster relief, security alerts, international peacekeeping and rescues

interestingly they also note that

The United States has had a similar program since 1993

so maybe that’s behind the decline of that decadence

SCIENCE said:

party_pants said:

SCIENCE said:

it begins

https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/xi-expands-china-s-military-powers-to-defend-interests-abroad-20220614-p5atmc.html

Chinese President Xi Jinping has authorised an expansion of his country’s military capabilities, giving the defence forces the power to protect its interests abroad.

Any such move will do more self-harm than good. The more belligerent China gets the less foreign investment and trade they will get. The democratic world is already decoupling from China because of the sovereign risk. More belligerence increases the sovereign risk and drives away more business. Without foreign trade the Chinese economy shrinks. They don’t have the domestic market to maintain the economy on their own.

but the article specifically focuses on unbelligerent language

power to protect

operations other than war

peacetime activities to protect

troops without fighting is the supreme state

cooperation

cooperative relationships

counterterrorism, protecting

disaster relief, security alerts, international peacekeeping and rescues

interestingly they also note that

The United States has had a similar program since 1993

so maybe that’s behind the decline of that decadence

It is just words from China.

The last two lines make no sense – the US is not in decline. For the last 20 years they have been offshoring their supply chains to China. They can (and are) withdraw them at any time and reshore or friendshore them. Much of China’s rise has only been with the acquiescence of the US. The mirage of US decline is only because they were offshoring so much to lower wage countries rather than homebasing. The US are still the one and only superpower in the world right now – both military and economic.

(Reshoring and friendshoring are the new economic buzz-words of the year)

party_pants said:

SCIENCE said:

party_pants said:

Any such move will do more self-harm than good. The more belligerent China gets the less foreign investment and trade they will get. The democratic world is already decoupling from China because of the sovereign risk. More belligerence increases the sovereign risk and drives away more business. Without foreign trade the Chinese economy shrinks. They don’t have the domestic market to maintain the economy on their own.

but the article specifically focuses on unbelligerent language

power to protect

operations other than war

peacetime activities to protect

troops without fighting is the supreme state

cooperation

cooperative relationships

counterterrorism, protecting

disaster relief, security alerts, international peacekeeping and rescues

interestingly they also note that

The United States has had a similar program since 1993

so maybe that’s behind the decline of that decadence

It is just words from China.

The last two lines make no sense – the US is not in decline. For the last 20 years they have been offshoring their supply chains to China. They can (and are) withdraw them at any time and reshore or friendshore them. Much of China’s rise has only been with the acquiescence of the US. The mirage of US decline is only because they were offshoring so much to lower wage countries rather than homebasing. The US are still the one and only superpower in the world right now – both military and economic.

(Reshoring and friendshoring are the new economic buzz-words of the year)

Concerning. Very concerning.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-14/xi-jinping-expands-china-military-influence-abroad/101152154

> The more belligerent China gets …

The words “belligerent” and “China” should never be used in the same sentence.

mollwollfumble said:

> The more belligerent China gets …

The words “belligerent” and “China” should never be used in the same sentence.

Totally Not Image Edited

SCIENCE said:

mollwollfumble said:

> The more belligerent China gets …

The words “belligerent” and “China” should never be used in the same sentence.

Totally Not Image Edited

And Australia (an island, dependent on ocean trade) does not need any naval air power, whereas China (which has a coastline half the length of Australia’s and whose borders are 75% on land) needs three aircraft carriers.

SCIENCE said:

mollwollfumble said:

> The more belligerent China gets …

The words “belligerent” and “China” should never be used in the same sentence.

Totally Not Image Edited

It’s nice that it has a smiley face.

Witty Rejoinder said:

SCIENCE said:

mollwollfumble said:

> The more belligerent China gets …

The words “belligerent” and “China” should never be used in the same sentence.

Totally Not Image Edited

It’s nice that it has a smiley face.

and 3 eyes, it’s the surveillance state, 3 eyes

captain_spalding said:

China (which has a coastline half the length of Australia’s

dv disagrees

SCIENCE said:

captain_spalding said:

China (which has a coastline half the length of Australia’s

dv disagrees

China’s coastline covers approximately 14,500 km from the Bohai gulf in the north to the Gulf of Tonkin in the south.

ccording to The World Factbook, Australia has the sixth longest coastline in the world, at 25,780 kilometres (16,020 mi).

roughbarked said:

SCIENCE said:

captain_spalding said:

China (which has a coastline half the length of Australia’s

dv disagrees

China’s coastline covers approximately 14,500 km from the Bohai gulf in the north to the Gulf of Tonkin in the south.

ccording to The World Factbook, Australia has the sixth longest coastline in the world, at 25,780 kilometres (16,020 mi).

Canada is #1

captain_spalding said:

SCIENCE said:

mollwollfumble said:

> The more belligerent China gets …

The words “belligerent” and “China” should never be used in the same sentence.

Totally Not Image Edited

And Australia (an island, dependent on ocean trade) does not need any naval air power, whereas China (which has a coastline half the length of Australia’s and whose borders are 75% on land) needs three aircraft carriers.

Idk man the marine territory they claim is extensive…

China mortgage strikes threaten property sector’s house of cards
As unfinished homes disrupt lives, pressure grows on developers and Beijing alike

CISSY ZHOU, Nikkei staff writer
AUGUST 2, 2022 06:00 JST

HONG KONG — Chen Peng put his entire life savings, and that of his parents, into a 300,000 yuan ($44,000) down payment for a condominium that should have been finished in 2018. Four years later, the 36-year-old musician is still waiting for the keys.

His complex is one of tens of thousands of residential projects lagging behind schedule across China. And as the songwriter and guitar player is unable to earn much — the government’s zero-COVID policy all but prohibits musical performances — he relies on credit cards to cover bills, sinking deeper and deeper into debt.

“I always think I am already at the bottom of society and there is no way that I could be pushed down further. Now I know that even if you are at the bottom of the valley, they can still trample you into the mud,” Chen told Nikkei Asia.

He has had enough. He has decided that his July mortgage payment of 2,000 yuan will be his last, at least for the time being, as he joins hundreds of thousands of homebuyers nationwide who have threatened to or have gone on “mortgage strikes” over roughly the past month. The buyers’ message is simple: Until their units are completed, they will not pay their loans.

So far, at least 320 projects in 99 Chinese cities have been affected by the strikes, according to open source data. Such complexes are huge — typically they have at least 1,000 units, while larger ones may have 5,000 to 6,000. Most of the affected properties are in the center and west of the country, with 20% in Henan Province, where Chen bought his place.

Half-finished construction projects, colloquially known as “rotten-tail buildings,” are nothing new. But a crisis is coming to a head due to unsustainable debt loads among developers, falling sales, and the illegal but widespread practice of siphoning proceeds from some projects to pay for others.

The problems are disrupting lives. If they escalate they could send shock waves through a Chinese economy struggling to maintain growth momentum. A broader mortgage boycott could also trigger social unrest — the last thing President Xi Jinping wants a few months before he is widely expected to seek a third term.

China’s property defaults started to surge last summer as the sector struggled with Beijing’s efforts to rein in excess leverage. The government had outlined “three red lines” in 2020 to cap debt-to-cash, debt-to-assets and debt-to-equity ratios for property developers, and imposed limits on bank lending to the industry last year. From July 21, 2021, to July 22, 2022, 34 Chinese real estate issuers defaulted on $83.65 billion worth of U.S. dollar bonds, according to a BofA Global Research assessment.

Now declining sales are adding to the pressure.

The top 100 Chinese developers saw their sales halved in the first six months of this year. Overall, nationwide residential sales dropped 31.8% on the year in the January-June period, by nearly $2 trillion, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. This has severely constrained developers’ ability to cover construction costs.

The mortgage strikes are calling into question the very model on which the Chinese real estate market is based.

Nearly 90% of new homes are presold. While this model is not unique to China, buyers in the country typically must pay 100% upfront. As a result, more than half of Chinese developers’ financing needs were generated from presales in the past decade, while construction loans from banks accounted for less than 15% of their funding.

Under Chinese regulations, a portion of presale proceeds must be placed into an escrow account and supervised by a bank. The bank then transfers money to the developer according to the progress of the project in question. In reality, however, the money has often been used to pay for other projects or to purchase additional land-use rights from local governments. These and other questionable practices, including diverted loans at embattled industry giant Evergrande that prompted top executives to resign last month, have created what increasingly looks like a house of cards.

Nomura, the Japanese brokerage, estimates that China’s developers have only delivered around 60% of homes they presold between 2013 and 2020, while in those years the value of China’s outstanding mortgages rose by 26.3 trillion yuan.

Nomura says the ratio of paused projects to total projects last year and this might be around 20.3%.

The evident risks are cranking up the pressure on Beijing to act, with multiple regulatory bodies calling for efforts to stabilize the property market and ensure delivery of presold homes.

S&P Global Ratings estimates that the mortgage strike could put almost 1 trillion yuan in bank lending at risk.

If the crisis snowballs further, construction companies are likely to face more delayed payments from cash-strapped developers, and the ripples could affect the economy in some not-so-obvious ways. Analysts from ABC International, the investment banking arm of Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), said in a recent report that stalled purchases of new home appliances could hit consumption figures, for example.

“We expect the regulators to ramp up a crackdown on developers’ embezzlement of the presale funds, or further increase the proportion of presale funds to ensure there are sufficient funds to complete the project,” the ABC International analysts said, referring to the habit of inappropriately using escrow funds for projects besides the ones intended. “We also expect banks to grant more mortgage loans and lower the mortgage interest rates, and local governments will continue to loosen real estate market restrictions.”

The analysts added that the authorities would likely “encourage state-owned enterprises to purchase some of the good projects from the private sector.” With their ample cash flow, the thinking goes, the SOEs would be able to get construction moving again.

Some reports say Chinese regulators are thinking about instituting a grace period for homebuyers to repay mortgages, while the authorities may create a bailout fund to help developers kick-start delayed projects.

Unfinished buildings in Luoyang, in Henan Province, are seen in late 2021. The province is a hot spot for mortgage strikes. © Reuters
Yet, the potential solutions come with their own risks.

Lu Ting, Nomura’s chief China economist, warned that if these policies are not designed and executed well, they could lead to “serious moral hazard problems” by giving developers incentives to slow or even stop construction.

A larger question is what the future holds for Chinese real estate, and whether the market’s glory days — considered to be from 2003 to 2016 — are over.

S&P Global Ratings expects property sales to fall 28% to 33% this year, double the agency’s previous prediction, as people lose faith that developers will ever complete presold units.

“This could further squeeze the liquidity of distressed developers, leading to more defaults,” the agency said in a recent report.

During the first half of the year, China has cut down payment ratios and mortgage rates to boost the housing market.

In an attempt to spur a housing recovery, some local governments earlier this year cut the down payment ratio — the amount buyers have to pay on their own without bank loans — to 20% from 30%. Mortgage rates were also reduced.

Nevertheless, Nomura says the sector is unlikely to strongly recover in the next half-year due to a combination of factors: highly infectious new variants of COVID-19, the reduced confidence of Chinese households, front-loaded demand for new homes in lower-tier cities seen in 2015 to 2018 and Beijing’s reluctance to loosen the reins on the property sector too much.

Shuang Ding, greater China chief economist at Standard Chartered Bank, says the key issue is whether homebuyers’ confidence in private property developers can be restored. If not, even those who want to buy and have the means to might hesitate.

“China’s per capita floor space has long exceeded 40 sq. meters,” Ding said — a high figure compared with, say, Hong Kong, where the median is just 16. sq. meters. “And with the aging population and the dropping birthrate and marriage rate, the country’s urbanization growth has also slowed down, suggesting China’s property development has peaked.”

Daisy Li, a China equity fund manager at EFG Asset Management, agreed that the sector’s headiest days may be behind it. “Before, real estate served as the country’s primary investment market,” she said, “but as people’s confidence wanes, a lot of funds are shifting to other sectors such as automobiles.”

In Henan, Chen sees little chance that construction on his building will resume anytime soon. With no savings left, he has given up hope of ever being able to purchase a home of his own.

“What got rotten is not the home that I put all my family’s savings into,” he said, “but my life.”

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/China-mortgage-strikes-threaten-property-sector-s-house-of-cards?

Some provocations, however, are necessary.

China shores up smaller banks with fresh $47bn injection
Funds from infrastructure bonds tapped to shield lenders from economic slowdown

The Chinese government is making a second round of capital infusions for smaller banks affected by the pandemic. © Reuters
IORI KAWATE, Nikkei staff writer
August 4, 2022 01:20 JST

BEIJING — The Chinese government is injecting 320 billion yuan ($47 billion) in public funds into small and midsized banks in a bid to help regional lenders reeling from the economic slowdown.

The capital injections are financed by funds raised with infrastructure bonds. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, along with the Ministry of Finance, plan to grant 320 billion yuan in bond issue allotments to specific regions through the end of August.

As of June, 103 billion yuan in bond allotments had already been granted to Liaoning, Gansu and Henan provinces, as well as to the city of Dalian.

Smaller banks operating in the applicable regions will received the funds in the form of capital injections. This spring, Liaoning poured 13.5 billion yuan into five banks, including Bank of Dandong and Bank of Yingkou.

In July 2020, the State Council, China’s cabinet, allowed local governments to inject funds into small and midsized banks using “special bonds” issued to capitalize infrastructure projects.

This came after a host micro to midsize businesses went bust in the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic. Around 2.3 million businesses across China failed during the first half of 2020, accounting for 6% of all businesses at the time, according to the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics think tank.

Nonperforming loans ballooned at banks too. At the end of June 2020, the amount of bad debt was 13% higher than at the end of 2019.

During the first round of coronavirus relief, the government injected a total of 210 billion yuan into roughly 300 banks through the end of 2021. This allowed smaller banks to recover financially to a certain extent.

At the end of 2021, the capital adequacy ratio at so-called urban commercial banks that operate at the regional level came to 13.1%. The adequacy ratio at rural commercial banks, which serve villages and towns, was 12.6%. The readings were up 0.1 and 0.2 percentage point from the end of 2020.

But during the same period, large banks that operate at the national level improved their average adequacy ratios by 0.8 point to 17.3%. Because small and midsized banks are less financially fit, they have limited channels to raise funds outside of injections of public capital.

This spring brought the wave of omicron infections and lockdowns that caused the economy to slow. Small businesses, the main clients of minor banks, suffered. The real estate industry, which serves as the backbone of regional economies, has struggled under tougher financial regulations.

In the face of a funding shortage, real estate developers are increasingly halting or delaying construction work. In July, buyers of still-uncompleted property called a mortgage strike in protest. Such a movement has provoked concern, since home loans account for around 20% of all bank loans.

Starting this spring, small banks in Henan Province and elsewhere have frozen withdrawals from accounts. With smaller banks facing a deteriorating business environment, the central government has grown wary of potential social unrest.

The Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission has urged banks to write off nonperforming debt. During the first half of the year, the amount of bad-loan disposals rose 18% from a year earlier.

At small and midsized banks, such write-offs jumped 37% on the year for January to May. The new injection of public funds is expected to be put to use to expedite bad-debt disposals.

In May, the State Council rolled out a stimulus package designed to restore the economy battered by the zero-COVID policy. Under these measures, banks are encouraged to defer debt payments from small businesses and sole proprietorships. The beneficiaries also include home loans taken out by individuals whose incomes shrank during the pandemic.

The payment deferments will last until the end of the year. Without further extensions, the latent nonperforming-debt problem could erupt from beneath the surface.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Finance/China-shores-up-smaller-banks-with-fresh-47bn-injection?

Witty Rejoinder said:

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Finance/China-shores-up-smaller-banks-with-fresh-47bn-injection?

That this is happening at a time when allegations of widespread corruption and embezzlement in operation of small and mid-sized banks in China is mere coincidence.

captain_spalding said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Finance/China-shores-up-smaller-banks-with-fresh-47bn-injection??

That this is happening at a time when allegations of widespread corruption and embezzlement in operation of small and mid-sized banks in China is mere coincidence.

Fuck Corruption

thankfully in our and allied modern theo… deio… ah we mean democracies we have this thing called separation of church and state, nothing like those communists

The Chinese government has made it clear that it wants final approval of all reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhism, including the Dalai Lama, and insisted they will be found within China’s borders.

oh wait ah fuck never mind

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-07/dalai-lama-succession-plan-china-interference-in-tibet/101247862

reincarnation must comply with Chinese laws and regulations

SCIENCE said:

thankfully in our and allied modern theo… deio… ah we mean democracies we have this thing called separation of church and state, nothing like those communists

The Chinese government has made it clear that it wants final approval of all reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhism, including the Dalai Lama, and insisted they will be found within China’s borders.

oh wait ah fuck never mind

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-07/dalai-lama-succession-plan-china-interference-in-tibet/101247862

>Amid global concerns…”

probably still be correct with a slight alteration…

make that ‘..amid globalist’ concerns….’

wonder what australian’s spiritual core is, where it comes from, perhaps it’s the immortal ABC

SCIENCE said:

reincarnation must comply with Chinese laws and regulations

and must conform to the right aesthetic and look.

Tau.Neutrino said:

SCIENCE said:

reincarnation must comply with Chinese laws and regulations

and must conform to the right aesthetic and look.

Must look like this:

transition said:

SCIENCE said:

thankfully in our and allied modern theo… deio… ah we mean democracies we have this thing called separation of church and state, nothing like those communists

The Chinese government has made it clear that it wants final approval of all reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhism, including the Dalai Lama, and insisted they will be found within China’s borders.

oh wait ah fuck never mind

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-07/dalai-lama-succession-plan-china-interference-in-tibet/101247862

>Amid global concerns…”

probably still be correct with a slight alteration…

make that ‘..amid globalist’ concerns….’

wonder what australian’s spiritual core is, where it comes from, perhaps it’s the immortal ABC

Buddhists are all peaceloving hippies, Muslims are all violent jihadists, Jews are sneaky greedy bastards, and Christians are right, Right and naturally the leaders¡

Mutual agitation: Can US and China avoid conflict over Taiwan?

Peter Hartcher
Political and international editor

August 9, 2022 — 5.00am

Why did Nancy Pelosi go to Taiwan last week? For the same reason that Xi Jinping responded with a tantrum of historical proportions.

Politics. Not geopolitics. Domestic politics. The Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously held that war is politics by other means. So it pays to heed the politics if you wish to understand the war.

Pelosi has a long history of defending Taiwan’s democracy, but she has a short history ahead of her as Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Unless something dramatic happens, that is. She is contesting her seat at the US Congressional midterm elections in three months. For a 19th term. She shouldn’t have any trouble winning her seat. But she’s also hoping to be re-elected as the leader of the Democrats in the House of Representatives. And, if the party can hold enough seats, she could return as Speaker. For a fifth term. At 82 years of age, presumably it’d be her last.

But her national approval rating is poor; she’s more unpopular than Joe Biden or Donald Trump. And the Democrats are expected to lose their majority of the House.

How does an unpopular American politician boost their approval? “Standing up to China” is the answer. It’s about the only thing that Americans can agree on. The percentage of Americans with an unfavourable view of China is at a record high of 83 per cent, according to a Pew poll conducted in March.

So Pelosi “stood up to China”. She had nothing to lose. She’ll either lead the Democrats to an upset win in the House, or she’ll lead her party to defeat as a heroic opponent of the Chinese Communist Party.

Coincidentally, Xi Jinping faces an election himself, though it’s an election with Chinese characteristics. In October or November, the Chinese Communist Party is due to hold a once-in-five-years party congress to formally endorse its leader.

And while Xi has been described widely in the West as “leader for life”, he nonetheless needs to be re-endorsed by the party every five years.

No serious analyst is suggesting that he will be dumped. His grip on the party is iron. But even an autocrat feels political pressures and Xi has his – China’s zero tolerance policy on COVID continues to impose rolling lockdowns on China’s cities, frustrating millions. It’s also stalled economic growth, triggering a liquidity crisis in the real estate industry and leaving hundreds of thousands of incensed homebuyers without homes.

How does a stressed Chinese politician boost their approval? By “standing up to America”, especially over the hypersensitive question of Taiwan.

So Xi ordered a series of punishments for the US and for Taiwan. Beijing has shut down its communications channels with the US on vital matters including defence and climate change. It has imposed an import ban on 100 categories of Taiwanese exports. It sent scores of warships and air force planes to intimidate Taipei and fired ballistic missiles across the island.

And, by conducting live-fire military exercises in six locations around Taiwan’s coast, it put a de facto blockade on the island for three days. Party-owned media cheered on this display of China’s power.

Xi didn’t need to do any of this. He could have dismissed Pelosi as a “lame duck” Speaker, the term that the Republicans like to use against her, making a last, pathetic play for relevance. He could have treated her with a show of pity rather than one of anger. But no; China’s president turned on the outrage machine of hypernationalist indignation.

In this way, Pelosi and Xi, America and China, inflamed each other’s nationalist animosities. The two great powers fed a mutually beneficial feedback loop, each side seeking domestic points by hurting the other, with Taiwan left to bear the greatest pain.

This is exactly the trap that Xi has warned about in the past, the so-called Thucydides trap. He took the name from the Harvard sinologist Graham Allison, who a decade ago wrote:

“The defining question about global order in the decades ahead will be: can China and the US escape Thucydides’s trap?” This is when a ruling power and a rising power go to war in a struggle for primacy just like Sparta and Athens did in the fifth century BC in the Peloponnesian War, as recorded by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides.

Xi has spoken about the idea publicly and a number of times with the then Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull: “Xi often referred to the Thucydides trap,” Turnbull tells me. “When war arises not because of any particular incident but simply because the rising power creates enormous anxiety in the incumbent power.

“If the trap is sprung by rising levels of anxiety, you’d have to say that Xi’s foreign policy has been calculated to spring the trap. The belligerence, the rhetoric has all seemed to heighten anxiety.” The US and China “are certainly falling into it”.

The head of the ANU National Security College, Rory Medcalf, says, “There’s no inevitability about all-out conflict, but there’s a disconcerting willingness to play with risk. What’s changed as a result of last week is that we have a permanently heightened level of risk.

“Paradoxically, it’s revealed China’s hand – China has confirmed its willingness to move rapidly to military threats and to a blockade. China is giving us a data set to prepare against. China is clearly willing to cause immense economic damage to use an embargo.

“That should be an alarm bell to business communities all over the world, including in Europe and others deeply invested in the economic lifelines of the Indo-Pacific. A warlike crisis would kill business as usual. It has implications for shipping, supply lines, insurance. It’s a reason to start preparing economic levers so that they can be used to help deter China from this folly.”

The world needs sane statecraft, but at the moment it’s getting only politics.

https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/mutual-agitation-can-us-and-china-avoid-conflict-over-taiwan-20220808-p5b81e.html

Why China’s Confidence Could Turn Out to Be a Weakness
State propaganda about China’s rise is stoking extreme nationalism. That could blind China to its problems, and could lead to conflict — perhaps over Taiwan.

By Li Yuan
Aug. 9, 2022
Updated 4:09 p.m. ET

In his decade of ruling China, Xi Jinping has tried to imbue its people with confidence, telling them that the country is doing very well compared with the chaotic West.

He has told the younger generation that China can finally look at the world as an equal. “It’s no longer as backward,” he said last year.

“The East is rising, and the West is declining,” he declared, at a time when the United States and other Western countries seemed mired in high Covid infection rates, racial tensions and other problems.

Mr. Xi has told China’s 1.4 billion people to be proud of its culture, its governance system and its future as a great power, all of which add up to his signature political philosophy, sometimes called the “confidence doctrine.”

While much of that pride is well placed, it also breeds cockiness. It gives Mr. Xi a justification for unwinding the policies of openness that helped China emerge from international isolation and abject poverty under Mao. It has also given a boost to extreme nationalists who trumpet Chinese superiority, and who are now urging military confrontation with Taiwan after Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit.

Their strident rhetoric shows how little they think of American power and how easily they think China would win a great-power competition with the United States. It is making more moderate nationalists feel uncomfortable, raising fears that Beijing could feel compelled to act tough.

Such posturing and nationalistic sentiment heighten the risk of war, especially as China establishes a new status quo with Taiwan, announcing on Tuesday that it will continue air and sea drills around the island democracy.

And in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry, this tendency toward overconfidence could also prove to be a weakness for Beijing, blinding it to its own challenges. It could be a blessing for the United States, if it can get its act together.

The Chinese people, not the government, have every reason to feel proud and confident in their achievements over the past four decades.

They lifted themselves from poverty and created some of the most successful companies on earth. They made their country a manufacturing colossus and the biggest consumer market for cars, smartphones and many luxury brands. They built new skyscrapers, subways, highways and high-speed railways, some of the best in the world.

The United States, on the other hand, has seemed embroiled in its many domestic problems and often too paralyzed to sort through its issues.

Before the pandemic, I got used to Chinese people coming back from trips to the United States and telling me how backward, shabby and underwhelming they had found it to be.

Some of them refused to take the New York subway system, saying it was dirty, smelly and full of service disruptions. They were appalled by the lack of public transportation in Los Angeles and the poor highway conditions in Silicon Valley. They didn’t understand why wealthy San Francisco was plagued with homelessness. They were greatly disturbed by gun violence and the failure of laws to control it.

Most of those people weren’t nationalists. They were educated elites who grew up in poverty, benefited from China’s opening up and had seen the United States as an ideal. The United States awed and disappointed them at the same time.

But for many other Chinese, especially younger ones, the idea of a rising East and a declining West is an accepted fact. News programs and social media are filled with such dogma, and political science classes, at the urging of Mr. Xi, are teaching it.

Yan Xuetong, a professor of international studies at Tsinghua University with a nationalistic bent, said at a Beijing conference in January that China’s college students needed to learn more about the world. They often have a binary view, believing that “only China is just and innocent while all other countries, especially the Western countries, are ‘evil,’ and that Westerners are bound to hate China,” he said. Students “usually have a very strong sense of superiority and confidence” in international relations, he said, and often “treat the other countries with a condescending mind-set.”

“They use ‘wishful thinking’ in international affairs, believing that it’s very easy for China to achieve its foreign policy objectives,” said Professor Yan. He added that they also tended to believe conspiracy theories and other unsubstantiated opinions found online.

Many young people criticized him in turn, accusing him of condescension.

Chinese propaganda has always tried to highlight China’s achievements and the West’s failures. On Dec. 30, 1958, when China was entering the Great Famine that would result in the death of millions by starvation, the front page of the People’s Daily reported that the country was succeeding in industrial and agricultural production. In the international news section, stories about socialist countries like North Korea were celebratory, while ones about the capitalist West were all about their economic and political woes.

I grew up reading a newspaper column titled, “Socialism Is Good. Capitalism Is Bad.” Each week, millions of young readers like myself would consume biased pieces about an American girl going hungry or a North Korean boy living a happy life. We believed them, until China opened up and we realized that our socialist country was impoverished.

That changed to a degree in the 1990s and 2000s, as the Chinese Communist Party allowed some investigative reporting and public online criticism. But under Mr. Xi, everything about China exudes “positive energy,” including economic forecasts, while the West, especially the United States, is increasingly portrayed as evil or in decline.

The state broadcaster Chinese Central Television, eager to give the party credit for the country’s successes, made a documentary called “Amazing China” in 2018. In one section about achievements in poverty eradication, the film showed Mr. Xi sitting among farmers, talking about how their income had increased twentyfold in 20 years.

“Who else could have done this?” he asked rhetorically. “Only the Communist Party could have done this. Only our socialist system could have done this. It couldn’t have been done in any other places.”

But capitalist countries like Japan and South Korea had gone through similar economic transformations decades earlier.

In the past two years, many state news reports and theoretical essays have contrasted China’s orderly governance with the “messy West,” citing the United States’ mishandling of the pandemic, its widespread protests against racism and its many mass shootings. When the United States and a few other Western countries struggled with their Covid responses, state media and many Chinese social media influencers urged them to “copy China’s homework.”

Wang Jisi, a professor of international studies at Peking University and a top expert in U.S.-China relations, complained at a peace forum in July that CCTV’s main news program ran at least two stories about the United States every night, and that both were negative.

“They’re either about the U.S. having another mass shooting, another example of racial tensions or its messy handling of the pandemic,” he said. “Why can’t we talk about what’s happening in Africa or Latin America and not talk about bad stuff in the U.S.?”

In an interview with an academic journal this year, Mr. Wang tried to correct the idea that the United States is in decline. He argued that after America’s international standing experienced relative decline between 1995 and 2011, its share of global output rose in the decade after 2011. There is not enough evidence to conclude that America’s economy is in irreversible decline, he said, though he acknowledged that U.S. soft power had diminished.

For China, the danger of drinking its own propaganda Kool-Aid is that it stops looking at its own problems while exaggerating America’s weaknesses.

The Communist Party’s aversion to truth and its obsession with control are backfiring. Mr. Xi’s zero-Covid policy, which relies on mass testing and lockdowns, is wreaking huge damage on the Chinese economy. But since no criticism is allowed, the country is largely going along with strict restrictions while much of the world is in the process of returning to normal.

Despite all its issues, the American democratic system still seems to be working, with its checks and balances that allow for different views to win out and for new strategic approaches to emerge. The 2020 presidential election is an example, with the Democrats returning to power. So is Kansas’ vote to preserve protections for abortion rights in its Constitution, after the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade.

Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act recently to help global semiconductor manufacturers set up operations in the country to better compete with China. And President Biden’s administration is better at working with allies than his predecessor’s was.

“When people stop queuing up for visas in front of the U.S. Consulates,” said Mr. Wang, the professor, “then the U.S. is in decline.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/09/business/china-xi-jinping-united-states-taiwan.html?

lol

It said the banknote was created to generate sales income targeting the Chinese and wider Asian market, adding that “NO NEW $0.88 numismatic banknotes will be entering into circulation”.

A US-China War Over Taiwan Isn’t Happening Anytime Soon
Here are five reasons a conflict won’t occur in the next 18 months, contrary to warnings from alarmists in and out of the Biden administration.

ByJames Stavridis
10 August 2022 at 09:30 GMT+10

Tensions, already very high between the US and China over Taiwan, were exacerbated by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s “farewell tour” visit to the island. Many analysts are warning that an invasion by Beijing could come sooner rather than later — within 18 months is a common projection — often citing the Ukraine conflict as a model: China playing the part of Russia and bringing what it views as a non-nation sharply to heel.

Based on many years of engagement with the Chinese around the Pacific both operationally and diplomatically, I believe we are years away from any potential military move by Beijing against Taipei, and it is particularly unlikely to happen in the immediate future. There are several reasons.

First, events in Ukraine are likely to give Chinese President Xi Jinping pause, not encouragement. He must be asking himself, “I wonder if my generals and admirals are as bad as those Russians appear to be?” Xi was probably assured by Putin, when they met at the Olympics in February, that this would be a sharp, short war and that the Russians would have full control of Ukraine before the West could get its collective boots on. Things turned out very differently for the Kremlin.

The Chinese military, similar in many ways to Russia’s, lacks even the level of combat experience the Russians had in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria, and in the previous invasions of Ukraine and Georgia.

A second reason for Chinese hesitancy is uncertainty about the Taiwanese. Would they fold or fight? Polling is never fully reliable, but all indications are that the Taiwanese have a strong sense of national identity and are unlikely to simply roll over when the first wave of Chinese missiles strike on the island. (Beijing gave a preview of its muscle in the exercises responding to the Pelosi visit.)

President Tsai Ing-wen is a steely leader — she’s not unlike Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy — and my assessment is that the Taiwanese will fight, and fight hard. The geography of the island — mountain and forest — is a nightmare for an invader, especially one that must mount the assault by sea.

Third, Beijing is watching the alignment of the Western democracies across Europe and the Far East in enacting crippling sanctions on Russia, causing Moscow to default on its debt for the first time in more than a century. Almost all Western corporations decamped from Moscow, helping cause a collapse in imports, and few look to be going back anytime soon. The NordStream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany will have nothing but air whistling through its long tubes for the foreseeable future, and the Europeans are making strides toward energy independence from Moscow.

Sure, the Chinese will say to themselves, our economy is too big to sanction, and they would be largely correct. But could the West produce real pain-inducing sanctions on specific sectors? Absolutely. And at a moment when the Chinese economy has been slowed by the ravages of zero-Covid lockdowns, this prospect is particularly unappetizing.

Fourth, as the old saw goes, “all politics are local,” and Xi has a very delicate political situation before him. At the 20th Communist Party Congress late in the fall, he will almost certainly be given a third five-year term. It is a remarkable achievement, vaulting him into the company of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. He does not want a major conflict with the US to interfere with this anointment, and even after he fully consolidates control it seems unlikely he would quickly manufacture a crisis that could crater the global economy.

Finally, China’s military and political leaders probably assess that they are not (quite) ready for a full-scale war with the US. They have a backlog of military capability they will want to fully integrate into the People’s Liberation Army: a new strategic nuclear force, nuclear-powered warships (notably aircraft carriers), hypersonic missiles, improved offensive cyberwarfare techniques, and a far better satellite network for reconnaissance and actual combat in space.

A war between the US and China, of course, is possible in the near term. I co-authored a novel a year ago with the depressing title, “2034: A Novel of the Next World War.” But I wrote the book not as predictive fiction, but rather as a cautionary tale. The US still has time to construct the coherent strategy — militarily, diplomatically, economically, technologically — that could deter such a conflict. The clock is ticking, but the hour of maximum danger almost certainly lies some years ahead.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-09/a-us-china-war-over-taiwan-isn-t-happening-anytime-soon?

Witty Rejoinder said:

A US-China War Over Taiwan Isn’t Happening Anytime Soon
Here are five reasons a conflict won’t occur in the next 18 months, contrary to warnings from alarmists in and out of the Biden administration.

ByJames Stavridis
10 August 2022 at 09:30 GMT+10

Tensions, already very high between the US and China over Taiwan, were exacerbated by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s “farewell tour” visit to the island. Many analysts are warning that an invasion by Beijing could come sooner rather than later — within 18 months is a common projection — often citing the Ukraine conflict as a model: China playing the part of Russia and bringing what it views as a non-nation sharply to heel.

Based on many years of engagement with the Chinese around the Pacific both operationally and diplomatically, I believe we are years away from any potential military move by Beijing against Taipei, and it is particularly unlikely to happen in the immediate future. There are several reasons.

First, events in Ukraine are likely to give Chinese President Xi Jinping pause, not encouragement. He must be asking himself, “I wonder if my generals and admirals are as bad as those Russians appear to be?” Xi was probably assured by Putin, when they met at the Olympics in February, that this would be a sharp, short war and that the Russians would have full control of Ukraine before the West could get its collective boots on. Things turned out very differently for the Kremlin.

The Chinese military, similar in many ways to Russia’s, lacks even the level of combat experience the Russians had in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria, and in the previous invasions of Ukraine and Georgia.

A second reason for Chinese hesitancy is uncertainty about the Taiwanese. Would they fold or fight? Polling is never fully reliable, but all indications are that the Taiwanese have a strong sense of national identity and are unlikely to simply roll over when the first wave of Chinese missiles strike on the island. (Beijing gave a preview of its muscle in the exercises responding to the Pelosi visit.)

President Tsai Ing-wen is a steely leader — she’s not unlike Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy — and my assessment is that the Taiwanese will fight, and fight hard. The geography of the island — mountain and forest — is a nightmare for an invader, especially one that must mount the assault by sea.

Third, Beijing is watching the alignment of the Western democracies across Europe and the Far East in enacting crippling sanctions on Russia, causing Moscow to default on its debt for the first time in more than a century. Almost all Western corporations decamped from Moscow, helping cause a collapse in imports, and few look to be going back anytime soon. The NordStream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany will have nothing but air whistling through its long tubes for the foreseeable future, and the Europeans are making strides toward energy independence from Moscow.

Sure, the Chinese will say to themselves, our economy is too big to sanction, and they would be largely correct. But could the West produce real pain-inducing sanctions on specific sectors? Absolutely. And at a moment when the Chinese economy has been slowed by the ravages of zero-Covid lockdowns, this prospect is particularly unappetizing.

Fourth, as the old saw goes, “all politics are local,” and Xi has a very delicate political situation before him. At the 20th Communist Party Congress late in the fall, he will almost certainly be given a third five-year term. It is a remarkable achievement, vaulting him into the company of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. He does not want a major conflict with the US to interfere with this anointment, and even after he fully consolidates control it seems unlikely he would quickly manufacture a crisis that could crater the global economy.

Finally, China’s military and political leaders probably assess that they are not (quite) ready for a full-scale war with the US. They have a backlog of military capability they will want to fully integrate into the People’s Liberation Army: a new strategic nuclear force, nuclear-powered warships (notably aircraft carriers), hypersonic missiles, improved offensive cyberwarfare techniques, and a far better satellite network for reconnaissance and actual combat in space.

A war between the US and China, of course, is possible in the near term. I co-authored a novel a year ago with the depressing title, “2034: A Novel of the Next World War.” But I wrote the book not as predictive fiction, but rather as a cautionary tale. The US still has time to construct the coherent strategy — militarily, diplomatically, economically, technologically — that could deter such a conflict. The clock is ticking, but the hour of maximum danger almost certainly lies some years ahead.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-09/a-us-china-war-over-taiwan-isn-t-happening-anytime-soon?

By 2034 climate change should be hitting us quite bad and perhaps we are too busy with that to fight a large scale war

Cymek said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

A US-China War Over Taiwan Isn’t Happening Anytime Soon
Here are five reasons a conflict won’t occur in the next 18 months, contrary to warnings from alarmists in and out of the Biden administration.

ByJames Stavridis
10 August 2022 at 09:30 GMT+10

Tensions, already very high between the US and China over Taiwan, were exacerbated by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s “farewell tour” visit to the island. Many analysts are warning that an invasion by Beijing could come sooner rather than later — within 18 months is a common projection — often citing the Ukraine conflict as a model: China playing the part of Russia and bringing what it views as a non-nation sharply to heel.

Based on many years of engagement with the Chinese around the Pacific both operationally and diplomatically, I believe we are years away from any potential military move by Beijing against Taipei, and it is particularly unlikely to happen in the immediate future. There are several reasons.

First, events in Ukraine are likely to give Chinese President Xi Jinping pause, not encouragement. He must be asking himself, “I wonder if my generals and admirals are as bad as those Russians appear to be?” Xi was probably assured by Putin, when they met at the Olympics in February, that this would be a sharp, short war and that the Russians would have full control of Ukraine before the West could get its collective boots on. Things turned out very differently for the Kremlin.

The Chinese military, similar in many ways to Russia’s, lacks even the level of combat experience the Russians had in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria, and in the previous invasions of Ukraine and Georgia.

A second reason for Chinese hesitancy is uncertainty about the Taiwanese. Would they fold or fight? Polling is never fully reliable, but all indications are that the Taiwanese have a strong sense of national identity and are unlikely to simply roll over when the first wave of Chinese missiles strike on the island. (Beijing gave a preview of its muscle in the exercises responding to the Pelosi visit.)

President Tsai Ing-wen is a steely leader — she’s not unlike Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy — and my assessment is that the Taiwanese will fight, and fight hard. The geography of the island — mountain and forest — is a nightmare for an invader, especially one that must mount the assault by sea.

Third, Beijing is watching the alignment of the Western democracies across Europe and the Far East in enacting crippling sanctions on Russia, causing Moscow to default on its debt for the first time in more than a century. Almost all Western corporations decamped from Moscow, helping cause a collapse in imports, and few look to be going back anytime soon. The NordStream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany will have nothing but air whistling through its long tubes for the foreseeable future, and the Europeans are making strides toward energy independence from Moscow.

Sure, the Chinese will say to themselves, our economy is too big to sanction, and they would be largely correct. But could the West produce real pain-inducing sanctions on specific sectors? Absolutely. And at a moment when the Chinese economy has been slowed by the ravages of zero-Covid lockdowns, this prospect is particularly unappetizing.

Fourth, as the old saw goes, “all politics are local,” and Xi has a very delicate political situation before him. At the 20th Communist Party Congress late in the fall, he will almost certainly be given a third five-year term. It is a remarkable achievement, vaulting him into the company of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. He does not want a major conflict with the US to interfere with this anointment, and even after he fully consolidates control it seems unlikely he would quickly manufacture a crisis that could crater the global economy.

Finally, China’s military and political leaders probably assess that they are not (quite) ready for a full-scale war with the US. They have a backlog of military capability they will want to fully integrate into the People’s Liberation Army: a new strategic nuclear force, nuclear-powered warships (notably aircraft carriers), hypersonic missiles, improved offensive cyberwarfare techniques, and a far better satellite network for reconnaissance and actual combat in space.

A war between the US and China, of course, is possible in the near term. I co-authored a novel a year ago with the depressing title, “2034: A Novel of the Next World War.” But I wrote the book not as predictive fiction, but rather as a cautionary tale. The US still has time to construct the coherent strategy — militarily, diplomatically, economically, technologically — that could deter such a conflict. The clock is ticking, but the hour of maximum danger almost certainly lies some years ahead.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-09/a-us-china-war-over-taiwan-isn-t-happening-anytime-soon?

By 2034 climate change should be hitting us quite bad and perhaps we are too busy with that to fight a large scale war

Don’t bother reading the book…it was shit.

sibeen said:

Cymek said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

A US-China War Over Taiwan Isn’t Happening Anytime Soon
Here are five reasons a conflict won’t occur in the next 18 months, contrary to warnings from alarmists in and out of the Biden administration.

ByJames Stavridis
10 August 2022 at 09:30 GMT+10

Tensions, already very high between the US and China over Taiwan, were exacerbated by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s “farewell tour” visit to the island. Many analysts are warning that an invasion by Beijing could come sooner rather than later — within 18 months is a common projection — often citing the Ukraine conflict as a model: China playing the part of Russia and bringing what it views as a non-nation sharply to heel.

Based on many years of engagement with the Chinese around the Pacific both operationally and diplomatically, I believe we are years away from any potential military move by Beijing against Taipei, and it is particularly unlikely to happen in the immediate future. There are several reasons.

First, events in Ukraine are likely to give Chinese President Xi Jinping pause, not encouragement. He must be asking himself, “I wonder if my generals and admirals are as bad as those Russians appear to be?” Xi was probably assured by Putin, when they met at the Olympics in February, that this would be a sharp, short war and that the Russians would have full control of Ukraine before the West could get its collective boots on. Things turned out very differently for the Kremlin.

The Chinese military, similar in many ways to Russia’s, lacks even the level of combat experience the Russians had in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria, and in the previous invasions of Ukraine and Georgia.

A second reason for Chinese hesitancy is uncertainty about the Taiwanese. Would they fold or fight? Polling is never fully reliable, but all indications are that the Taiwanese have a strong sense of national identity and are unlikely to simply roll over when the first wave of Chinese missiles strike on the island. (Beijing gave a preview of its muscle in the exercises responding to the Pelosi visit.)

President Tsai Ing-wen is a steely leader — she’s not unlike Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy — and my assessment is that the Taiwanese will fight, and fight hard. The geography of the island — mountain and forest — is a nightmare for an invader, especially one that must mount the assault by sea.

Third, Beijing is watching the alignment of the Western democracies across Europe and the Far East in enacting crippling sanctions on Russia, causing Moscow to default on its debt for the first time in more than a century. Almost all Western corporations decamped from Moscow, helping cause a collapse in imports, and few look to be going back anytime soon. The NordStream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany will have nothing but air whistling through its long tubes for the foreseeable future, and the Europeans are making strides toward energy independence from Moscow.

Sure, the Chinese will say to themselves, our economy is too big to sanction, and they would be largely correct. But could the West produce real pain-inducing sanctions on specific sectors? Absolutely. And at a moment when the Chinese economy has been slowed by the ravages of zero-Covid lockdowns, this prospect is particularly unappetizing.

Fourth, as the old saw goes, “all politics are local,” and Xi has a very delicate political situation before him. At the 20th Communist Party Congress late in the fall, he will almost certainly be given a third five-year term. It is a remarkable achievement, vaulting him into the company of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. He does not want a major conflict with the US to interfere with this anointment, and even after he fully consolidates control it seems unlikely he would quickly manufacture a crisis that could crater the global economy.

Finally, China’s military and political leaders probably assess that they are not (quite) ready for a full-scale war with the US. They have a backlog of military capability they will want to fully integrate into the People’s Liberation Army: a new strategic nuclear force, nuclear-powered warships (notably aircraft carriers), hypersonic missiles, improved offensive cyberwarfare techniques, and a far better satellite network for reconnaissance and actual combat in space.

A war between the US and China, of course, is possible in the near term. I co-authored a novel a year ago with the depressing title, “2034: A Novel of the Next World War.” But I wrote the book not as predictive fiction, but rather as a cautionary tale. The US still has time to construct the coherent strategy — militarily, diplomatically, economically, technologically — that could deter such a conflict. The clock is ticking, but the hour of maximum danger almost certainly lies some years ahead.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-09/a-us-china-war-over-taiwan-isn-t-happening-anytime-soon?

By 2034 climate change should be hitting us quite bad and perhaps we are too busy with that to fight a large scale war

Don’t bother reading the book…it was shit.

Oh he’s that guy…

Spiny Norman said:

Looks pretty much like it’s more complicated to me.

Traditional Chinese Characters 繁體字
Simplified Chinese Characters 简体字

fair

lol why not

Hongkongers in Australia say billboards advertising Hong Kong as stable and prosperous are Beijing propaganda

Hongkonger not-for-profit groups have lodged complaints about the ads, arguing they vilify a section of the community

Political advertising is not regulated by Ad Standards

just Clive Palmer it

SCIENCE said:

lol why not

Hongkongers in Australia say billboards advertising Hong Kong as stable and prosperous are Beijing propaganda

Hongkonger not-for-profit groups have lodged complaints about the ads, arguing they vilify a section of the community

Political advertising is not regulated by Ad Standards

just Clive Palmer it

HK was a great place to visit. But now…

Pelosi’s Taiwan visit is just what Xi needed for the beach
Chinese president will have freer hand on personnel and party issues

Diana Choyleva
August 10, 2022 05:00 JST

Diana Choyleva is chief economist of Enodo Economics, a macroeconomic and political forecasting company in London.

Early August is the time of year when Chinese leaders gather with retired top officials at the pretty northern seaside resort town of Beidaihe to exchange views and discuss upcoming personnel changes.

This year’s burst of political horse-trading long looked to be intense given that it would set the stage for a Communist Party national congress in which Xi Jinping would be seeking a third term as party leader and put his stamp on other appointments. With top factions still deadlocked recently on a few positions, it looked like the congress might not convene until November.

But waves from U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit last week to Taiwan have splashed right onto the shore at Beidaihe, strengthening Xi’s hand in ways the California congresswoman undoubtedly never intended.

China’s authoritarian leader looks set to exploit the latest upswing in international tensions to have his way on appointments to the Politburo Standing Committee and other top bodies, ensuring his dominance over policymaking for the next five years. Xi may even push to call for the party congress to start as soon as September to close the door on brewing discontent and free his hand to address pressing economic and international issues, including a reorientation of COVID strategy.

Xi has a history of manipulating party protocols to his own advantage. His swift and decisive moves, including early convocation of previous party meetings, have in the past caught rivals off-guard. A prompt congress would prevent discontent among the party elite from gaining momentum among the rank and file.

The biggest argument for an early congress is economic. In 2012, when Xi became general secretary of the party, he pledged to realize the “China Dream,” but his statist policies have failed to make a dent in Beijing’s debt mountain. Instead, pressure on well-off urbanites from various directions and the party’s assault on Big Tech are killing both consumer demand and the entrepreneurial spirit in China.

By many measures, Xi has succeeded in his early pledge to curtail corruption. But provincial scandals, such as the recent protests in Henan over vanished bank deposits, show that old-style political campaigns are not enough. Underlying economic problems must be addressed. The sooner Xi cements his mandate for a third term, the sooner he can address pressing policy issues.

An early party congress could also extricate his government from its zero-COVID policy and set a new way forward. China’s initial response to the coronavirus pandemic may be hotly debated, but Xi’s ultimate choice of a hard lockdown no doubt saved hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions, of Chinese lives.

Now, however, the zero-COVID policy is taking a toll on economic performance and on public tolerance for continued lockdowns as the rest of the world largely goes back to normal.

In recent months, Xi has made some economic policy concessions, acquiescing to the view of other Politburo Standing Committee members and retired party elders that resuscitating the economy, and ironing out logistics snafus caused by the lockdown of major cities, should be given as much priority as the total elimination of COVID.

A strong early party mandate could allow for a COVID policy reset. But while Xi may give some ground on economic issues, public support for a more aggressive stance on Taiwan in the wake of Pelosi’s trip will reinforce the president’s position in getting his way on military and security appointments.

Xi may also have geopolitical reasons to call an early congress. Aligning with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the Ukraine conflict made some sense for China geopolitically but has implicated Beijing in the disastrous military misadventure. Xi needs the bandwidth to maintain his relations with Moscow while not carrying water for Putin’s mistakes.

Where does this leave the rest of the world? An early party congress would leave Xi freer to face the inevitable challenges of the third term he has worked so hard to get. Addressing China’s economic stagnation and extricating it from zero-COVID will be beneficial to trading partners, especially in Asia.

But there is a danger, too. Xi’s vision of a China Dream involves resetting relations with the U.S., and the international order, to reflect Beijing’s restored heft and clout. Careful attention and discipline are needed to calibrate that shift and avoid an unintentional slide toward conflict — a risk that Pelosi’s visit has accentuated. The tragic assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has meanwhile removed a true statesman who provided balance in the region.

If Xi uses the tensions over Taiwan to strengthen his personal power, he will emerge from the upcoming party congress beholden to the forces within China that favor confrontation. An early congress, then, is a sign for those of us outside China to approach Taiwan, and other issues, with even more care.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Pelosi-s-Taiwan-visit-is-just-what-Xi-needed-for-the-beach?

Hong Kong therapists guilty of sedition over cartoons of sheep and wolves

By Theodora Yu
September 7, 2022 at 6:35 a.m. EDT

HONG KONG — The children’s books featured cartoons of sheep and wolves. But in the brightly illustrated pages, Hong Kong authorities saw a sinister plot against the government — so they convicted the publishers of sedition.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/07/hong-kong-childrens-book-sedition-cartoon/?

…

Good to see the CCP has their priorities right.

China’s Ponzi-like property market is eroding faith in the government
Its meltdown could scarcely come at a worse time for Xi Jinping

Sep 12th 2022 | SHANGHAI

The 120km train ride between the cities of Luoyang and Zhengzhou is a showcase of economic malaise and broken dreams. From the window, endless half-built residential towers pass one after another for the duration of the hour-long journey. Many of the buildings are near completion; some are finished and have become homes. But many more are skeletons where construction ceased long ago. Developers have run out of cash and can no longer pay workers. Projects have stalled. Families will never get their homes.

The train ride through China’s heartland helps to explain one of the country’s biggest crises in recent memory: the public’s loss of confidence in the government’s economic model. For decades the property industry has been symbolic of China’s rise. Private entrepreneurs have made vast fortunes. Average people have witnessed their net worth soar as home values trebled. Local governments have filled their coffers by selling vast tracts of land to developers. An astonishing 70% of Chinese household wealth is now tied up in real estate.

To undermine trust in this model is to shake the foundations of China’s growth miracle. With sweeping covid-19 lockdowns and a crackdown on private entrepreneurs, this is happening on many fronts. But nowhere is it clearer than in the property industry, which makes up around a fifth of gdp. New project starts fell by 45% in July compared with a year ago, the value of new home sales by 29% and property investment by 12%. The effects are rippling through the economy, hitting furniture-makers and steelworkers alike. The crisis comes at a critical time for Xi Jinping, China’s leader, who will probably be granted a third term at a party congress in October.

Reviving trust in the system is crucial for Mr Xi and the Communist Party. Yet the government’s response has been disjointed and slow, with officials seemingly overwhelmed by the complexity of the situation. To regain faith in the housing market, the public needs to see stalled projects finished. Meanwhile, construction firms and workers need to be reimbursed, and investors paid back on their fixed-income products. All this must be done without reinflating the unsustainable debt bubble that the property market has become.

The housing crisis has two immediate causes. The first is a crackdown on the property industry’s excesses. Since August 2020 officials have restricted developers’ ratios of liabilities to assets, net debt to equity and cash to short-term debt, in a policy known as the three red lines. This has forced many to stop unsustainable borrowing and sell down assets, severely limiting their ability to continue building.

China’s zero-covid policy is a second blow. The central government has forced dozens of cities to lock residents in their homes for days, and sometimes weeks, on end when covid cases are discovered. At the time of writing, the megacities of Chengdu and Shenzhen are fully or partly locked down. The shutdowns have stopped people from viewing homes. They have also had an impact on the consumer psyche. Entrepreneurs fear the sudden closure of their businesses. Employees worry about being laid off. This sort of trepidation does not encourage homebuying.

The result is a crunch. China’s developers need to sell homes long before they are built to generate liquidity. Last year they pre-sold 90% of homes. But without access to bonds and loans, as banks cut their exposure to the property sector, and with sales falling, the Ponzi-like nature of the property market has come into full view.

Evergrande, the world’s most indebted developer, defaulted in December. An effort to restructure its offshore debts, intended as a model to follow, missed an end-of-July deadline. At least 28 other property firms have missed payments to investors or gone into restructuring. Trading in the shares of 30 Hong Kong-listed developers, constituting 10% of the market by sales, has been frozen, according to Gavekal, a research firm. In early August half of China’s listed developers traded at a price-to-earnings ratio of less than 0.5, the level that Evergrande traded at four months before it defaulted, notes Song Houze of MacroPolo, a think-tank.

Firms that just months ago were considered safe bets are now struggling. Earlier this year analysts dismissed concerns that Country Garden, China’s biggest developer by sales, would come under pressure. But on August 30th the firm revealed that profits for the first half of the year had fallen by almost 100%. The property market has “slid rapidly into severe depression”, it noted. The firm’s difficulties indicate that problems are no longer specific to certain developers. The entire industry is at risk.

Potential homebuyers have dropped out of the market. Far more worrying, though, are the millions waiting, often for years, for homes for which they have paid. Just 60% of homes that were pre-sold between 2013 and 2020 have been delivered.

Mr Liu, who has asked to be referred to by his family name, bought a flat in Zhengzhou in 2014, with an initial 250,000 yuan ($40,000) down-payment. The home was scheduled to be finished in 2017. But it never was. Instead, he rented a flat, eventually buying another in an old building. It is hardly the life he imagined. Mr Liu never started paying his mortgage and has engaged in endless discussions with the property developer about getting back his down-payment. “There’s no use,” he says.

Analysts have known of these problems for years, but had thought the authorities would not allow protests. Two years ago a report by pwc, an accounting firm, noted that when building stalls, the “unco-ordinated households normally have little ability to influence things”. This calculation has been turned on its head. A movement to collect data on the refusal to pay mortgages has taken officials by surprise. On July 12th volunteers began sharing data on social media. So far about 350 boycotts have been identified; analysts believe this is a fraction of the true number. State censors try to remove references to the information, but knowledge appears to spread nevertheless. As it does, others are persuaded to join in.

Investors and potential homebuyers are now watching with unease as the state puts together its response. For more than a decade cities have wielded a long list of rules and incentives to fine-tune real-estate markets, usually to reduce speculation and cool prices. These included limits over access to mortgages, as well as on who can buy homes and how many they can buy.

Cities are now loosening these rules. Between May and July municipal governments announced 304 individual measures to restore confidence, according to cicc, a Chinese investment bank. Zhengzhou, at the centre of the protests, was an early mover. In March it announced 18 actions to stimulate demand, including measures to make it easier to get mortgages and to allow families with elderly members to buy flats if they move to the city.

These have attracted attention—not because they have revived demand but because they seem to contradict central-government policy. In a video circulated on social media in August, a local Communist Party chief in Hunan province was seen calling on people to buy as many homes as possible: “Did you buy a third one? Then buy a fourth.” The message clashes with the one from Mr Xi himself, who has warned that “homes are for living in” and certainly not for speculative investment.

Local governments have also been encouraged by regulators and officials to create bail-out funds to invest in unfinished housing projects, and eventually to help deliver homes. Zhengzhou has allocated 80bn yuan ($12bn) to the cause. The thinking goes that local funds will be better suited to conditions on the ground.

Zhengzhou is also trying perhaps the most aggressive plan yet. City officials have issued a directive to developers that says all stalled construction must restart by October 6th. Insolvent companies that cannot do so must file for restructuring to bring in new investment, and repay down-payments made by homebuyers such as Mr Liu. Failure to do so could result in developers being investigated for embezzlement and other serious crimes.

For their part, policymakers have repeatedly cut mortgage rates since mid-May. To guarantee the supply of homes, the central government is fully guaranteeing bond issuance by private developers, shifting the risk to the state. Longfor, a struggling firm, priced a 1.5bn-yuan bond at a 3.3% coupon rate on August 26th, far below the market rate. This was possible solely because the bond was underwritten by China Bond Insurance, a state agency. More such issuance is planned to deliver liquidity to developers the government views as higher quality. It is the beginning of a programme to pick winners.

Another prong of state support takes the form of direct liquidity. On August 22nd the central bank and finance ministry said that they would back special loans from state-directed policy banks to finish pre-sold homes. The size of the programme has not been disclosed, but Bloomberg, a news service, reported that 200bn yuan would be made available.

This public spending is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it will help deliver homes and restart mortgage payments, taking pressure off banks. But at the same time the cash is filling a hole created by bad local governance and dubious property developers. “That simply represents money that can’t be spent on stimulus elsewhere,” notes Alex Wolf of JPMorgan Chase, a bank.

Zhengzhou’s efforts to encourage new buyers since March have fallen flat. Conditions have continued to deteriorate, suggesting that tinkering with city policies is not enough. Local bail-out funds also look flimsy. On paper several cities have hefty pots, but they rely on local-government financing firms that are strapped for cash. Analysts are watching Zhengzhou’s attempt to restart all construction within a month, but many question if the necessary funds are available. The measures could unleash collapses among smaller developers, causing panic and financial turmoil.

Investors have more hope in the central government, but its response has so far failed to match the scale of the crisis. The 200bn-yuan lending programme may account for just 10% of what is needed to complete all unfinished homes. About $5trn-worth of residential property has been pre-sold since 2020, reckons Mr Song of MacroPolo, making a bail-out of even a fraction of these homes incredibly costly.

The central government has more levers to pull. Larry Hu of Macquarie, an investment bank, says a number of measures can be snapped into place. These include temporarily easing the three red lines policy, or vowing to act as a lender of last resort for all stalled projects. The latter, while expensive, is fully within the central government’s financial wherewithal.

The debate now focuses not on whether the central government can restore confidence, but on how far it is willing to go. The crackdown on leverage was meant to punish firms that had taken on too much debt. A bigger bail-out will encourage more developers to ask for assistance, pushing the government to subsidise more of the property sector, writes Allen Feng of Rhodium, a research firm: “quite the opposite of what was intended with the ‘three red lines’”.

The campaign against leverage was meant to bring the sector in line with demand. Officials have long acknowledged that developers were building too much. About 70% of homes sold since 2018 were bought by people who already owned one, estimates JPMorgan. Restricting debt was supposed to force firms to adjust to reality.

Demand is likely to fall as China’s population growth slows. Home sales reached 1.57bn square metres in 2021, more than twice as high as in 2007. But Chen Long of Plenum, another research firm, projects that real annual demand will fall to 0.88bn-1.36bn square metres over the next decade, as the demographic shift takes hold and urbanisation slows. Reinflating the market means propping up the bubble.

The government’s balancing act is fraught with risk. In mid-October the party congress will happen as cities lock down. Mortgage boycotts will rumble on, and possibly grow. Confidence in China’s economic foundations could cross a threshold, beyond which it becomes far more difficult to recover. Mr Xi’s third term will start in inauspicious circumstances.

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/09/12/chinas-ponzi-like-property-market-is-eroding-faith-in-the-government?

https://www.withinnigeria.com/gist/2022/09/24/internet-abuzz-with-rumours-of-xi-jinpings-house-arrest-alleged-coup-in-china/

Witty Rejoinder said:

https://www.withinnigeria.com/gist/2022/09/24/internet-abuzz-with-rumours-of-xi-jinpings-house-arrest-alleged-coup-in-china/

withjnnigeria. No doubt owned by the Nigerian Prince.

Witty Rejoinder said:

https://www.withinnigeria.com/gist/2022/09/24/internet-abuzz-with-rumours-of-xi-jinpings-house-arrest-alleged-coup-in-china/

There are quite a number of reports of Twitter rumours of Xi Jinping’s house arrest and a coup in China.

Twitter rumours eh…

Michael V said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

https://www.withinnigeria.com/gist/2022/09/24/internet-abuzz-with-rumours-of-xi-jinpings-house-arrest-alleged-coup-in-china/

There are quite a number of reports of Twitter rumours of Xi Jinping’s house arrest and a coup in China.

Twitter rumours eh…

I think they’re based upon his (and one of his military ministers) apparently not turning up to an important military based gig a couple of days ago. A long bow, but we’ll see.

Dark Orange said:

Michael V said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

https://www.withinnigeria.com/gist/2022/09/24/internet-abuzz-with-rumours-of-xi-jinpings-house-arrest-alleged-coup-in-china/

There are quite a number of reports of Twitter rumours of Xi Jinping’s house arrest and a coup in China.

Twitter rumours eh…

I think they’re based upon his (and one of his military ministers) apparently not turning up to an important military based gig a couple of days ago. A long bow, but we’ll see.

shrug 김정은 is still beating right

SCIENCE said:

Dark Orange said:

Michael V said:

There are quite a number of reports of Twitter rumours of Xi Jinping’s house arrest and a coup in China.

Twitter rumours eh…

I think they’re based upon his (and one of his military ministers) apparently not turning up to an important military based gig a couple of days ago. A long bow, but we’ll see.

shrug 김정은 is still beating right

this will be interesting.

SCIENCE said:

Dark Orange said:

Michael V said:

There are quite a number of reports of Twitter rumours of Xi Jinping’s house arrest and a coup in China.

Twitter rumours eh…

I think they’re based upon his (and one of his military ministers) apparently not turning up to an important military based gig a couple of days ago. A long bow, but we’ll see.

shrug 김정은 is still beating right

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-09-25/north-korea-launches-ballistic-missile/101472062

PHake KNews ¡¡

Unsubstantiated reports that Chinese President Xi Jinping is under house arrest and that China is in the midst of a military coup swirled on social media on Saturday.

Among the unproven rumors circulating is that Li Qiaoming, a general for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military, has replaced Xi.

China’s President Xi Jinping attends a meeting with Russian President on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leaders’ summit in Samarkand on September 15. Unsubstantiated reports that Jinping is under house arrest and has been replaced by a general named Li Qiaoming swirled on social media Saturday.

Li was born in 1961 and was promoted to serve as a general—the PLA’s highest rank—in 2019, according to Indian television station OdishaTV. Li is also a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) central committee.

Li had been considered a contender to serve as a member of China’s Central Military Commission—a panel with authority over military decision—according to news outlet Nikkei Asia. Several members of the seven-member body are expected to retire next month.

Nikkei Asia reported that Li wrote an article that resonated with Xi, who has wanted to increase the communist party’s control over the army.

“The Soviet Union collapsed because the party didn’t have its own army,” Li’s article stated, according to the outlet.

Indian Twitter accounts have seemed to prominently promote the rumors about the Chinese president.

The rumor that Xi had been ousted was boosted by Indian politician Subramanian Swamy, who tweeted Saturday: “When Xi was in Samarkand recently, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were supposed to have removed Xi from the Party’s in-charge of Army. Then House arrest followed. So goes the rumour.”

Last week, Xi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leaders’ summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In his opening remarks, Putin wished Xi success at the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress next month. CCP members are expected to grant Xi an unprecedented third term as leader at the twice-a-decade event, which traditionally involves a change in leadership after two terms.

Gordon Chang, an expert on China and the author of the book, The Coming Collapse of China, tweeted Saturday that the “lack of news from #China over the last few hours suggests coup rumors are untrue, but whatever happened inside the #Chinese military during the last three days—evidently something unusual occurred—tells us there is turbulence inside the senior #CCP leadership.”

“The unexpected events in #China started right after #XiJinping came back from #Uzbekistan and disappeared from sight for days, something unusual for him. There are extremely few coincidences in elite #CCP politics,” he later added.

In an interview with Newsmax on Saturday, Chang said that there have been “unusual” and “abnormal” events occurring in China over the last few days, including the country’s decision to cancel 60 percent of its flights on Wednesday and suspend bus and high speed rail travel in and out of Beijing.

He also mentioned a widely shared video posted on Twitter is also reported to show a line of military vehicles up to 80 kilometers long heading into Beijing amid reports of a military coup.

“There’s been a lot of smoke, that says there is a fire somewhere. We don’t think that there has actually been a coup, but at this point there have been some extremely troubling developments at the top of the Communist Party as well as the top of the People’s Liberation Army, which reports to the party, so something is terribly wrong,” Chang said.

https://www.msn.com/en-au/news/world/li-qiaoming-general-at-center-of-china-coup-rumors-on-social-media/ar-AA12cBBd

Massive rumour making round on social media – many of them originated from China – have said that Chinese President Xi Jinping is under threat of military coup, and is set to be replaced as country’s President by a powerful military General Li Qiaoming. Li Qiaoming, who is among the most senior officials of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has served as commander of the Northern Theater Command from September 2017 to September 2022.

China’s Li Qiaoming – Army General rumoured to replace Xi Jinping in a coup

Li Qiaoming has served in various significant positions in the Chinese army, including as the Chief of Staff of the 361st Regiment, Commander of the 364th Regiment, Chief of Staff of the 124th Division, Deputy Chief of Staff of the 42nd Group Army, and Commander of the 124th Division of the 42nd Army.

In 2017, Li Qiaoming was elected as a member of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Social media is abuzz with the rumours of Chinese President Xi Jinping being put under house arrest, and a possible coup taking place in the country, a week after two of its former minister were sentenced for corruption – a highly controversial decision in nation’s history.

As per the social media posts, many by experts across the fields from China itself, an unprecedented military movement was seen towards Xi Jinping’s residence in Beijing. Military vehicles were seen making a movement close to Xi’s residence. A few puported videos of such movements have also gone viral on social media. However, their is no official confirmation on the same.

A number of social media users from China said that a coup was almost confirmed as the country, without giving any specific reason, cancelled over 9,000 domestic flights. Some even said that military chief General Li Qiaoming is set to become next President.

“PLA military vehicles heading to #Beijing on Sep 22. Starting from Huanlai County near Beijing & ending in Zhangjiakou City, Hebei Province, entire procession as long as 80 KM. Meanwhile, rumor has it that #XiJinping was under arrest after #CCP seniors removed him as head of PLA,” a Twitter user who goes by the name Jennifer Zeng said.

https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/who-is-chinas-li-qiaoming-army-general-rumoured-to-replace-xi-jinping-in-a-coup/ar-AA12dL0u

三人成虎

SCIENCE said:

三人成虎

LOLOLOLOL

:)

SCIENCE said:

三人成虎

It happens here too.

PermeateFree said:

SCIENCE said:

三人成虎

It happens here too.

ah well

the formation has operated in accordance with international rules and norms

we suppose that doesn’t stop it being beaten up into Big News Inspiring Belligerent Thoughts does it

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-09-27/chinese-and-russian-warships-spotted-near-alaska/101477148

China has declared itself a “near Arctic” state and plans to build the world’s largest icebreaker, he said.

as in the world’s biggest coal power station right

SCIENCE said:

ah well

the formation has operated in accordance with international rules and norms

we suppose that doesn’t stop it being beaten up into Big News Inspiring Belligerent Thoughts does it

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-09-27/chinese-and-russian-warships-spotted-near-alaska/101477148

China has declared itself a “near Arctic” state and plans to build the world’s largest icebreaker, he said.

as in the world’s biggest coal power station right

heh

“China is an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs. Geographically, China is a “Near-Arctic State”, one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle. The natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate system and ecological environment, and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fishery, marine industry and other sectors.”
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

Well let’s analyse this claim. Some states have territory in the Arctic (USA, Russia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, United States, Canada, Iceland.

Countries that are closer to the Arctic Circle than China include Latvia, Estonia, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ireland. Just about tied with Netherlands.

I suppose of all the countries in the world China can say it is in the top 10% in this regard.

An investigation into what has shaped Xi Jinping’s thinking
A new podcast series explores what lies behind the Chinese leader’s power

Sep 28th 2022

Just over ten years ago, Xi Jinping disappeared. He was then China’s leader-in-waiting, about to acquire a slew of titles that would make him arguably the most powerful man on Earth. Without explanation, his aides cancelled meetings with foreign dignitaries, including America’s then secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. Western analysts were baffled.

Outside observers are acutely sensitive to such absences. Over the past few days a prolonged stretch with no public sightings of Mr Xi again triggered wild rumours about his political welfare: on September 27th he put paid to them by visiting an exhibition highlighting the Communist Party’s achievements under his rule. But in 2012 those withdrawals from diplomatic appointments felt different. It was two weeks before Mr Xi resurfaced. To this day analysts wonder about what happened then and what it meant.

Speculation about why Mr Xi went dark has ranged from a health problem to an assassination attempt. Chris Johnson had recently left the cia, where he had worked as a China analyst. He thinks it was probably Mr Xi’s riposte to Communist Party elders who—while backing his rise to the top—had bristled at his eagerness for power unfettered by their opinions. “Find someone else to take the job, then,” Mr Johnson imagines Mr Xi as having told them. “It was a good opportunity for him to show, ‘I’m not going to be dictated to by any retired person’,” reckons the ex-spook. Mr Xi wanted to be “not just the first among equals, but just plain first.”

If that theory is correct, Mr Xi got his way. He has shown more might and ruthlessness than any leader since Mao Zedong, who died in 1976. The Economist is this week releasing an eight-part podcast, called “The Prince”, to examine Mr Xi’s rise.

He has conducted sweeping purges of the party and security forces to remove the corrupt and political enemies (including many allies of those elders). He has turned a fractured party that had disappeared from many ordinary people’s lives into an omnipresent, ideologically re-charged, tech-enabled machine. He has crushed dissent: wiping out much of civil society, building a gulag for Muslims in Xinjiang and gutting Hong Kong’s freedoms.

Mr Xi has turned sand banks in the South China Sea into fortresses, threatened Taiwan with military exercises near the island’s coast and increased the deployment of nukes to keep America at bay. He has beefed up China’s global power, using its economic heft in a battle for political influence with the West, which he scoffs at as being chaotic and in decline.

On October 16th the party will convene a five-yearly congress. It will last about a week and will reshuffle a broad swathe of the ruling elite. The new group will then meet to choose the core leadership for the next half-decade. It is almost certain that Mr Xi will be reappointed as party leader and military chief, and that he will be reconfirmed as president early next year. This will be unprecedented in the post-Mao era. The norm for these posts has been a maximum of two five-year terms. Mr Xi, it appears, has decided to be ruler for as long as he wants.

The past ten years have revealed a lot about his thinking. But as tensions grow with America, not least over Taiwan, studying his character has become an ever more pressing task. Could he be another Vladimir Putin, willing to take enormous risks to secure his territorial ambitions? How much does it matter to him if China and the West part company? Is he animated by a Marxist spirit that will upend the post-Mao economic order? Will he allow an obsession with preventing the spread of covid-19 to cripple one of the world’s biggest engines of economic growth?

Over the past few months The Economist has spoken to a wide range of people with insights into Mr Xi’s personality, from former officials in the West to Chinese familiar with the secretive world of their country’s elite and the influences that may have shaped Mr Xi’s political preferences as he rose to power. Some of their observations are quoted in this article. Audio extracts can be heard in The Economist’s podcast series by one of this newspaper’s writers on China, Sue-Lin Wong. It is now available, in full, online and on all major podcast apps.

The conclusions of this series have grim implications for China and the world. When Mr Xi assumed power in 2012 some observers were cautiously optimistic that he would turn out to be some kind of reformer: not another Mikhail Gorbachev, but at least someone who would rule with a lighter touch and try to get along with the United States and the West. Those hopes were dashed as it became evident that Mr Xi was determined to amass immense power, wield it ruthlessly against his own and the party’s critics, and use it to turn China into a global power of which the West would be in awe. The personal attributes that set Mr Xi on this path will keep driving him along it. So will the forces around him: a nationalistic elite, a party ever fearful of losing its grip and a public that welcomes a strongman.

Those optimists a decade ago included Chinese people familiar with the party’s inner workings. One of them was Li Rui, who had served as a deputy minister and as Mao’s personal secretary in the 1950s, had later spent nine years in jail for criticising Mao and who had been restored to high office in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping. After his retirement he remained an outspoken advocate of economic and political reforms until his death in 2019. “Once Xi Jinping became the number one, my father was so happy,” recalls his daughter, Nanyang Li, who now lives in America. “My father told me, now is good…we have hope for our political system.”

Mr Li should have been well placed to judge. In 1982-84 he served in a crucial role as a deputy chief of the party’s Organisation Department, an agency that manages China’s vast bureaucracy and helps select officials for promotion. He was tasked with setting up a new office within it called the Young Cadres Bureau. Its job was to identify and groom young officials who could become China’s future leaders. The bureau compiled a list of 1,100 of them. Of the 14 men who were appointed to the pinnacle of power—the Politburo Standing Committee—after the party congress in 2007 and the following one in 2012, all but two were on that list drawn up four decades before. Mr Xi, who became general secretary in 2012, was on it. Mr Li had sent a subordinate to investigate his suitability.

So why were he, and many others, so wrong in their guesses about how Mr Xi would turn out as China’s leader? There are two main reasons. First, assessments in 2012 of Mr Xi’s personality were based largely on his family ties. He was the son of Xi Zhongxun, a veteran of the revolution that brought the party to power in 1949. The elder Mr Xi, who died in 2002, had been purged by Mao and rehabilitated by Deng. He was an economic reformer who, under Deng, oversaw the creation of China’s first “special economic zone”—what is now the dynamic megacity of Shenzhen. That experiment in capitalism had made the party’s conservatives squirm (some hardliners refused even to go there). Like father, like son, is a common feature of Chinese political culture. Many expected that the son of such a reformist pioneer would be of similar kind.

The other reason was a dearth of information. Before Mr Xi emerged as leader-in-waiting in 2007, he had kept his head down. His wife, Peng Liyuan (pictured), was a singer of patriotic folk ballads and opera songs and far more famous than he (she has ten albums on Spotify). After the Chinese army crushed the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, she had performed on the square for the troops.

Mr Xi was a little-known politician who had neither said nor done anything striking. Unusually for a leader-in-the-making, he had spent 17 years in one province—Fujian on the south-eastern coast—before getting his first job as a provincial party chief in 2002 in neighbouring Zhejiang. Alfred Wu was a journalist for state media in Fujian who was assigned to cover Mr Xi’s activities. It was a dull job. “He was very quiet and a little bit timid,” says Mr Wu, who is now at the National University of Singapore. “People never imagined that he will become the national leader.”

In 2011, the year before Mr Xi took power, Joe Biden—then America’s vice-president under Barack Obama—went to China to meet Mr Xi, who by then was vice-president of his country, too (a clear sign that he had risen to become heir apparent). Mr Biden was accompanied by Evan Medeiros, who was the National Security Council’s China director. There was “very little that we knew” about Mr Xi, recalls Mr Medeiros. Mr Biden tried to build a rapport with China’s future leader: they awkwardly played a little basketball together during a visit to a school. Mr Xi came across as a “very controlled and very careful politician”, says Mr Medeiros.

Not much has changed. Since taking over, Mr Xi has given no face-to-face interviews to Western journalists, nor held any press conferences except brief ones alongside foreign leaders during state visits. His speeches often are not released until long after they are delivered (for example, one that discussed the Soviet Union’s collapse and the “extremely great risks and challenges” involved in keeping the Chinese Communist Party in power into the distant future was published on September 15th, well over four years after he gave it). Unlike Mr Putin, he does not give rambling monologues on state television. While extending China’s power globally, Mr Xi has kept himself cloaked in mystery. His recent disappearance from public view followed a trip to Central Asia that was his first abroad since covid-19 was declared a pandemic.

Mr Biden’s visit to China in 2011 did provide a glimmer of insight. Daniel Russel, who was Mr Medeiros’s boss in the White House, recalls a dinner at which Mr Xi “talked at some considerable length” about the upheavals that had been toppling authoritarian leaders in Arab countries that year. Mr Xi mused on what might have caused these events: he pointed to corruption, factionalism within ruling parties and leaders’ loss of touch with ordinary citizens and their needs. The same things could topple the Communist Party if it failed to get its act together, Mr Russel recalls him saying.

Perhaps the biggest mistake made by observers at the time was underestimating how much Mr Xi was driven by a fear of the party’s collapse, how far he would go to prevent it, and how widely shared his concerns were within the ruling elite. Much of Mr Xi’s behaviour as leader, including his chest-thumping nationalism, can be explained as a response to the anxieties he conveyed to Mr Biden in 2011.

He was right to sense danger. China had been changing dramatically in the few years previously. A large home-owning middle class had emerged within the previous decade or two. With the rapid growth of private enterprise, the party’s grassroots presence had withered: by then most urbanites felt little connection with it. Social media had just emerged as a tool for communication; smartphone ownership was surging. Across China people were using these technologies to share grievances. Small ngos were springing up, championing the rights of the downtrodden.

And splits were emerging in the party. A rival to Mr Xi, Bo Xilai, was vying for attention in the south-western region of Chongqing, where he was party chief. Mr Bo—charismatic and good-looking—was winning public support by ostentatiously fighting corruption and appealing to lingering nostalgia for the supposedly fairer days of Mao, when the state provided housing and health care for urbanites.

Mr Bo, a member of the Politburo, was arrested for corruption and abuse of power early in 2012. After Mr Xi took over, months later, he put Mr Bo on trial. He was sentenced in 2013 to life in jail. Officials suggested that he had plotted a coup. Several others, including China’s former security overlord, Zhou Yongkang, and two retired generals, were accused of being in cahoots. Assets worth more than $14bn were seized from Mr Zhou’s family and associates.

Many analysts were surprised by Mr Xi’s ability to topple such powerful people. Mr Zhou had held the highest rank of anyone convicted of corruption since 1949. The generals had served as the most senior uniformed officers in the party commission that controls the armed forces. The trial of Mr Bo and the round-up of these men in the first three years of Mr Xi’s rule was a political drama rivalling that of the arrest in 1976, soon after Mao’s death, of the Gang of Four—the ultra-radicals who had orchestrated Mao’s vicious Cultural Revolution.

The purge was enabled by two crucial features of Mr Xi’s power and personality. The first is the support he enjoyed within the elite. The West saw a country that had weathered the storm of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and was rising fast. Inside China, however, party insiders were less optimistic. They privately criticised Mr Xi’s lacklustre predecessor, Hu Jintao, for having let the country drift and the party lose its discipline. For the party to survive, they believed, it was essential to inject it with a renewed sense of purpose, and to tighten control over it. Mr Xi’s talk of a “Chinese dream” of the country’s “great rejuvenation” struck a chord with many.

Redder than red
The other asset that Mr Xi enjoyed was his pedigree. In China, Mr Xi is known (in whispers) as a taizi, or princeling. The word is most commonly applied to the offspring of leaders, especially the children of Communist China’s founders. Members of this group enjoy political advantage. Among the first 600 or so promising young officials identified by the Young Cadres Bureau in the early 1980s, about 5% were princelings. In the Politburo Standing Committee that Mr Xi took charge of in 2012, the majority were.

Our podcast series is called “The Prince”, the title of Niccolo Machiavelli’s work on how to be a ruler. As Machiavelli wrote, some 500 years ago, “Hereditary states…are maintained with far less difficulty than new states, since all that is required is that the Prince shall not depart from the usages of his ancestors.” Mr Xi may disagree with how easy that makes it sound (Machiavelli himself might have written differently about a colossus such as China). But the Chinese president clearly believes that preserving the party’s traditional ideological rhetoric—no matter how out of keeping with many aspects of today’s state-led capitalism—is vital for keeping its 97m members in lockstep and himself in charge.

In 2009 the American embassy in Beijing sent a classified cable to Washington (later published by Wikileaks) about the assessment of one unnamed—but clearly trusted—Chinese academic who had known Mr Xi early in the Chinese leader’s career. “Our contact is convinced that Xi has a genuine sense of ‘entitlement’, believing that members of his generation are the ‘legitimate heirs’ to the revolutionary achievements of their parents and therefore ‘deserve to rule China’,” said the dispatch. Mr Xi was not driven by ideology, it quoted the scholar as saying, but had chosen to survive by “becoming redder than red”. By cloaking himself in communism, he would be seen by the party elite as a safe pair of hands.

In terms of how Mr Xi has chosen to craft his image, the contact proved more correct than the optimistic liberals. In the past few months officials around the country have been made to watch (yet another) film about the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The documentary points to a big lesson: that the giants of communism’s past must not be criticised. Attacking Stalin, as the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev did in 1956, sowed the seeds of ruin.

Mr Xi is no Maoist. He wants to bring private entrepreneurs to heel but not eliminate them, as Mao did—their contribution to the economy is too valuable to be dispensed with. Unlike Mao, who was happy to wreck party structures in pursuit of Utopian goals, Mr Xi wants to strengthen the country’s political and economic framework, keeping the party firmly in control.

To Mr Xi, the party as an institution matters more than it did to Mao. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao tried to purge his critics by unleashing the Red Guards—spontaneously formed gangs of radicals, independent of the party. In many places they seized local power, attacking party officials and party organisations for being “reactionary”, or insufficiently Maoist. Mr Xi’s family was among those targeted. His father was tortured. His half-sister killed herself to avoid similar treatment.

That experience may have bolstered Mr Xi’s belief in a strong party. It needed beefing up to prevent chaos like that again. Giving freer rein to the masses was dangerous. “What I see is not just the superficial things: the power, the flowers, the glory, the applause,” said Mr Xi in 2000. “I see the cow sheds”—meaning Red Guard detention houses—“and how people can blow hot and cold.”

Few people dare to blow cold about Mr Xi—those who have done so have been jailed or otherwise punished. He has used the party as his weapon, injecting party committees into private firms and reviving them in neighbourhoods. Party cells have been leading the mass mobilisation of people to enforce covid-related lockdowns, round up virus-carriers and put them in supervised quarantine, and conduct endless nucleic-acid tests and door-to-door inspections. In Xinjiang party secretaries were given the final say over who would be sent to detention camps for “deradicalisation”. Mr Xi has created new party groups, often with himself in charge, to oversee the work of government ministries. As he puts it: “East, west, south, north and centre—the party leads everything.”

As does Mr Xi. He is in charge of all of the government’s main portfolios, including economic policy, which previous general secretaries had put in the hands of the prime minister. After next month’s party congress, when the new leadership line-up is revealed, much attention will be paid to the unprecedented third term as general secretary that he will almost certainly be granted. But given the power he has, he had always been likely to remain paramount leader even if he had decided to give the job of party chief to someone else. Even Deng, who tried to introduce a more orderly system of succession, wielded ultimate authority years after stepping down.

Mr Xi, who is 69, is therefore likely to rule, formally or informally, for as long as he is fit enough to do so. He could, conceivably, be toppled, but that would be difficult in the high-tech surveillance state he has created. In his remaining years, little is likely to change in China or abroad to the extent that he would decide not to rule with an iron fist or challenge America.

Yet Mr Xi remains haunted by the fate of the Soviet Union and still sees enemies at home. Despite what appears to be strong public approval of his rule, he has reason to worry. In the past couple of years he has been waging war against a “political faction” in the police. Officials say it was posing a “serious threat to political security”. In the past few days the alleged ringleader, Sun Lijun, who had served as a deputy minister of public security, was given a suspended death sentence that could be commuted to life in prison without parole. Several others were given lengthy jail terms.

A new helmsman
As the economy slows, the public’s support may ebb. Mr Xi will be even more inclined to clamp down on dissent, and will become even more suspicious of private businesspeople in charge of giant firms who might challenge his policies. He has identified himself personally with China’s “zero-covid” strategy. Despite its heavy drag on the economy, and ever louder grumbling from citizens affected by draconian lockdowns, he is unlikely to abandon it until he is sure that doing so will not lead to a surge in deaths. But as a nationalist he is unlikely to hasten use of foreign vaccines that would enable China to make a swifter exit.

Abroad, Mr Xi will remain just as determined to chip away at American power in China’s neighbourhood and beyond. He sees a growing threat from America, as it tries to strengthen bonds with democratic countries to counter Chinese influence and to sever Chinese access to cutting-edge technologies. It is not known what he truly thinks of the war in Ukraine, but he will continue to back Russia diplomatically, seeing it as a vital bulwark of authoritarianism. Taiwan should continue to worry. Mr Xi has not shown signs of being a reckless risk-taker like Mr Putin. Especially given Mr Biden’s repeated suggestions that America would defend Taiwan militarily, he cannot be sure of swift victory should he decide to try to conquer it (a bigger challenge in some ways than subduing Ukraine, given its terrain and distance from the mainland). But taking Taiwan remains a stated party goal. Mr Xi is rapidly building up the hardware needed to do so.

Optimists may pin hope on change for the better in China when Mr Xi eventually passes from the political scene. They may be proved right. More liberal-minded leaders have occasionally risen in Communist China, though never to the apex of power. But the broader political elite that helped Mr Xi’s rise—including retired leaders, generals and the princelings—may prefer to keep China on much the same political track after he is gone.

As Mr Xi puts it, China is experiencing “changes not seen in 100 years” at home and globally. Amid such uncertainties, most of the ruling elite would probably like a firm hand on the tiller—another “helmsman”, as fawning officials are beginning to call Mr Xi—just as they appreciated Deng’s decision to send the army into Tiananmen Square. Despite his larger-than-life, domineering personality and rule-changing ways, Mr Xi represents continuity in Chinese politics as much as change. Even imagining a China without him, it is hard to be sanguine.

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/09/28/an-investigation-into-what-has-shaped-xi-jinpings-thinking?

Elon Musk’s unsolicited idea for Taiwan welcomed by Beijing, slammed in Taipei

Hong KongCNN Business — 

As tensions between China and Taiwan simmer at their highest point in decades, officials in both places have clashed in recent days over an unsolicited idea from billionaire Elon Musk.

The world’s richest man suggested in an interview that hostilities between the two could be resolved if Taipei handed some control of the democratically governed island to Beijing, prompting praise from China and predictable outrage in Taiwan.

“My recommendation … would be to figure out a special administrative zone for Taiwan that is reasonably palatable, probably won’t make everyone happy,” Musk told the Financial Times in an interview published on Friday. “And it’s possible, and I think probably, in fact, that they could have an arrangement that’s more lenient than Hong Kong.”

China’s ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, thanked Musk for his suggestion in a tweet Saturday, calling for “peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/10/media/elon-musk-china-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html

dv said:

Elon Musk’s unsolicited idea for Taiwan welcomed by Beijing, slammed in Taipei

Hong KongCNN Business — 

As tensions between China and Taiwan simmer at their highest point in decades, officials in both places have clashed in recent days over an unsolicited idea from billionaire Elon Musk.

The world’s richest man suggested in an interview that hostilities between the two could be resolved if Taipei handed some control of the democratically governed island to Beijing, prompting praise from China and predictable outrage in Taiwan.

“My recommendation … would be to figure out a special administrative zone for Taiwan that is reasonably palatable, probably won’t make everyone happy,” Musk told the Financial Times in an interview published on Friday. “And it’s possible, and I think probably, in fact, that they could have an arrangement that’s more lenient than Hong Kong.”

China’s ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, thanked Musk for his suggestion in a tweet Saturday, calling for “peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/10/media/elon-musk-china-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html

He’s trying to score the Nobel Prize in Trolling.

Bubblecar said:

dv said:

Elon Musk’s unsolicited idea for Taiwan welcomed by Beijing, slammed in Taipei

Hong KongCNN Business — 

As tensions between China and Taiwan simmer at their highest point in decades, officials in both places have clashed in recent days over an unsolicited idea from billionaire Elon Musk.

The world’s richest man suggested in an interview that hostilities between the two could be resolved if Taipei handed some control of the democratically governed island to Beijing, prompting praise from China and predictable outrage in Taiwan.

“My recommendation … would be to figure out a special administrative zone for Taiwan that is reasonably palatable, probably won’t make everyone happy,” Musk told the Financial Times in an interview published on Friday. “And it’s possible, and I think probably, in fact, that they could have an arrangement that’s more lenient than Hong Kong.”

China’s ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, thanked Musk for his suggestion in a tweet Saturday, calling for “peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/10/media/elon-musk-china-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html

He’s trying to score the Nobel Prize in Trolling.

He could be seeking inroads to China.

dv said:

“peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

Yeah, after all, that worked out s-o-o-o well for Hong Kong, right?

Tau.Neutrino said:

Bubblecar said:

dv said:

Elon Musk’s unsolicited idea for Taiwan welcomed by Beijing, slammed in Taipei

Hong KongCNN Business — 

As tensions between China and Taiwan simmer at their highest point in decades, officials in both places have clashed in recent days over an unsolicited idea from billionaire Elon Musk.

The world’s richest man suggested in an interview that hostilities between the two could be resolved if Taipei handed some control of the democratically governed island to Beijing, prompting praise from China and predictable outrage in Taiwan.

“My recommendation … would be to figure out a special administrative zone for Taiwan that is reasonably palatable, probably won’t make everyone happy,” Musk told the Financial Times in an interview published on Friday. “And it’s possible, and I think probably, in fact, that they could have an arrangement that’s more lenient than Hong Kong.”

China’s ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, thanked Musk for his suggestion in a tweet Saturday, calling for “peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/10/media/elon-musk-china-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html

He’s trying to score the Nobel Prize in Trolling.

He could be seeking inroads to China.

There’s already at least one Gigafactory and huge Tesla plant there.

captain_spalding said:

dv said:

“peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

Yeah, after all, that worked out s-o-o-o well for Hong Kong, right?

They should never have handed over Hong Kong.

Hong Kong was owned by imperial China not communist China. A lot of Chinese in Hong Kong thought everything would be fine after the takeover

wookiemeister said:

captain_spalding said:

dv said:

“peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

Yeah, after all, that worked out s-o-o-o well for Hong Kong, right?

They should never have handed over Hong Kong.

Hong Kong was owned by imperial China not communist China. A lot of Chinese in Hong Kong thought everything would be fine after the takeover

Hong Kong was handed over to Britain as reparation for losing the opium wars – british companies trying to pump opium into china

wookiemeister said:

wookiemeister said:

captain_spalding said:

Yeah, after all, that worked out s-o-o-o well for Hong Kong, right?

They should never have handed over Hong Kong.

Hong Kong was owned by imperial China not communist China. A lot of Chinese in Hong Kong thought everything would be fine after the takeover

Hong Kong was handed over to Britain as reparation for losing the opium wars – british companies trying to pump opium into china

Nasty beginnings, but the British had no obligation to return Hong King island, which had been ceded to Britain in perpetuity.

The New Territories, on the shores of mainland China, were another matter. It was those Territories which were governed by the 99 year lease to Britain.

However, Hong Kong island on its own would be untenable without the New Territories, and so when the lease expired, it really left Britain with no option but to give the lot back.

The Chinese would not have been able to balk at the British keeping the island, if they’d so wished, as it was China which was keen to see the ‘enforcement’ of one 19th century agreement, so they could hardly have complained if the British insisted on the maintenance of another 19th century arrangement.

But, that was never going to be the case.

The best thing China should do is have some kind of treaty with taiwan

Bubblecar said:

dv said:

Elon Musk’s unsolicited idea for Taiwan welcomed by Beijing, slammed in Taipei

Hong KongCNN Business — 

As tensions between China and Taiwan simmer at their highest point in decades, officials in both places have clashed in recent days over an unsolicited idea from billionaire Elon Musk.

The world’s richest man suggested in an interview that hostilities between the two could be resolved if Taipei handed some control of the democratically governed island to Beijing, prompting praise from China and predictable outrage in Taiwan.

“My recommendation … would be to figure out a special administrative zone for Taiwan that is reasonably palatable, probably won’t make everyone happy,” Musk told the Financial Times in an interview published on Friday. “And it’s possible, and I think probably, in fact, that they could have an arrangement that’s more lenient than Hong Kong.”

China’s ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, thanked Musk for his suggestion in a tweet Saturday, calling for “peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/10/media/elon-musk-china-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html

He’s trying to score the Nobel Prize in Trolling.

I thought Musk stopped smoking pot.

wookiemeister said:

The best thing China should do is have some kind of treaty with taiwan

Something like that might work.

Welp, there seems to have been a run on plums. Not really expecting any fresh ones at this time of year but I’ve been to 3 stores and they’ve none in the canned, jarred, dried or frozen categories. Just empty shelf space with a label, showing where the plums lived in happier times.

Normally this wouldn’t bother me but I rather promised my daughter I’d make one of her favourite foodstuffs, which includes plums in the recipe.

Bubblecar said:

dv said:

Elon Musk’s unsolicited idea for Taiwan welcomed by Beijing, slammed in Taipei

Hong KongCNN Business — 

As tensions between China and Taiwan simmer at their highest point in decades, officials in both places have clashed in recent days over an unsolicited idea from billionaire Elon Musk.

The world’s richest man suggested in an interview that hostilities between the two could be resolved if Taipei handed some control of the democratically governed island to Beijing, prompting praise from China and predictable outrage in Taiwan.

“My recommendation … would be to figure out a special administrative zone for Taiwan that is reasonably palatable, probably won’t make everyone happy,” Musk told the Financial Times in an interview published on Friday. “And it’s possible, and I think probably, in fact, that they could have an arrangement that’s more lenient than Hong Kong.”

China’s ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, thanked Musk for his suggestion in a tweet Saturday, calling for “peaceful unification and one country, two systems.”

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/10/media/elon-musk-china-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html

He’s trying to score the Nobel Prize in Trolling.

Never let a good business opportunity get away ¡

Though he did not mention the U.S. by name, his distrust of the world’s other great power was an unmistakable backdrop as Xi warned of potential obstacles ahead. “Get the house in good repair before rain comes, and prepare to undergo the major tests of high winds and waves, and even perilous, stormy seas,” he said. Here are updates from the congress.

NYTimes email newsletter

…

Those remarks by Xi are quotes of Chinese idioms. The western equivalent would be be quoting lines from the bible verbatim in a policy speech although in Chinese the idioms are usually 4 characters whose use together has a definite meaning.

One idiom ‘Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon’ used in the film of the same name roughly translates as ‘there are many people here with unexpected talents’.

Director of Public Prosecutions Shane Drumgold asked Senator Cash if she was aware of the alleged incident earlier than she had said.

“The question is, I’m putting to you that you were aware, you were fully aware in October 2019 that Brittany Higgins had made an allegation that she was sexually assaulted by Bruce Lehrmann,” he said.

“I can’t accept that,” Senator Cash said.

“I don’t accept that.”

Mr Drumgold asked Senator Cash if it would be a political issue for her party if the allegations were to be released publicly.

“Absolutely not… I don’t know how it could be politically embarrassing,” she responded.

Mr Drumgold also asked Senator Cash if she denied any knowledge of the event in court.

“Are you familiar with the term plausible deniability?” Mr Drumgold asked.

“I’m not quite sure what you’re referring to,” Senator Cash responded.

“Plausible deniability with regard to an allegation of sexual assault by one staff member against another staff member in a government minister’s office,” he said.

“I do apologise, I don’t understand what you’re trying to ask me,” Senator Cash said.

“I’m suggesting that you were aware of what Ms Higgins alleged during the course of her employment with you.” Mr Drumgold said.

Senator Cash denied that she had heard of the alleged sexual assault earlier than February 5, 2021

dv said:

There are no open border crossings between China and India, nor between China and Bhutan.

so what we’re saying is that China is a set which contains all its limit points

SCIENCE said:

dv said:

There are no open border crossings between China and India, nor between China and Bhutan.

so what we’re saying is that China is a set which contains all its limit points

It does have border crossings with Afghanistan, Burma, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam.

It has land boundary disputes with Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, South Korea, India, Bhutan, and maritime/insular disputes with Japan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia.

EDITORIAL
Xi’s grip on power will be felt far beyond China
The Age’s View

October 18, 2022 — 6.52pm

This week, Xi Jinping – the son of a man purged from high office and sent to the countryside to help manage a tractor factory – will confirm himself in a third five-year term as the head of the Chinese Communist Party and through it the People’s Republic.

To achieve this summit of personal power, Xi has had to roll back term limits put in place decades ago, in the aftermath of Mao Zedong’s absolute rule and its catastrophic consequences for the Chinese people. He has been able to do so largely because, in an era of global crises and economic uncertainty, he has promised “common prosperity” and made himself the symbol of political continuity and stability.

As our North Asia correspondent Eryk Bagshaw pointed out in his profile, the installation of “Xi Jinping Thought” as the party’s line means that to criticise the leader is now the same as criticising the state. But this cuts both ways; having made himself the unrivalled source of power and policy, Xi will now be identified with the party-state’s handling of all the challenges before it.

They are enormous, yet in some cases strangely familiar. Long after Victoria and New Zealand said goodbye to zero-COVID strategies, China is still committed to one, using harsher lockdowns and stifling economic activity. Beijing’s insistence on self-reliance through less-effective homegrown vaccines has led to it being overwhelmed by the Omicron variant and its sub-variants.

The country is sitting on a property market timebomb, with construction stalled and developers drowning in debt. The first sign of the extent of this problem was the default of development giant Evergrande in 2021. At a time when governments here are being pushed to build affordable housing, Xi has repeatedly declared that “houses are built to be inhabited, not for speculation”. But there has been little to suggest since then that China’s leaders can find a way out of this mess, other than moving the mountain of debt to state-owned companies.

More than a decade after the global financial crisis, China is hurtling towards a reckoning on reckless bank lending to people whose incomes and spending are stagnating, with the only thing preventing 2008-style runs on Chinese banks being Beijing’s array of oppressive powers. Because Xi underwrites those, any signs of protest – from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, and from July’s mass demonstration by bank depositors in Henan province to last week’s lone anti-lockdown protester in Beijing – are automatically seen not as grievances to be addressed but threats to national security.

Any economic crisis in China would severely affect the global outlook, but also brings the danger that Xi might seek to overcome internal difficulties by assailing external adversaries. As Shanghai-based activist Ji Xiaolong noted after an April anti-lockdown protest there, Chinese officials’ reaction to dissent is that “behind every problem, every protest, is also a plot” by foreign forces.

In February, Xi welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin – another leader who has managed to circumvent all constraints on his tenure – to Beijing, and in the shadow of the Olympic flame declared that their partnership had “no limits”.

Putin’s power to shape the world around him and perpetuate his personal rule is being tested through bloody destruction in Ukraine. The vital question for China and all those who do business with it is whether Xi can avoid such a path or whether the quest for absolute security and unchallenged rule will lead him to some reckless action that might prove his undoing.

At a time when the West is seeking to constrain Chinese power while avoiding military confrontation, hopes for “common prosperity” both within China and beyond it may hinge on whether Xi can imagine a different approach to absolute leadership. The signs are not promising.

https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/xi-s-grip-on-power-will-be-felt-far-beyond-china-20221017-p5bqbw.html

Xi to tighten his grip on power by promoting key lieutenants
By Eryk Bagshaw
October 18, 2022 — 7.13pm

Xi Jinping is set to tighten his grip on the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party by bringing in key lieutenants into his seven-man cabinet and surrounding himself with loyalists.

The promotions, expected to be announced on Sunday, will entrench the Chinese President’s dominance over the Politburo Standing Committee, and allow him to pursue his economic, ideological and foreign affairs priorities with even fewer dissenting voices at top of the Party hierarchy.

Li Keqiang – China’s number two, the leader of the rival Communist Youth League faction and a relatively moderate economic voice in Beijing – will have to step down from his role as Premier after serving two terms. Li, 67, is young enough to remain on the Standing Committee in a different role but may choose to retire. That has opened the door to Xi’s protégé Li Qiang, the current party boss of Shanghai – who despite bungling the city’s response to COVID-19 in May – has been persistently raised as a top candidate.

Dr Willy Lam, an adjunct professor at the Centre for China Studies at the University of Hong Kong, said Li Qiang’s elevation would indicate Xi has locked in his monopoly on power.

“There’s a long tradition of the party secretary of Shanghai becoming a member of the Standing Committee but in the eyes of foreigners, if you look at the way the pandemic was handled in Shanghai, he is a total failure,” said Lam. “He also has no national achievements.”

Yang Zhang, an assistant professor at the American University in Washington said if Li Qiang becomes premier, “then any power balance at the top ceases to exist”.

Xi’s chief of staff, Ding Xuexiang, who has worked alongside Xi since 2007 is also set for promotion, The South China Morning Post and The Wall St Journal reported on Tuesday.

“I think at the central level of the party machinery and of the party hierarchy, we will have Xi Jinping and Ding Xuexiang,” said Lam.

“It is possible that Xi will get five members of the Standing Committee. If you look at previous standing committees, almost all of them since Deng Xiaoping have maintained a rough factional balance between the conservatives and the liberals.

“Five factional members will be lopsided. It is abnormal and goes against Party tradition.”

The entrance of four loyalists into Xi’s cabinet would create a “Xi unbound scenario” the Asia Society Policy Institute said in a briefing ahead of the Party Congress, in which “Xi’s influence proves to be unconstrained, and he takes full advantage to set up his ideal .”

Lam said the retirement of Li Keqiang without a replacement of similar stature would effectively eliminate the factional threat of the more liberal Communist Youth League, putting it on course to join former President Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai Clique in being largely shut out of high office.

“That would be a very bad scenario,” said Lam.

Ding, who runs Xi’s office and the Central Committee’s general office, could replace Li Zhanshu, the 72-year-old chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, or vice-premier Han Zheng, 68, who has also reached retirement age.

Both of their retirements would leave room for one more younger Xi loyalist to join the Standing Committee with Chen Min’er and Li Xi the most likely potential candidates. Chen went to Tsinghua University with Xi in the 1970s and was then parachuted in as the Party Secretary of Chongqing in southwestern China by Xi in 2017. Li, the Party Secretary of Guangdong province – home to megacities Guangzhou and Shenzhen – has been a family friend of Xi’s since the 1980s.

Zhao Leji, Xi’s anti-corruption enforcer would likely remain in this scenario. As would Wang Huning, China’s chief ideologist, who has served former presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Wang, the faceless man of Chinese politics is the architect of “Xi Jinping Thought”, Xi’s ideological blueprint that is now entrenched in China’s constitution.

“He is the brain of Xi Jinping,” said Lam.

But two appointments on Sunday could also show that Xi’s power is not as strong as expected. Wang Yang, who is currently on the Standing Committee, is considered the compromise candidate for Premier. The 67-year-old has been historically linked with Li’s Communist Youth League faction and has been in favour of market-led reforms.

“There are essentially two sides in this debate over Chinese economic policy. The first is what might be termed ‘Fortress China’ led by Xi and his ‘Xi Jinping Economic Thought’,” the Asia Society Policy Institute said.

“A second group that could be called the ‘Reform and Opening’ faction, however, feels that Xi’s economic policies have… ultimately damaged China’s economic prospects – resulting in rapidly slowing growth and threatening China’s future as a superpower.”

The Premier’s position will not be formally announced until March at the National People’s Congress, but the order in which the Standing Committee members walk on stage on Sunday behind Xi will indicate their seniority. Hu Chunhua, a protégé of former president Hu Jintao who is also aligned with Li’s more economically liberal group, could step up from the 25-member Politburo to the seven-member Standing Committee if Li manages to retain some factional power.

China’s foreign policy establishment is also preparing for a reshuffle. Yang Jiechi, the veteran diplomat who berated US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Alaska in March last year is scheduled to retire at 72. His deputy, Foreign Minister Wang Yi is 69, making him technically too old to join the 25-member Politburo. Neither Yang nor Wang are part of the seven-member standing committee, where foreign policy is largely run by Xi and his ideological guide Wang Huning.

Lam said he expected Xi to make an exception for Wang Yi to join the Politburo despite being past retirement age. That leaves his position as Foreign Minister open to his deputy Ma Zhaoxu, who was Beijing’s Ambassador to Australia between 2013 and 2016.

Ma, 59, presided over a relatively harmonious period in Australia-China relations but was hauled in by former prime minister Tony Abbott in 2013 after Beijing declared an air identification zone over islands in the East China Sea.

https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/xi-to-tighten-his-grip-on-power-by-promoting-key-lieutenants-20221018-p5bqpq.html

clean

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-22/hu-jintao-chinese-ex-president-escorted-out-of-party-congress/101566426

SCIENCE said:

clean

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-22/hu-jintao-chinese-ex-president-escorted-out-of-party-congress/101566426

Interesting

dv said:

SCIENCE said:

clean

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-22/hu-jintao-chinese-ex-president-escorted-out-of-party-congress/101566426

Interesting

Just Xi making sure the trash is taken out.

sibeen said:

dv said:

SCIENCE said:

clean

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-22/hu-jintao-chinese-ex-president-escorted-out-of-party-congress/101566426

Interesting

Just Xi making sure the trash is taken out.

we thought he already did that by infecting the world and foisting Lockdown on all of us

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-04/coronavirus-bin-isolation-outing-viral-costume-facebook-group/12116574

seeing as y’al’r’ so enthusiastic about the rotating doors with Ruddetc here and Cameronetc in the motherland, we thought y’al’d be relieved that there is good news for stability in the world order

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-23/chinese-leader-xi-jinping-named-to-third-term/101567072

SCIENCE said:

seeing as y’al’r’ so enthusiastic about the rotating doors with Ruddetc here and Cameronetc in the motherland, we thought y’al’d be relieved that there is good news for stability in the world order

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-23/chinese-leader-xi-jinping-named-to-third-term/101567072

Cameron? That pig-f***er?

captain_spalding said:

SCIENCE said:

seeing as y’al’r’ so enthusiastic about the rotating doors with Ruddetc here and Cameronetc in the motherland, we thought y’al’d be relieved that there is good news for stability in the world order

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-23/chinese-leader-xi-jinping-named-to-third-term/101567072

Cameron? That pig-f***er?

Unlike the seemingly permanent mediocracy in the CCP Cameron had the good grace to make a quiet exit from national leadership.

Xi Jinping has no interest in succession planning
The longer he clings to power, the harder it will be to engineer an orderly transition

Oct 20th 2022

The emperor Qin Shi Huang is celebrated for unifying China, starting its Great Wall and building himself a vast mausoleum, guarded by an army of terracotta warriors. Less widely known is what happened after he died in 210bc on a tour of eastern China. According to the historian Sima Qian, aides concealed the death until the imperial entourage reached the capital, in order to stop his eldest son and heir from taking power. They had food sent to the royal carriage and handled business from there as before. Carts of fish were placed nearby to mask the corpse’s stench. The ruse paid off at first. The eldest son committed suicide and a younger one, backed by the scheming aides, took the throne. But he proved weak. Within four years he was dead and the Qin dynasty collapsed.

Imperial Chinese history is littered with succession sagas tainted by bloodshed and skulduggery. Communist China was not much better for its first six decades. When Hu Jintao handed power to Xi Jinping in 2012 after ten years in office, it was the first complete, orderly leadership transition since the revolution in 1949. A decade later, however, Mr Xi is set to be granted a third five-year term—breaching the norms Mr Hu helped to establish—after the Communist Party’s congress ends on October 22nd. And with no end to the Xi era in sight, China is once again confronting questions that have plagued its history. How does an all-powerful leader retire? And what happens if one suddenly dies or is incapacitated?

China’s succession norms were admittedly flimsy and mostly unwritten. Deng Xiaoping, who took power in 1978, introduced them to protect against Mao-era despotism and Soviet-style gerontocracy. That did not stop him from wielding huge power almost until his death in 1997, aged 92. His successor, Jiang Zemin, also meddled in politics long after retiring. Some see 2012 as an anomaly. Yet the partial institutionalisation of succession, combined with collective leadership, provided enough stability to underpin an extraordinary economic expansion. With the shift back to one-man rule, some scholars now foresee succession problems common to other modern-day autocracies—as well as China’s own emperors.

Among such scholars is Erica Frantz at Michigan State University, who has compiled and analysed data on 301 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2020. She and her colleagues conclude that as autocrats concentrate power in their own hands, they tend to extend their own tenure—often considering themselves indispensable and fearing elite recriminations if they retire. But that often comes at the expense of the regime they represent. “These choices that Xi Jinping is making are positive for him in the short term, but in terms of the longer time horizon, they are elevating the risk that the regime will see instability and perhaps an earlier collapse,” says Ms Frantz.

One way for authoritarian regimes to enhance their resilience is to establish rigid term limits. The best example is Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party, which enforced a one-term cap on the presidency while in power from 1929 to 2000. That is rare, though. Another way is to designate a successor, clearly and early. But autocrats other than monarchs often avoid that, even when old or sick. Some fear the elite will reject their choice, as when Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe tried to hand power to his wife in 2017. Others worry that the anointed heir will try to seize power prematurely, as Mao’s second one, Lin Biao, was accused of doing in 1971.

Another concern for autocrats is that designating a successor implies an intention to step down imminently, limiting their options and undermining their authority. That is a more likely rationale for Mr Xi, who did not elevate a potential heir to the Politburo Standing Committee—the top leadership body—at the previous congress, as earlier norms required. Two or more next-generation Chinese leaders might be on the new Standing Committee to be unveiled on October 23rd. But none is considered a successor and Mr Xi, now 69, is widely thought to be planning another ten years in power, if not longer.

Although that may foster stability by clearly signalling Mr Xi’s intent, it also increases the risk that he dies or becomes seriously ill while in office. Democracies can obviously face such problems too: America’s current president is 79. Unlike America, though, China has no clear line of succession or procedures for filling unplanned leadership vacancies. An autocrat’s sudden death or incapacitation seldom leads to regime collapse in the short term. The elite usually coalesces around a replacement to protect its own interests. But it can cause infighting. A bitter power struggle erupted in China even before Mao’s death in 1976. Ill health, often concealed from the public, can also cause the kind of paralysis that plagued the Kremlin under its hospital-bound leaders Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko.

Mr Xi appears in fine enough fettle. But as a portly former smoker who was a local official in a period when regular banqueting and heavy drinking were de rigueur, he would be lucky to have avoided some associated ailments. And there have been occasional rumours of ill health, especially after he appeared to walk with a slight limp on a visit to Europe in 2019. The speech he gave at the congress on October 16th was about 90 minutes shorter than his three-and-a-half-hour marathon in 2017. Among the retired leaders on stage (many of whom now forgo the black hair dye they used in office), a white-haired Mr Hu (79) appeared markedly more frail than at past appearances—a reminder of how mortality could catch up with Mr Xi over the next decade.

If Mr Xi’s health endures, there is still time for him to identify one or more potential successors, possibly at the next congress in 2027 or the one after. But whoever replaces him will inevitably struggle to match his authority, especially if nominated relatively late. That is one reason why Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s president, has had trouble filling the shoes of Hugo Chávez, who named him as successor just three months before dying in 2013. China’s next leader will face an elite dominated by Xi loyalists and highly invested in the status quo—with no clear norms for how long to stay in power. “There will be power fragmentation and struggle after Xi’s rule,” predicts Yang Zhang of American University in Washington. “Without basic rules, succession means struggle. It’s just about when, and who will be involved.”

Research on China’s emperors reaches some similar conclusions. Yuhua Wang of Harvard University has compiled data on 282 emperors across 49 dynasties. He found that dynasties lasted for 70 years on average and the most common cause of collapse was elite rebellion. About half of all emperors died naturally. But identifying a successor made an emperor 64% less likely to be deposed. And their chances of dying naturally and preserving their dynasty increased further if they appointed an heir within five years of taking power—a similar timescale to the succession norms that Mr Xi is dismantling.

Mr Xi may not have crunched the data in the same way. But he displays an avid interest in China’s imperial past, frequently quoting from historical texts. Mao, whom Mr Xi emulates in so many ways, was also a fan of China’s ancient history. He often referred to the “Zizhi Tongjian”, a chronicle published in 1084 that recounts the lessons learned from previous Chinese emperors. That did not help him engineer a smooth succession. Of his heirs, one died in prison, another was killed in a plane crash after a failed coup attempt, and the last was toppled after just two years in power. Perhaps Mr Xi will fare better. But the longer he clings to power, history suggests, the harder that becomes.

https://www.economist.com/china/2022/10/20/xi-jinping-has-no-interest-in-succession-planning?

NETHERLANDS

China accused of operating ‘secret police stations’ in the Netherlands

https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/26/china-accused-of-operating-secret-police-stations-in-the-netherlands

dv said:

NETHERLANDS

China accused of operating ‘secret police stations’ in the Netherlands

https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/26/china-accused-of-operating-secret-police-stations-in-the-netherlands

They’ve got them in Australia too.

bastard CHINA police state restricts more Australian trade

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-29/hong-kong-seizes-meth-headed-to-australia/101594190

SCIENCE said:

bastard CHINA police state restricts more Australian trade

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-29/hong-kong-seizes-meth-headed-to-australia/101594190

let’s bomb them

or let us start development on the capability to bomb them

How a Mysterious China Screenshot Spurred $450 Billion Rally
Unverified post claimed top officials mulling reopening plan
Investors are desperate for signs Covid Zero policy will ease

ByBloomberg News
2 November 2022 at 20:00 GMT+11Updated on3 November 2022 at 10:30 GMT+11

Nobody is quite sure who wrote it, when it was written or if it’s even true. But a screenshot of four paragraphs detailing a China reopening plan was enough for traders to scoop up stocks for two days running.

The unverified post, which contained black characters on a white background with no identifying marks, first began circulating on Monday night in WeChat social messaging groups filled with analysts and fund managers, according to accounts by a dozen investors who asked not to be identified. By the next morning, it was spreading like wildfire.

The screenshot claimed that China’s No. 4 official Wang Huning — one of seven men on the powerful Politburo Standing Committee — held a meeting on Sunday of Covid-19 experts at the request of President Xi Jinping. It called Xi “big boss” and used “WHN” to refer to Wang in a bid to sidestep censors, who strictly manage messages and social media posts on China’s political elite.

Representatives at the meeting, which included members of the economic and propaganda departments, discussed “speeding up a conditional opening plan, with the goal of substantially opening by March next year,” it said.

The post gained more traction when it was shared at 11:26 a.m. by “96 Old Stock Trader” on Xueqiu, a Chinese-language financial platform. Less than 20 minutes later, prominent Hong Kong-based economist Hong Hao tweeted something similar — and stocks in the MSCI China Index were well on their way to a $320 billion rally. More gains on Wednesday brought the two-day total to $450 billion.

While Beijing initially stayed mum on the rumors, late Wednesday the China National Health Commission issued a fresh reaffirmation that the country would “firmly adhere” to Xi’s Covid Zero policy. But even that failed to dampen traders’ enthusiasm: US-listed China stocks kept rallying after the announcement.

Investors have been looking for reasons to scoop up Chinese stocks, which are among the worst performers in the world this year as the economy grows near the slowest pace in four decades. Equities saw a historic rout last week after Xi consolidated power in a twice-a-decade personnel reshuffle, and the yuan weakened to a 14-year low.

Covid lockdowns, weak consumption and an ailing housing sector have all clouded the investment outlook in China. And now that Xi has put his allies in key positions, hope is building for steps to boost the economy at the next annual session of China’s legislature in March.

“Reopening is not a decision that can be made overnight,” said Hong, a partner and chief economist at hedge fund Grow Investment Group. “It has to be through careful study and communication. That is why most of us think that after the Twin Sessions in March is a good time to reopen.”

Any easing carries big risks for Xi: Vaccination levels in China for people age 60 or older are lower than countries such as Singapore and South Korea. China’s official Xinhua News Agency last month cited a study saying that an uncontrolled omicron wave could overwhelm the hospital system and lead to nearly 1.6 million deaths — about 50% more than the US has recorded so far.

That scenario would undermine Xi’s approach both at home and abroad, and risk making him look weak at a time when the Communist Party leadership is facing criticism over a slowing economy.

Chinese stocks in Hong Kong extend rallies to second day

On Wednesday, more rumors were afoot as the rally continued. Twitter user Shanghai Macro Strategist, who claims to be a China strategist and has more than 14,000 followers, posted screenshots purporting to be from two Chinese brokerages reporting upcoming changes to China’s Covid policies. The user declined to comment further in a message to Bloomberg News.

One screenshot showed Haitong Securities Co. saying a meeting would be held Friday to ease quarantine requirements and remove circuit breakers for flights, among other measures. The brokerage said the screenshot wasn’t true in an emailed reply to Bloomberg News.

The other screenshot cited three analysts from Tianfeng Securities Co. saying that virus controls would be loosened. When contacted by Bloomberg News, all three analysts said they weren’t aware of any information about Covid policy.

Even as the Communist Party offers little transparency and severely restricts press freedom, officials in Beijing discouraged investors from reading too much into international media reports on China.

“A lot of media reports, let me put it this way, they really don’t understand China very well and they have a short-term focus,” Fang Xinghai, a vice chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, said in prerecorded remarks to Hong Kong’s banking summit on Wednesday. “I would advise the international investors to find out what’s really going on in China and what’s the real intention of our government by themselves.”

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-02/how-a-mysterious-china-screenshot-spurred-a-450-billion-rally?

…

Some bright spark probably made millions with this market friendly spiel. This would be investigated by financial authorities for market manipulation in most OECD countries.

Witty Rejoinder said:

How a Mysterious China Screenshot Spurred $450 Billion Rally
Unverified post claimed top officials mulling reopening plan
Investors are desperate for signs Covid Zero policy will ease

ByBloomberg News
2 November 2022 at 20:00 GMT+11Updated on3 November 2022 at 10:30 GMT+11

……snip……

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-02/how-a-mysterious-china-screenshot-spurred-a-450-billion-rally?

…

Some bright spark probably made millions with this market friendly spiel. This would be investigated by financial authorities for market manipulation in most OECD countries.

I reckon.

“Kerry King, the tarot queen, uses tarot and star sign wisdom to create inspiring forecasts and insights, with over 25 years fortune telling experience, and many happy clients all over the world. You can book a personal, written reading, which comes as a beautifully illustrated brochure, through Etsy or join her new Tarot Club and get weekly forecasts and more for £5 a month.”

That’s a small amount to pay for the comfort of knowing what the day, week or month holds for you.

China’s Business Elite See the Country That Let Them Thrive Slipping Away
The business class, which shunned politics, is now questioning if there is still a place for it in a system dominated by one ruler, Xi Jinping.

Li Yuan
Nov. 7, 2022

For decades, China’s business class had an unspoken contract with the Communist Party: Let us make money and we’ll turn a blind eye to how you use your power.

Like most Chinese people, they bought into the party’s argument that its one-party rule provides more efficient governance.

Now, the tacit agreement that entrepreneurs had come to count on is dissolving in front of their eyes. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, used an important Communist Party congress last month to establish near-absolute power and make it clear that security will trump the economy as the nation’s priority.

“My last lingering hope was dashed,” said the founder of an asset management firm in the southern city of Shenzhen who contacted me hours after the congress ended.

“Totally finished, completely lost control and absolutely terrifying,” a tech entrepreneur in Beijing texted me after seeing the party’s new leadership lineup, which is packed with Mr. Xi’s acolytes.

Like many Chinese, they fully expected Mr. Xi to secure a third term, breaking a norm followed since the 1980s. Still, they held on to the hope that his dominance would be tempered by other power factions within the party. Mr. Xi’s sweeping victory, by pushing out perceived moderates in favor of loyalists, made it clear that it would be a one-man-rule system that could last for decades.

China’s last leader as powerful as Mr. Xi, 69, was Mao Zedong, who led the country into the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution, which resulted in tens of millions of deaths, social chaos and economic destruction.

Last month’s party congress jolted the Chinese business world with uncertainty. It was seen publicly in the immediate market response: China’s stocks plunged, and its currency, the renminbi, fell in value. I am hearing it in the voices and messages of the many businesspeople I have spoken to in recent weeks who repeatedly call their reaction a “political depression.”

They are not displaying their anxiety in public, unlike a young demonstrator I wrote about in my last column. All the businesspeople I interviewed for this article requested anonymity for fear of punishment by the authorities. But they are expressing dissent in their own way, pledging to withhold further investment in China or even contemplating leaving their country for another that would exchange a passport for their wealth.

The party, under Mr. Xi, has taken control of nearly every aspect of society, costing Chinese people agency over their destinies. Members of the business class, especially those working at the top of the technology sector who operated with relatively few restrictions until a few years ago, have taken it especially hard.

These tech entrepreneurs mostly grew up “in the age of ‘economism,’ when money making, economic principles and economic rationality trumped everything else,” said Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California. “Now they see the regime puts politics in command,” he said. “For them, this is incomprehensible.”

In the past decade, Mr. Xi’s economic thinking can be summed up like this: bigger roles for the state and smaller roles for the market. He left the private sector largely alone in his first term, when he was busy consolidating his power within the party and the military. In his second term, which began in 2017, Mr. Xi kept private enterprises on a much tighter leash. The government cracked down on businesses, sending some of the country’s most successful businesspeople into early retirement or self-imposed exile. China’s harsh “zero-Covid” policy has left the economy in the worst shape in decades.

To Chinese in the business elite, who grew accustomed to the privilege and attention their success brought, the Big Boss, as many of them refer to Mr. Xi, doesn’t care about the economy or people like them. In his opening address at the party congress, Mr. Xi mentioned “security” 52 times, “Marxism” 15 times and “markets” three times.

A photo of seven men in dark suits and white shirts standing on a stage in front of a red backdrop.
China’s leader, Xi Jinping, center, solidified his dominant role at the Communist Party congress.Credit…Ng Han Guan/Associated Press

“There’s no question about the shift both in political rhetoric and in action and in also the appointment of the team,” said Professor Pei, who said he believed that Mr. Xi’s leadership lineup showed that he did not value expertise in managing a market-oriented economy. “He values people who can implement his policy regardless of the economic consequences.”

That makes the business community anxious. Under Mr. Xi, the ability of China’s bureaucracy to dictate to the public has increased while its ability to govern has decreased, Guoguang Wu, an adviser to former Premier Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s, told me on my Chinese-language podcast.

“When the ability to govern decreases, even in the absence of any particular policy from the top, the ineptitude, brutality, and ignorance of lower-level officials will brew disasters for the common people they rule over,” said Mr. Wu, who is a senior research scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions.

Many businesspeople have lost a lot of money under “zero-Covid,” which has shuttered cities and locked millions of people in their homes for weeks at a time as the government seeks to eliminate the coronavirus.

“Under the leadership of this dictator, our great country is falling into an abyss,” said a hardware tech executive in Shenzhen. “But you can’t do anything about it. It pains and depresses me.”

Despite many conversations over the years, we never talked about politics. I was surprised when he called after the party congress to talk about his “political depression.” He said he used to be very nationalistic, believing that the Chinese were among the smartest and hardest-working people in the world. Now, he and many of his friends spend most of their time hiking, golfing and drinking. “We’re too depressed to work,” he said.

Until a year ago, his start-up was doing so well that he was planning to take it public. Then he lost a big chunk of his revenues, and his new hires sat idly with nothing to do when cities were locked down under the “zero-Covid” rules. He said now he had no choice but to lay off more than 100 people, sell his business and move his family to North America.

“Since the dark night has descended,” he said, “I’ll deal with it the dark night way.”

The tech entrepreneur from Beijing who texted me after the party congress recounted a chilling experience. In May, when there were rumors that Beijing could be locked down, he felt he could not tell his employees to leave work early and stock up on groceries. He was worried that he could be reported for spreading rumors — something that had gotten people detained by the police. He told them only that they should feel free to leave early if they had things to take care of.

This successful businessman is now applying to emigrate to a European country and the United States.

Just like many ordinary Chinese people, the executives I spoke to said they were horrified by the video of Hu Jintao, Mr. Xi’s predecessor as China’s top leader, being abruptly led out of the closing ceremony of the party congress. They did not accept the official government explanation that Mr. Hu had to leave early because of health issues.

If Mr. Xi could remove his predecessor like that, several of them said, he could do anything to anyone.

A well-connected investor in Beijing said his friends who were entrepreneurs now realized they could no longer remain indifferent to politics. At social gatherings, they have started discussing which countries to seek passports from, and how to move their assets offshore. At social gatherings, hosts are asking friends to surrender their phones to be kept in a separate place for fear of surveillance.

After the party congress, most people in the investors’ circle expect that they will be forced to pay more in taxes or be expected to donate more money to universities and other state-backed charities. They are not planning to make any big investments.

“We’re all anxious,” he said. “We’re at a loss of what to do at this historical crossroad.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/07/business/xi-jinping-china-party-congress.html?

Witty Rejoinder said:

China’s Business Elite See the Country That Let Them Thrive Slipping Away
The business class, which shunned politics, is now questioning if there is still a place for it in a system dominated by one ruler, Xi Jinping.

Li Yuan
Nov. 7, 2022

For decades, China’s business class had an unspoken contract with the Communist Party: Let us make money and we’ll turn a blind eye to how you use your power.

Like most Chinese people, they bought into the party’s argument that its one-party rule provides more efficient governance.

Now, the tacit agreement that entrepreneurs had come to count on is dissolving in front of their eyes. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, used an important Communist Party congress last month to establish near-absolute power and make it clear that security will trump the economy as the nation’s priority.

“My last lingering hope was dashed,” said the founder of an asset management firm in the southern city of Shenzhen who contacted me hours after the congress ended.

“Totally finished, completely lost control and absolutely terrifying,” a tech entrepreneur in Beijing texted me after seeing the party’s new leadership lineup, which is packed with Mr. Xi’s acolytes.

Like many Chinese, they fully expected Mr. Xi to secure a third term, breaking a norm followed since the 1980s. Still, they held on to the hope that his dominance would be tempered by other power factions within the party. Mr. Xi’s sweeping victory, by pushing out perceived moderates in favor of loyalists, made it clear that it would be a one-man-rule system that could last for decades.

China’s last leader as powerful as Mr. Xi, 69, was Mao Zedong, who led the country into the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution, which resulted in tens of millions of deaths, social chaos and economic destruction.

Last month’s party congress jolted the Chinese business world with uncertainty. It was seen publicly in the immediate market response: China’s stocks plunged, and its currency, the renminbi, fell in value. I am hearing it in the voices and messages of the many businesspeople I have spoken to in recent weeks who repeatedly call their reaction a “political depression.”

They are not displaying their anxiety in public, unlike a young demonstrator I wrote about in my last column. All the businesspeople I interviewed for this article requested anonymity for fear of punishment by the authorities. But they are expressing dissent in their own way, pledging to withhold further investment in China or even contemplating leaving their country for another that would exchange a passport for their wealth.

The party, under Mr. Xi, has taken control of nearly every aspect of society, costing Chinese people agency over their destinies. Members of the business class, especially those working at the top of the technology sector who operated with relatively few restrictions until a few years ago, have taken it especially hard.

These tech entrepreneurs mostly grew up “in the age of ‘economism,’ when money making, economic principles and economic rationality trumped everything else,” said Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California. “Now they see the regime puts politics in command,” he said. “For them, this is incomprehensible.”

In the past decade, Mr. Xi’s economic thinking can be summed up like this: bigger roles for the state and smaller roles for the market. He left the private sector largely alone in his first term, when he was busy consolidating his power within the party and the military. In his second term, which began in 2017, Mr. Xi kept private enterprises on a much tighter leash. The government cracked down on businesses, sending some of the country’s most successful businesspeople into early retirement or self-imposed exile. China’s harsh “zero-Covid” policy has left the economy in the worst shape in decades.

To Chinese in the business elite, who grew accustomed to the privilege and attention their success brought, the Big Boss, as many of them refer to Mr. Xi, doesn’t care about the economy or people like them. In his opening address at the party congress, Mr. Xi mentioned “security” 52 times, “Marxism” 15 times and “markets” three times.

A photo of seven men in dark suits and white shirts standing on a stage in front of a red backdrop.
China’s leader, Xi Jinping, center, solidified his dominant role at the Communist Party congress.Credit…Ng Han Guan/Associated Press

“There’s no question about the shift both in political rhetoric and in action and in also the appointment of the team,” said Professor Pei, who said he believed that Mr. Xi’s leadership lineup showed that he did not value expertise in managing a market-oriented economy. “He values people who can implement his policy regardless of the economic consequences.”

That makes the business community anxious. Under Mr. Xi, the ability of China’s bureaucracy to dictate to the public has increased while its ability to govern has decreased, Guoguang Wu, an adviser to former Premier Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s, told me on my Chinese-language podcast.

“When the ability to govern decreases, even in the absence of any particular policy from the top, the ineptitude, brutality, and ignorance of lower-level officials will brew disasters for the common people they rule over,” said Mr. Wu, who is a senior research scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions.

Many businesspeople have lost a lot of money under “zero-Covid,” which has shuttered cities and locked millions of people in their homes for weeks at a time as the government seeks to eliminate the coronavirus.

“Under the leadership of this dictator, our great country is falling into an abyss,” said a hardware tech executive in Shenzhen. “But you can’t do anything about it. It pains and depresses me.”

Despite many conversations over the years, we never talked about politics. I was surprised when he called after the party congress to talk about his “political depression.” He said he used to be very nationalistic, believing that the Chinese were among the smartest and hardest-working people in the world. Now, he and many of his friends spend most of their time hiking, golfing and drinking. “We’re too depressed to work,” he said.

Until a year ago, his start-up was doing so well that he was planning to take it public. Then he lost a big chunk of his revenues, and his new hires sat idly with nothing to do when cities were locked down under the “zero-Covid” rules. He said now he had no choice but to lay off more than 100 people, sell his business and move his family to North America.

“Since the dark night has descended,” he said, “I’ll deal with it the dark night way.”

The tech entrepreneur from Beijing who texted me after the party congress recounted a chilling experience. In May, when there were rumors that Beijing could be locked down, he felt he could not tell his employees to leave work early and stock up on groceries. He was worried that he could be reported for spreading rumors — something that had gotten people detained by the police. He told them only that they should feel free to leave early if they had things to take care of.

This successful businessman is now applying to emigrate to a European country and the United States.

Just like many ordinary Chinese people, the executives I spoke to said they were horrified by the video of Hu Jintao, Mr. Xi’s predecessor as China’s top leader, being abruptly led out of the closing ceremony of the party congress. They did not accept the official government explanation that Mr. Hu had to leave early because of health issues.

If Mr. Xi could remove his predecessor like that, several of them said, he could do anything to anyone.

A well-connected investor in Beijing said his friends who were entrepreneurs now realized they could no longer remain indifferent to politics. At social gatherings, they have started discussing which countries to seek passports from, and how to move their assets offshore. At social gatherings, hosts are asking friends to surrender their phones to be kept in a separate place for fear of surveillance.

After the party congress, most people in the investors’ circle expect that they will be forced to pay more in taxes or be expected to donate more money to universities and other state-backed charities. They are not planning to make any big investments.

“We’re all anxious,” he said. “We’re at a loss of what to do at this historical crossroad.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/07/business/xi-jinping-china-party-congress.html?

The enemy within. The West needed China to slow down, although it will probably heighten belligerence.

PermeateFree said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

China’s Business Elite See the Country That Let Them Thrive Slipping Away
The business class, which shunned politics, is now questioning if there is still a place for it in a system dominated by one ruler, Xi Jinping.

Li Yuan
Nov. 7, 2022

For decades, China’s business class had an unspoken contract with the Communist Party: Let us make money and we’ll turn a blind eye to how you use your power.

Like most Chinese people, they bought into the party’s argument that its one-party rule provides more efficient governance.

Now, the tacit agreement that entrepreneurs had come to count on is dissolving in front of their eyes. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, used an important Communist Party congress last month to establish near-absolute power and make it clear that security will trump the economy as the nation’s priority.

“My last lingering hope was dashed,” said the founder of an asset management firm in the southern city of Shenzhen who contacted me hours after the congress ended.

“Totally finished, completely lost control and absolutely terrifying,” a tech entrepreneur in Beijing texted me after seeing the party’s new leadership lineup, which is packed with Mr. Xi’s acolytes.

Like many Chinese, they fully expected Mr. Xi to secure a third term, breaking a norm followed since the 1980s. Still, they held on to the hope that his dominance would be tempered by other power factions within the party. Mr. Xi’s sweeping victory, by pushing out perceived moderates in favor of loyalists, made it clear that it would be a one-man-rule system that could last for decades.

China’s last leader as powerful as Mr. Xi, 69, was Mao Zedong, who led the country into the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution, which resulted in tens of millions of deaths, social chaos and economic destruction.

Last month’s party congress jolted the Chinese business world with uncertainty. It was seen publicly in the immediate market response: China’s stocks plunged, and its currency, the renminbi, fell in value. I am hearing it in the voices and messages of the many businesspeople I have spoken to in recent weeks who repeatedly call their reaction a “political depression.”

They are not displaying their anxiety in public, unlike a young demonstrator I wrote about in my last column. All the businesspeople I interviewed for this article requested anonymity for fear of punishment by the authorities. But they are expressing dissent in their own way, pledging to withhold further investment in China or even contemplating leaving their country for another that would exchange a passport for their wealth.

The party, under Mr. Xi, has taken control of nearly every aspect of society, costing Chinese people agency over their destinies. Members of the business class, especially those working at the top of the technology sector who operated with relatively few restrictions until a few years ago, have taken it especially hard.

These tech entrepreneurs mostly grew up “in the age of ‘economism,’ when money making, economic principles and economic rationality trumped everything else,” said Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California. “Now they see the regime puts politics in command,” he said. “For them, this is incomprehensible.”

In the past decade, Mr. Xi’s economic thinking can be summed up like this: bigger roles for the state and smaller roles for the market. He left the private sector largely alone in his first term, when he was busy consolidating his power within the party and the military. In his second term, which began in 2017, Mr. Xi kept private enterprises on a much tighter leash. The government cracked down on businesses, sending some of the country’s most successful businesspeople into early retirement or self-imposed exile. China’s harsh “zero-Covid” policy has left the economy in the worst shape in decades.

To Chinese in the business elite, who grew accustomed to the privilege and attention their success brought, the Big Boss, as many of them refer to Mr. Xi, doesn’t care about the economy or people like them. In his opening address at the party congress, Mr. Xi mentioned “security” 52 times, “Marxism” 15 times and “markets” three times.

A photo of seven men in dark suits and white shirts standing on a stage in front of a red backdrop.
China’s leader, Xi Jinping, center, solidified his dominant role at the Communist Party congress.Credit…Ng Han Guan/Associated Press

“There’s no question about the shift both in political rhetoric and in action and in also the appointment of the team,” said Professor Pei, who said he believed that Mr. Xi’s leadership lineup showed that he did not value expertise in managing a market-oriented economy. “He values people who can implement his policy regardless of the economic consequences.”

That makes the business community anxious. Under Mr. Xi, the ability of China’s bureaucracy to dictate to the public has increased while its ability to govern has decreased, Guoguang Wu, an adviser to former Premier Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s, told me on my Chinese-language podcast.

“When the ability to govern decreases, even in the absence of any particular policy from the top, the ineptitude, brutality, and ignorance of lower-level officials will brew disasters for the common people they rule over,” said Mr. Wu, who is a senior research scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions.

Many businesspeople have lost a lot of money under “zero-Covid,” which has shuttered cities and locked millions of people in their homes for weeks at a time as the government seeks to eliminate the coronavirus.

“Under the leadership of this dictator, our great country is falling into an abyss,” said a hardware tech executive in Shenzhen. “But you can’t do anything about it. It pains and depresses me.”

Despite many conversations over the years, we never talked about politics. I was surprised when he called after the party congress to talk about his “political depression.” He said he used to be very nationalistic, believing that the Chinese were among the smartest and hardest-working people in the world. Now, he and many of his friends spend most of their time hiking, golfing and drinking. “We’re too depressed to work,” he said.

Until a year ago, his start-up was doing so well that he was planning to take it public. Then he lost a big chunk of his revenues, and his new hires sat idly with nothing to do when cities were locked down under the “zero-Covid” rules. He said now he had no choice but to lay off more than 100 people, sell his business and move his family to North America.

“Since the dark night has descended,” he said, “I’ll deal with it the dark night way.”

The tech entrepreneur from Beijing who texted me after the party congress recounted a chilling experience. In May, when there were rumors that Beijing could be locked down, he felt he could not tell his employees to leave work early and stock up on groceries. He was worried that he could be reported for spreading rumors — something that had gotten people detained by the police. He told them only that they should feel free to leave early if they had things to take care of.

This successful businessman is now applying to emigrate to a European country and the United States.

Just like many ordinary Chinese people, the executives I spoke to said they were horrified by the video of Hu Jintao, Mr. Xi’s predecessor as China’s top leader, being abruptly led out of the closing ceremony of the party congress. They did not accept the official government explanation that Mr. Hu had to leave early because of health issues.

If Mr. Xi could remove his predecessor like that, several of them said, he could do anything to anyone.

A well-connected investor in Beijing said his friends who were entrepreneurs now realized they could no longer remain indifferent to politics. At social gatherings, they have started discussing which countries to seek passports from, and how to move their assets offshore. At social gatherings, hosts are asking friends to surrender their phones to be kept in a separate place for fear of surveillance.

After the party congress, most people in the investors’ circle expect that they will be forced to pay more in taxes or be expected to donate more money to universities and other state-backed charities. They are not planning to make any big investments.

“We’re all anxious,” he said. “We’re at a loss of what to do at this historical crossroad.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/07/business/xi-jinping-china-party-congress.html?

The enemy within. The West needed China to slow down, although it will probably heighten belligerence.

I don’t suppose China is doing anything different to any previous, upcoming or currently existing empire.
Take what they want be force, disregard the rights of minorities, exploit others, etc
Only difference really is the world can’t afford it anymore

As i said some months back, Deng Xiao Ping gave the Chinese people a choice: you can have money, or you can have freedom, but not both.

They went for money.

As Xi Jinping craves territory abroad, his real problems are at home
Yun Jiang
Contributor

November 9, 2022 — 3.30pm

Xi Jinping has declared the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China a “complete success”. But looking ahead, the party will have to deal with the most challenging period for the country in decades, as a pervasive sense of pessimism envelopes people inside the People’s Republic of China.

Many of the difficulties are self-inflicted. The most crucial challenge for the party is the drastic slowing of the economy. Since the reform and opening up in the late 1970s, the party’s social contract with the people has been based on economic growth and a sustained increase in the standard of living.

Despite Xi’s focus on the importance of ideology, economic growth is still paramount in most people’s eyes. How Chinese citizens judge the competence of the party is often on whether they believe their lives are getting better. Indeed, such a line has been used by party officials to deflect any external criticisms.

But this social contract is fracturing. Compared with the economic heydays of the 2000s and 2010s, people are no longer as certain their quality of living will improve or that the next generation will live a better life.

This pessimism is especially stark among young people. The urban youth unemployment rate has reached a record 20 per cent. While many are struggling to find work, some are also disillusioned with work itself. The “lying flat” movement, which shares a similar sentiment to “quiet quitting” in the United States or Australia, has become viral. The urge to work relentlessly to improve one’s situation in life is no longer as strong.

Some of China’s economic downturn can be attributed to its strict adherence to the zero-COVID policy, for which there is no end in sight. Cities in China are still being locked down because of a few COVID cases. These lockdowns disrupt businesses and people’s livelihoods, affecting both supply and demand.

As economic growth slows, Xi is trying to diversify the source of party legitimacy. From the party congress, two more sources of legitimacy have emerged: common prosperity and nationalism.

Common prosperity is Xi’s signature economic policy to reduce inequality and boost the quality of life for ordinary people. It is too early to judge whether inequality is indeed reducing under this policy banner, as the term was only introduced a year ago. So far, it has spooked some big technology companies into philanthropy.

Besides, some doubts remain that Xi will continue to push hard on reducing inequality in the face of drastic slowing growth. In the real estate sector, for example, the party has tried to curb the excesses of the property market. Yet, the real estate crisis this year has prompted the government to reverse that policy.

As for nationalism, the party has been trying to encourage it among the population since the 1990s. Xi is doubling down on this to reassert the party’s long-term goal of national rejuvenation. But the rising nationalism in China in the past three decades has been built upon the increasing prosperity of the country. In the past year, however, a sense of pessimism has replaced optimism, with people becoming less nationalistic as a result.

It’s not just due to the slowing growth. In China, the zero COVID policy has led to the resurging strong arm of the state. This is visible everywhere in the form of “Big White” – government officials who enforce quarantine and testing. Some of their more inhumane acts have been criticised in the country, from the mistreatment of pets to forcing people to stay in their buildings during an earthquake. And then there was the quarantine bus crash in which 27 people died on the way to a quarantine facility.

While China’s citizens were once proud of the party’s focus on protecting lives early in the pandemic, the over-the-top compliance measures have led to outcries and distrust towards the competence of local officials and doubts about the COVID policy.

The problem is especially acute as there is still no road map to ending the zero COVID policy, be it vaccines or otherwise. The party official responsible for the chaotic lockdowns in Shanghai was promoted to the second most powerful position in the party. And the signal from the party congress is that the policy will continue. Meanwhile, COVID testing now accounts for up to 1.3 per cent of China’s GDP and 7.2 per cent of public revenue, making the mandatory testing regime harder to dismantle. Local governments will also find it difficult to give up the power and control they gained from lockdowns.

Living under constant uncertainty of lockdowns and the sometimes arbitrary enforcement of quarantine, more and more middle-class and wealthy citizens are considering leaving China. Those currently overseas are rethinking their plans to return. This can severely hamper China’s efforts to attract enough people to achieve its ambition of becoming a technological superpower.

While Xi was triumphant in getting his third term, the party is facing a challenging period ahead. In the future, we may look back on 2022 as a turning point when optimism shifted to pessimism.

Much depends on whether Xi Jinping can successfully diversify the party’s sources of legitimacy as the economy slows. Xi is right that there could be “high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms” ahead – especially if the party cannot renew the social contract with the people.

https://www.theage.com.au/national/as-xi-jinping-craves-territory-abroad-his-real-problems-are-at-home-20221107-p5bw8f.html

Witty Rejoinder said:

As Xi Jinping craves territory abroad, his real problems are at home
Yun Jiang
Contributor

November 9, 2022 — 3.30pm

/..cut by me master transition../

https://www.theage.com.au/national/as-xi-jinping-craves-territory-abroad-his-real-problems-are-at-home-20221107-p5bw8f.html

read that

all’s well in the west

transition said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

As Xi Jinping craves territory abroad, his real problems are at home
Yun Jiang
Contributor

November 9, 2022 — 3.30pm

/..cut by me master transition../

https://www.theage.com.au/national/as-xi-jinping-craves-territory-abroad-his-real-problems-are-at-home-20221107-p5bw8f.html

read that

all’s well in the west

Not quite, but better than in China or Russia.

A Dangerous Game Over Taiwan
For decades, China has coveted its island neighbor. Is Xi Jinping ready to seize it?
By Dexter Filkins

November 14, 2022

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/11/21/a-dangerous-game-over-taiwan?

Witty Rejoinder said:

A Dangerous Game Over Taiwan
For decades, China has coveted its island neighbor. Is Xi Jinping ready to seize it?
By Dexter Filkins

November 14, 2022

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/11/21/a-dangerous-game-over-taiwan?

China wants a taste of economic collapse from international sanctions, over and above the economic woes they already have from their housing market crash and fanatical Covid lockdowns?

party_pants said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

A Dangerous Game Over Taiwan
For decades, China has coveted its island neighbor. Is Xi Jinping ready to seize it?
By Dexter Filkins

November 14, 2022

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/11/21/a-dangerous-game-over-taiwan??

China wants a taste of economic collapse from international sanctions, over and above the economic woes they already have from their housing market crash and fanatical Covid lockdowns?

fair, the whole point of Let It Rip® was that it couldn’t get worse than how terrible 2020 and half of 2021 were, right

Covid Lockdown Chaos Sets Off a Rare Protest in a Chinese City
Weary migrants thronged a street in the manufacturing hub of Guangzhou to protest food shortages and lengthy stay-at-home orders under China’s strict “zero-Covid” policy.

By Chang Che and John Liu
Nov. 16, 2022

A lengthy lockdown and shortages of food prompted residents to take to the streets in China’s southern manufacturing hub of Guangzhou, a rare protest that reflected the growing public frustration with disruptions caused by the country’s Covid restrictions.

China maintains the world’s most stringent approach to Covid, a policy that relies heavily on mass lockdowns, quarantines and mandatory near-daily testing across the country. Whole regions and cities, including Shanghai, have been placed under strict lockdowns, derailing millions of people’s lives, forcing businesses to close and stirring public outrage.

The psychological toll of China’s “zero-Covid” policy is mounting. Earlier this month, a poorly managed outbreak in the world’s largest iPhone assembly complex in Zhengzhou led to a worker exodus and a delay in iPhone shipments around the world.

The restrictions have periodically prompted unrest, such as in Guangzhou on Monday evening, when throngs of residents marched down Qiaonanxin Street to protest the lack of food and daily necessities after being confined at home for three weeks, according to four owners of restaurants and shops on the street who were interviewed by phone.

A surge of Covid cases in Guangzhou in recent weeks prompted officials to enforce lockdowns in several districts that are home to roughly 6 million people, according to government announcements on social media. In the southern district of Haizhu, where Qiaonanxin Street is, the 1.8 million residents were ordered to stay at home and undergo daily testing. Travel was restricted. Schools moved online. The authorities put up barricades around neighborhoods where positive cases were recorded.

Some of the protesters tore down the fencing and the barricades that had been erected outside their housing compounds, according to two restaurant owners who would only give their surnames, Hu and Zhao. It was unclear if there were any casualties.

Many of the protesters were migrant workers from Hubei and its neighboring provinces working in Guangzhou’s textile industry, said Mr. Hu as well as another restaurant owner, whose surname is Dai.

Videos circulating on social media showed an overturned police vehicle, ransacked food provisions and altercations between residents and health officials. Officers at a police station in Haizhu, reached by phone, said that they did not know about the incident.

The police arrived a few hours later, said the four people, and the crowd soon dissipated.

As of Wednesday, over a dozen neighborhoods in the area near Qiaonanxin Street remained under lockdown, and officials have not provided a date for lifting the order.

Guangzhou officials said that 95 percent of Covid cases found in the city on Monday were in the Haizhu district, according to a news conference on Tuesday. Food and other daily necessities had been distributed free of charge, and the supplies of fruits and vegetables have been increased on top of the original provisions, said Fu Xiaochu, a Haizhu district official.

Huang Kunming, the Communist Party leader of Guangdong Province, of which Guangzhou is the capital, visited the city on Tuesday and urged health officials to “win the battle” of pandemic prevention.

The central government pledged last week to refine its Covid rules in an attempt to limit the disruption caused to people’s lives and to reduce the strain on public health care. Officials relaxed China’s quarantine period for inbound travelers to a minimum of five days from seven and said that contacts of contacts would no longer be tracked.

But as case counts nationwide reached 19,609 on Wednesday, the highest daily total in over six months, how far the government may go in easing restrictions remains unclear. Investors rejoiced at the easing of quarantine rules that have been a major drag on the economy, but for most Chinese, the daily reality of having one’s movements restricted has not changed.

Nor has China’s rhetoric. On Tuesday, days after some Covid rules were changed, the People’s Daily, China’s state newspaper, published an article with a familiar headline: To “unswervingly implement the ‘zero-Covid’ policy.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/asia/china-covid-protest.html?

Witty Rejoinder said:

Covid Lockdown Chaos Sets Off a Rare Protest in a Chinese City
Weary migrants thronged a street in the manufacturing hub of Guangzhou to protest food shortages and lengthy stay-at-home orders under China’s strict “zero-Covid” policy.

By Chang Che and John Liu
Nov. 16, 2022
/…cut by me master transition…/

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/asia/china-covid-protest.html?

good on them

transition said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Covid Lockdown Chaos Sets Off a Rare Protest in a Chinese City
Weary migrants thronged a street in the manufacturing hub of Guangzhou to protest food shortages and lengthy stay-at-home orders under China’s strict “zero-Covid” policy.

By Chang Che and John Liu
Nov. 16, 2022
/…cut by me master transition…/

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/asia/china-covid-protest.html?

good on them

dynamic zero I mean

transition said:

transition said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Covid Lockdown Chaos Sets Off a Rare Protest in a Chinese City
Weary migrants thronged a street in the manufacturing hub of Guangzhou to protest food shortages and lengthy stay-at-home orders under China’s strict “zero-Covid” policy.

By Chang Che and John Liu
Nov. 16, 2022
/…cut by me master transition…/

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/asia/china-covid-protest.html?

good on them

dynamic zero I mean

love how everyone gloats at the temptation of massive manufacturing supply disruption

SCIENCE said:

transition said:

transition said:

good on them

dynamic zero I mean

love how everyone gloats at the temptation of massive manufacturing supply disruption

yes reckon be multiplied many times more bad into a reality of worseness if the covid bomb visited, though’s much excitement about it visiting from outside, from those that knows best what is better for China, and who are the experts re that, I wonders, I wonders really hard

No Gritted Teeth Here

In a Challenge to Beijing, Unrest Over Covid Lockdowns Spreads
Protests are rising as China enacts more lockdowns and quarantines, with no end in sight. The defiance is a test of Xi Jinping’s authoritarian leadership.

By Amy Chang Chien, Chang Che, John Liu and Paul Mozur
Nov. 24, 2022

In an iPhone factory in central China, thousands of workers clashed with riot police and tore down barricades.

In the southern city of Guangzhou, protesters broke out of locked-down buildings to confront health workers and ransack food provisions.

And online, many Chinese raged at the authorities after the death of a 4-month-old girl, whose father said access to medical treatment was delayed because of Covid restrictions.

As China’s harsh Covid rules extend deep into their third year, there are growing signs of discontent across the country. For China’s leader, Xi Jinping, the unrest is a test of his precedent-breaking third term in power and underscores the urgent political question of how he can lead China out of the Covid era.

The rare displays of defiance over the past two weeks are the most visible signs of frustration and desperation with the lockdowns, quarantines and mass testing that have upended everyday life. The anger, combined with outbreaks of Covid across the country that have driven cases to an all-time high, augurs a dark winter ahead.

Earlier this month, officials said they would adjust Covid restrictions to limit the impact the disruptions have had on the economy and government resources. The latest surge in cases has called that pledge into question, with many officials falling back on familiar heavy-handed measures to try to stop the spread of the virus.

Whether Mr. Xi can find a middle ground will reflect on China’s status as the world’s factory floor and a major driver of global economic growth. Some multinational companies are already looking to expand production elsewhere.

“What we’re witnessing at Foxconn is the bankruptcy of ‘the China model,’” said Wu Qiang, a political analyst in Beijing, referring to the Taiwanese operator of the plant in central China that produces half of the world’s iPhones. “It’s the collapse of China’s image as a production powerhouse, as well as China’s relationship to globalization.”

Many will be watching to see if recent chaos at Foxconn’s plant spreads elsewhere. Even before the riot that broke out at the plant this week, Apple had warned that a poorly organized lockdown there would impact its sales. Analysts have predicted longer waiting times for holiday purchases of the iPhone 14 Pro and 14 Pro Max.

“If the government continues with its zero-Covid policy, Foxconn would only be the beginning. There is Foxconn today, but other factories will face similar situations,” said Li Qiang, founder and executive director of China Labor Watch, a New York-based Chinese labor rights group.

The Foxconn workers were lashing out about a delay in the payment of bonuses as well as the Taiwanese assembler’s failure to properly isolate new workers from those who had tested positive. The new hires had been recruited recently after thousands of workers fled the Foxconn plant last month because of a Covid outbreak.

From Tuesday evening until the dawn of Wednesday, thousands of workers clashed with riot police and health workers, according to four workers who spoke to The Times. Protesters destroyed barricades, stole food supplies and hurled pieces of fencing at the authorities.

“We protested the whole day, from day to night,” said Han Li, a new worker from Zhengzhou who had joined the protests. He said he had felt deceived, and that the bonus payments and living conditions at the factory were different from what he had been promised. Mr. Han said he saw workers get beaten and injured.

Videos that Foxconn workers shared with The Times showed workers, by the thousands, thrashing and hurling steel beams against police wearing riot gear and protective suits. One video, taken at dawn, showed the apparent aftermath: A motionless worker curled up on the roadside as a crew of security personnel stomped and kicked him. Another sat on the road with a bloodied sweater and towel wrapped over his head.

In a statement, Foxconn attributed the delayed bonuses to “a technical error” in its hiring system. Regarding the violence, it vowed to work with employees and the government to “prevent similar accidents from happening again.”

An Apple spokesman told The Times that Apple team members on the ground in Zhengzhou were “reviewing the situation” and were working with Foxconn “to ensure their employees’ concerns are addressed.”

On Wednesday evening, Foxconn promised $1,400 to workers who wished to resign, offering them free transportation home.

“It’s all tears,” Mr. Han said on Thursday. “Now I just want to get my compensation and go home.”

In some ways, China’s struggles are of Mr. Xi’s own making. China has clung to harsh “zero-Covid” policies aimed at eradicating Covid infections, even as its vaccination efforts have lagged. For three years, Beijing pumped out propaganda in support of tough controls, arguing they were the only way to protect lives. It also described the terrifying consequences of the uncontrolled spread of the virus in much of the rest of the world.

At the same time, many others have questioned the need for lockdowns at all. This week, as millions of Chinese tuned in to watch the World Cup in Qatar, they saw unmasked crowds rooting for their favorite teams. Chinese social media users posted messages expressing sarcasm and envy, as they contrasted their cloistered lives with the raucous celebrations on TV.

Mr. Xi, one of China’s most powerful leaders in decades, has used heavy censorship and severe punishments to silence his critics. That makes the public airing of grievances particularly striking, such as in Guangzhou last week, when throngs of migrant workers staged a forceful protest after being confined for over three weeks.

In the locked-down district of Haizhu, home to roughly 1.8 million people, the workers, many of whom toil for long hours and low pay in Guangzhou’s textile industry, rushed into the street to protest food shortages. They tore down fences and barricades, and videos circulating online showed another confrontation between residents and police.

Social media footage showed a large crowd confronting Covid workers wearing protective suits and tearing down fences installed as virus control measures in Guangzhou, China. It was unclear whether there were any casualties.CreditCredit…Video Obtained by Reuters
As cases continue to climb, the government’s pandemic prevention resources — which include food, hospital beds and quarantine facilities — have in some places been depleted, forcing workers to sleep on the streets or, in the case of Haizhu, in a tunnel, workers said.

People have also been angered by reports of deaths caused by delays in medical care resulting from Covid restrictions. Earlier this month, the death of a 3-year-old boy in the city of Lanzhou after coronavirus restrictions kept him from being taken promptly to a hospital drew an outpouring of grief and anger as well as fresh scrutiny of the costs of “zero Covid.”

A similar outcry erupted online last week following the death of a 4-month-old girl whose father took to Weibo, a Twitter-like Chinese social media outlet, to describe delays in the emergency response. Due to Covid protocols, dispatchers declined to send an ambulance, and when one arrived, responders refused to take his daughter to a hospital. In total, it took 12 hours for her to receive help.

“I hope the relevant departments will intervene, investigate a series of loopholes in epidemic prevention, inaction and irresponsibility, and seek justice for us ordinary people,” wrote Li Baoliang, the baby’s father. On Sunday, authorities released the results of an investigation into the incident. While the government expressed condolences to the family, it blamed the tragedy on individual medical staff who it said have a weak sense of responsibility.

Beneath Mr. Li’s online complaint, many pointed to the harms being done by policies designed to protect the public.

“What is taking people’s lives? Is it Covid?” asked one commenter.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/24/world/asia/china-unrest-covid-lockdowns.html?

Protests erupt in Shanghai and other Chinese cities over COVID controls
By Chris Buckley
November 27, 2022 — 11.00am

Protests spread to cities and campuses in China on Saturday night amid rising public anger at the country’s strict but faltering controls against the spread of COVID-19, with a crowd in Shanghai going so far as to call for the removal of the national leader, Xi Jinping.

The demonstration occurred after an outpouring of anger online and after a street protest erupted on Friday in Urumqi, the regional capital of Xinjiang in western China, where at least 10 people died and nine others were injured a day earlier in an apartment fire. Many Chinese people say they suspect that those killed were hindered from escaping their homes by COVID restrictions – despite government denials.

The tragedy has fanned broader calls for officials to ease China’s harsh regimen of COVID tests, urban lockdowns and restrictions on movement three years into the pandemic.

The biggest protest on Saturday appeared to have occurred in Shanghai, where college and university students were among hundreds of people who gathered at an intersection of Urumqi Road – named after the city in Xinjiang – to mourn the dead with candles and signs. The numbers grew, defying police efforts to hold back the throng, and chants broke out, with people calling for an easing of the COVID controls, video footage showed.

“We want freedom,” the protesters chanted.

They used obscene language to denounce the demand that residents check in with a COVID phone app in public places such as shops and parks. While lines of police officers watched, some in the crowd directed their anger at Xi, a rare act of political defiance that was likely to alarm Communist Party officials, prompting tighter censorship and policing.

“Xi Jinping!” a man in the crowd repeatedly shouted.

“Step down!” some chanted in response.

Xi won a groundbreaking third term as the Communist Party’s general secretary last month, entrenching his status as China’s most powerful leader in decades. He also packed a new national leadership lineup with loyalist officials, and his hold on power seems assured.

But the night of public anger indicated that Xi’s stringent COVID policies, heralded as a success for China after the pandemic spread globally from there in early 2020, have increasingly become a liability. The COVID controls have hurt restaurants, tour operators and other small businesses, adding to China’s recent economic slowdown.

The outbreak of discontent also appears likely to add pressure to the Chinese government’s efforts to maintain a “dynamic zero COVID” policy. This month, the government announced measures to ease the restrictions that have made travel and business difficult for many residents. But local authorities are still under pressure to keep infections to near zero, leading to confusion and flip-flops in rules.

The deadly fire in Urumqi appeared to crystallise public anger over those pressures.

“Before I felt I was a coward, but now at this moment I feel I can stand up,” a young man who said he was from Xinjiang told a gathering at a campus of the Communication University of China in Nanjing, in eastern China, according to a video published online and whose location was verified by The New York Times. Hundreds held up their phones like lit candles.

“I speak for my home region, speak for those friends who lost relatives and kin in the fire disaster and,” he added, “for the deceased.”

https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/protests-erupt-in-shanghai-and-other-chinese-cities-over-covid-controls-20221127-p5c1le.html

Witty Rejoinder said:

“Before I felt I was a coward, but now at this moment I feel I can stand up,” a young man who said he was from Xinjiang told a gathering at a campus of the Communication University of China in Nanjing, in eastern China, according to a video published online and whose location was verified by The New York Times. Hundreds held up their phones like lit candles.

“I speak for my home region, speak for those friends who lost relatives and kin in the fire disaster and,” he added, “for the deceased.”

https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/protests-erupt-in-shanghai-and-other-chinese-cities-over-covid-controls-20221127-p5c1le.html

Hey, are those tank engines i hear in the distance…?

captain_spalding said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

“Before I felt I was a coward, but now at this moment I feel I can stand up,” a young man who said he was from Xinjiang told a gathering at a campus of the Communication University of China in Nanjing, in eastern China, according to a video published online and whose location was verified by The New York Times. Hundreds held up their phones like lit candles.

“I speak for my home region, speak for those friends who lost relatives and kin in the fire disaster and,” he added, “for the deceased.”

https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/protests-erupt-in-shanghai-and-other-chinese-cities-over-covid-controls-20221127-p5c1le.html

Hey, are those tank engines i hear in the distance…?

Has a listen.

No, those are tractor engines towing tanks.

so the biological warfare worked

Unrest breaks out across China, as frustration at lockdowns grows
No one knows how or when Xi Jinping’s zero-covid policy will end

Nov 27th 2022 | BEIJING

From urumqi in the northwest to Shanghai in the east, demonstrations and protests have rocked China in recent days. They have varied in size, tenor and composition, but all have been united by one theme: demands for an end to the harsh lockdowns and arbitrary controls of the country’s “zero-covid” campaign. Taken together, they represent a broad-based and diverse bellow of frustration of a sort very rarely heard in China. Though not all protests are explicitly political, they are an unmistakable rebuke for President Xi Jinping, hailed by state media as “commander in chief of the people’s war against covid”.

Many people are increasingly fed up with that war. The latest trigger came on November 24th, when a fire at an apartment block in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang region, killed at least ten people and injured nine others. Local residents claimed that doorways and fire exits in the building were sealed to control covid. Officials in Urumqi denied this. “Some residents’ ability to rescue themselves was too weak…and they failed to escape,” explained the head of the fire brigade, causing yet more anger. Xinjiang, home to China’s Uyghur minority, has been under tight covid restrictions for months.

The plight of the Uyghurs often does not resonate in the rest of China. Over the past decade the government has detained hundreds of thousands of them for arbitrary reasons and kept Xinjiang under intense surveillance. The fire, though, prompted angry residents to stage protests at astonishing personal risk. And, in a rare display of inter-ethnic solidarity, those protests spread. Predominantly young people in Shanghai gathered over the weekend to hold vigils for the fire victims on Urumqi Road, a street better known for hipster cafes and clothes shops. Some even called for the overthrow of Mr Xi and the Communist Party. A protest in Beijing on November 27th lasted well into the night, with chants of solidarity for those arrested in Shanghai and for the dead in Xinjiang. Dozens of university campuses across the country have also seen demonstrations against the zero-covid policy.

These are merely the latest signs that Chinese citizens think the policy has lasted too long. In recent weeks there have been instances of indignant residents variously kicking down steel barriers meant to seal them in housing estates or—at the most genteel end of the protests—calling the police to question the legal authority of locally-enforced covid restrictions. Crowds of workers at the largest iPhone factory in the world, outside the city of Zhengzhou, clashed with riot police on November 23rd. They were reportedly angry about broken promises by Foxconn, which runs the factory, over bonuses and after newly hired workers were put in the same dormitories as the existing workforce, despite many suspected covid cases on the vast Foxconn campus. Earlier this month, some Foxconn workers climbed fences to flee an outbreak on the campus. (Foxconn says that all contractual promises have been met and that infected workers were not still living in factory dorms.)

Even as frustration with the zero-covid policy grows, no exit plan appears in the offing. China has squandered the whole of 2022, refusing to undertake the preparations that would be needed for a safe, planned opening up to the world. There are no signs of a new booster campaign to protect China’s under-vaccinated population, which includes the oldest Chinese. Foreign diplomats recently visited China’s most modern production site for making covid vaccines and found it all but idle, suggesting that no large orders have even been placed. Meanwhile, the most effective mrna shots, produced in Western countries, have never been approved for use in China. A rapid opening at the start of winter would bring about the waves of deaths that the party has boasted of avoiding until now.

The authorities have, at least, started tweaking their controls to make them more precise—and more durable. But the 20-point plan released by the government two weeks ago, which aims to eliminate inefficient tactics, has arguably contributed to the current mood. Earlier this year party leaders expressly condemned dissent over the zero-covid policy. By suggesting that unreasonable controls can be lifted, though, the party has made debate about the whole policy legitimate. It has also triggered confusion, with controls being eased and then hastily re-imposed in such large cities as Shijiazhuang, near Beijing.

What next?

For Mr Xi, the immediate challenge is curbing the unrest. Over 73 years of iron-fisted rule, the party has learned to pick its battles and bring different weapons to each fight. Its tactics lean towards violent repression in regions such as Xinjiang, where there is fear of ethnic conflict. Student protest leaders risk long jail terms (university leaders were recently filmed warning students that their parents may be called if they do not return to their dorms). But in the face of worker protests, a mixture of pay-offs and coercion are typically used to restore calm (though ringleaders can expect to be taken away and punished). As for disgruntled middle-class urbanites, the party often stands ready to bargain with them, offering concessions as long as its overall authority is not questioned.

Some of these tactics were on display in Tiantongyuan, a housing estate of shabby tower blocks in Beijing that is home to hundreds of thousands of residents, many of them migrant workers from outside the capital. On November 26th smartphone images showed residents kicking down the blue steel fencing erected to seal off part of the estate. But on the following day your correspondent easily walked into the same compound after a scan of his Beijing health-code app. Explaining the unrest, a middle-aged man said that many of his neighbours are blue-collar workers who go unpaid if they are locked in. The authorities understood this, he suggested, adding that all residents had received a conciliatory delivery of free vegetables the previous evening.

The mood in Tiantongyuan was calm and residents’ opinions divided about China’s covid policies. “I hope they stick with zero-covid, or it will be chaos,” said an older woman. But the man ventured that China had lost its fear of the virus. “At first we thought it was like sars, that if you get it you die,” he said. “But now people ask: how come they aren’t controlling it in the outside world? Maybe it’s not so bad.” He cited a friend in America who has had covid “three times, and it’s like getting a cold.” Chinese netizens have pointed to the football World Cup, where mask-less fans throng stadiums in Qatar. State censors have responded by sharply reducing the number of crowd shots shown during state television’s coverage of the tournament.

Extra hired muscle could be seen in Tiantongyuan, including two bruisers from Jilin province dressed in the overalls of pandemic workers, over which they wore green quilted overcoats. They had been brought in as support after the previous day’s troubles, said one of them, who asked to take a photograph of your correspondent’s press card and see proof of a recent covid test. Another guard, employed full-time by the housing estate and found guarding a sealed-off staircase, was both friendly and philosophical about a possible end to the zero-covid policy. Lots of people are tired and ready for a change, he said. “But if we opened up, many people would not dare go out, like in Shijiazhuang.” Asked for his personal opinion of the policy, he looked astonished. “We used to lock down a whole district for a few cases, now we only lock down single buildings,” he said. “So the disease isn’t as dangerous as it used to be. But opening, that is for the government to decide.”

https://www.economist.com/china/2022/11/27/unrest-breaks-out-across-china-as-frustration-at-lockdowns-grows?

opium

Man Allegedly Seeks International Work, Has Human Rights Violated

Mr Miralis said his client had been denied medical treatment and was unable to access pens to write a complaint to the Attorney-General’s department about his treatment on remand.

The lawyer has filed a complaint about the conduct of Australian intelligence officers and said extradition should be put on hold until that had been resolved by Australia’s intelligence watchdog.

Some BBC journalist type British colonial troublemaker was found inciting crowds in a Chinese city.
The authorities don’t muck around with these type of foreign interfering chaps.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bbc-says-chinese-police-assaulted-journalist-covering-protest-2022-11-27/

Peak Warming Man said:

Some BBC journalist type British colonial troublemaker was found inciting crowds in a Chinese city.
The authorities don’t muck around with these type of foreign interfering chaps.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bbc-says-chinese-police-assaulted-journalist-covering-protest-2022-11-27/

Foolish move. Could even be suicidal.

Tau.Neutrino said:

Peak Warming Man said:

Some BBC journalist type British colonial troublemaker was found inciting crowds in a Chinese city.
The authorities don’t muck around with these type of foreign interfering chaps.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bbc-says-chinese-police-assaulted-journalist-covering-protest-2022-11-27/

Foolish move. Could even be suicidal.

It’s only Foreign Interference if it’s not British and it’s not Opium¡

The protests in China may change the way Xi Jinping runs the country, says Minxin Pei
The Chinese-American academic believes they will influence government policy for years

Nov 30th 2022

The sudden eruption of anti-lockdown protests across China in the past week caught its leaders—and the world—by surprise. The first demonstrations took place in Xinjiang and Shanghai and the Chinese Communist Party (ccp), which has crushed countless mass protests in the past with ruthless efficiency, scrambled to respond.

Chinese authorities have now adopted a mixed approach to curb the demonstrations. It combines an increased police presence and intimidation of protesters with promises of more refined implementation of the government’s “zero-covid” policy—which remains unchanged. Whatever the immediate outcomes of the protests, which now appear to be over, they will probably influence policy for the remainder of President Xi Jinping’s time in power.

The protests were the most politically charged public expression of discontent since the crackdown on the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement in June 1989. People from different social backgrounds—university students, migrant labourers and wealthy city-dwellers—joined forces in denouncing the inadequacies of their government’s harsh zero-covid policy. As the ccp’s greatest fear is criticism from a coalition of diverse groups, the anti-lockdown protests augur badly for the government.

Another factor that must trouble Mr Xi is that protests took place simultaneously in politically important cities. Besides Beijing, the capital, demonstrations broke out in provincial capitals, including Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Nanjing, Lanzhou, Urumqi and Chengdu. The demonstrations in 1989 also had a wide geographic reach, though the numbers of protesters and cities involved that year were far greater.

For a regime obsessed with preserving its tough image, the political defiance of the recent protests will seem shocking. The gatherings were initially triggered by allegations that a local lockdown was responsible for the deaths of ten residents in a burning building in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, on November 24th. But some protesters quickly directed their anger at Mr Xi and the ccp, calling for them to “step down”. Not a single public gathering in the post-Tiananmen era has targeted China’s leader and its ruling party. That raises the stakes. If Mr Xi does not respond to such an open challenge to his personal authority forcibly, he risks damaging his carefully cultivated image as a strong leader.

The anti-lockdown protests have also revealed the limits of the party’s surveillance. The state failed to detect early signs of trouble even though the party has invested a fortune in systems capable of monitoring ordinary people’s movements and communications. Under ordinary circumstances, surveillance is quite effective because it targets a relatively small number of individuals known to the authorities as potential troublemakers. But targeted surveillance is ill-suited to the prevention of mass demonstrations precipitated by ordinary people who are not on the authorities’ watchlist. And once citizens had taken to the streets, facial recognition cameras, ai-assisted surveillance of social media and other fancy tools performed miserably in deterring protesters. They simply donned masks and wore other protective gear to disguise themselves.

To be sure, fear of government reprisals probably kept more disgruntled people from joining the protests. But the fact that such politically charged protests can happen at all under pervasive state surveillance may well have diminished fear of the party and its security apparatus. That means the ccp cannot depend on technology to forestall challenges to its authority.

Mr Xi also faces the task of reburnishing his image in the wake of the protests. Their eruption comes shortly after he gained an unprecedented third term as leader and packed the party’s top ranks with loyalists at its 20th national congress in October. The demonstrations can easily be seen as a popular rebuke. In a society where authority and personality are often intertwined, any public expression of ire against Mr Xi erodes his aura as a great leader.

Regaining public support in the wake of the protests may require Mr Xi to pivot away from policies he has been pursuing since assuming power in November 2012. In the past decade the party has replaced Deng Xiaoping’s focus on economic development with Mr Xi’s strategy. It pushes orthodox ideology, social control, assertive foreign policy and economic statism. The return of “politics in command” may have worked wonders for Mr Xi when he wanted to amass power and reassert control over a party softened by decades of economic prosperity and ideological laxity. But the costs of this shift are mounting for ordinary people. Growth has slowed down dramatically in the past decade, from 9.6% in 2011 to 3.2% this year according to a forecast from the International Monetary Fund. And a slow-motion implosion of the property sector has wiped out a huge chunk of the middle class’s wealth on paper. Homes were once considered their greatest assets.

Mr Xi’s zero-covid policy may be the last straw for many. Even though this policy scored early success, the Chinese government stuck with it for too long. Officials came to believe that eradicating covid-19 was a project to demonstrate the superiority of the Chinese political system. That also explains why vaccination drives were not made a priority. Until recently just 40% of people aged over 80 in China had had a third booster shot. Officials now say the share is 66%.

Mr Xi now faces two difficult quandaries. The first is how to act on protesters’ demands without unleashing a wave of covid-19 that overwhelms China’s health systems. The second is how he should govern in the coming decade if his uncompromising style and ideological agenda are no longer palatable to the country’s people. He may even see the latter as the more daunting challenge.■
_______________

Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in America

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/11/30/the-protests-in-china-may-change-the-way-xi-jinping-runs-the-country-says-minxin-pei?

‘Protests in China work’: Officials back down on restrictions after unrest
By Eryk Bagshaw

Singapore: Three COVID case highs were set in the Chinese megacities of Chongqing, Zhengzhou, and Guangzhou this week. By Thursday, all three cities had announced they were easing restrictions.

China, the last bastion of zero-COVID, is unwinding its signature policy after protests rocked its cities for days, police barricaded its residents, and some protesters called for regime change.

“This day in history,” read a message on WeChat on Thursday. It was three years to the day since Wuhan reported “the first case of pneumonia of unknown cause”. The message on December 1, 2019, carried a warning that Chinese authorities did not heed until it was too late, about a virus that would take 6.6 million lives worldwide and shut off China from the rest of the world.

“We don’t want lockdowns, we want freedom,” protesters chanted as far south as Hainan and as far north as Changchun this week.

Alpha, Beta, Delta, and Omicron: each variant has been a new challenge for authorities and each has been greeted with “resolute measures” needed to stamp out the threat to China’s 1.4 billion people. For three years, doors in tree-lined neighbourhoods in Shanghai and high-rise apartments in Beijing have been under constant threat of being sealed shut by the “Big White”, the country’s hazmat-suited COVID authorities.

This week frustration boiled over across the country, pushing many to undertake what had once been unimaginable: coordinated protests against the government. Communicating via the encrypted messaging app Telegram, some activists called for the end of Communist Party rule, but most just wanted the right to go back to work and see their families.

“It is our duty,” said two protesters in Shanghai.
“We have been worried for the last three years,” said a principal of one Western school in Beijing, who asked not to be identified because the pandemic measures are politically sensitive. “The more this kind of situation continues, it gets harder for us”.

The authorities had been slow to respond and deliberately avoided legitimising the protesters’ concerns until Wednesday afternoon when China’s National Health Commission acknowledged the “practical difficulties of the people”. Suddenly, the nation’s peak health body said for the first time that Omicron was not as severe as other strains, eliminating a key health justification for the government’s suppression measures.

Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan, the government’s chief COVID warrior, said it was time to shift strategies. Sun, who oversaw the world’s first lockdown in Wuhan in January 2020, did not once mention the zero-COVID doctrine that has defined her position since the first days of the pandemic.

“As the Omicron variant becomes less pathogenic, more people get vaccinated and our experience in COVID prevention accumulates, our fight against the pandemic is at a new stage, and it comes with new tasks,” she said on Wednesday evening, referring to the ability of the virus to cause serious illness.

By Thursday, Chinese government-controlled media was running hot with research from a laboratory of virology at Wuhan University that showed “Omicron’s pathogenicity has dramatically decreased compared with the original strain of coronavirus and other variants”. The US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention published the same findings in January. The Imperial College London followed in March.

But after 10 months of plummeting confidence, growing financial strain, and the threat of political instability, the Chinese government said it was ready to consider another strategy. The country had just hit 40,000 new cases in a day.

“Time, and again it proves that protests in China work,” wrote Yaqiu Wang, a senior China researcher for Human Rights Watch who has been forced to leave the country.

“If you are willing to take the risk and stand up, you get what you want, at least some of it. The CCP is the biggest paper tiger, whose power rests in your fear. When you no longer fear, poof, it melts.”

In Chongqing, which recorded a 12-month high of 648 cases on Tuesday, officials said they would allow close contacts of infected people to quarantine at home. Guangzhou, which had notched up 1529 cases the previous day, said it would put an end to mass PCR testing and end lockdowns for half of its districts. Zhengzhou, the home of one of the world’s largest iPhone factories and the scene of some of the biggest protests against lockdown, followed suit.

“Most Chinese people are no longer afraid of being infected,” said one of Beijing’s top propagandists, Hu Xijin. “China may walk out of the shadow of COVID-19 sooner than expected.”

The markets responded, jumping by almost 2 per cent on the mainland and 4 per cent in Hong Kong. Despite the domestic turmoil, the value of stocks has grown by more than $3 trillion in November alone, indicating investors are more optimistic about China’s acceleration out of the pandemic than many of those on the ground.

“The Chinese economy is not performing well now and as we can see, lots of shops are closed,” said a 70-year-old Wuhan retiree who asked not to be identified on Thursday.

“If this situation continues, young people will have no job and no income. If the country’s economy doesn’t grow, the government will have no revenue.”

The message from the top has not made its way down to all local officials. In Shanghai, on Thursday there were warnings to residents to prepare for the possibility of another lockdown. Video emerged of a local committee blocking the exit of one building with barbed wire. Jinzhou city in Liaoning province said it would keep pursuing a zero-COVID strategy and blamed other provinces for failing to execute the policy.

Mitul Kotecha, head of emerging markets at TD Securities, said the path ahead was riddled with difficulties.

“Any opening is still likely to be very slow and gradual to avoid pressuring the health system and unfortunately this will come at the expense of economic recovery in the months ahead,” he said.

“Despite protests, we don’t think the government is about to open the door to a quick easing of COVID restrictions given the lack of boosters to the elderly population, relatively low efficacy of China’s vaccines, and limited intensive care capacity.”

Just 60 per cent of the Chinese population aged over 80 has been vaccinated, leaving millions vulnerable to the disease. Health authorities have been reluctant to impose mandates on a population weary of inoculation after past scandals. On Thursday, Chinese finance news outlet Caixin reported that national authorities would push local administrators to drive that figure past 90 per cent.

“ speed up vaccination, especially the vaccination of the elderly,” said Xia Gang, a National Health Commission official. “I hope that elderly friends will actively complete the vaccination as soon as possible to protect the health of themselves and their families.”

Xia spoke just hours before one of the country’s elder statesmen, former president Jiang Zemin, died. Three of China’s most significant periods of civil unrest have coincided with the death of one of its leaders: premier Zhou Enlai in 1976; Hu Yaobang in April 1989, when the Tiananmen Square protests began; and now Jiang, as citizens lash out against COVID-19 restrictions and in some quarters, against the leadership of the Communist Party and President Xi Jinping himself.

After his death, Jiang’s cosmopolitan but controversial period in power was contrasted with Xi’s authoritarian rule. Chinese social media service Weibo was filled with tributes to Jiang on Thursday. “RIP, to you, and the era,” said one user, reflecting on China’s ascension to the World Trade Organisation and a decade of relatively liberal economic growth.

In the historic town of Wuzhen, Zhejiang province, a young woman walked down the street. She covered her arms in chains and put black tape across her mouth while holding a blank white paper, a symbol of the growing “A4 revolution” that has condemned Xi’s censorship regime across China.

Official government websites and newspapers turned black and white in mourning for the 96-year-old, but across WeChat, pictures proliferated of Xi as “the only person in colour” – a phrase that when read aloud in Chinese sounds similar to “dictator”.

The most vocal members of this week’s protests have already been rounded up by state security, but many thousands more are still seething over a system they believe has failed to give them economic prosperity and stripped them of their human rights.

Wang Dan, one of the leaders of the Tiananmen Square protests, now based in the United States, gave them some advice this week.

This image of a woman who took three alpacas into the street in Shanghai has become a meme widely shared among disaffected young Chinese people as a form of protest against their leadership. The Mandarin word for three lamas is similar to a common obsenity.

“It’s a long-term struggle,” he said. “There should be a rhythm. Retreat when you ought to, so you can advance again.”

https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/protests-in-china-work-officials-back-down-on-restrictions-after-unrest-20221201-p5c2up.html

LOL

Japan’s government has renamed what is known as pre-emptive strike to “counterstrike capability,” apparently to emphasise that it is for self-defence.

SCIENCE said:

LOL

Japan’s government has renamed what is known as pre-emptive strike to “counterstrike capability,” apparently to emphasise that it is for self-defence.

Time’s arrow is an abstraction

Fuck CHINA, they should be banning videos of children having fun and censoring them harder¡

Much of this is happening on TikTok, a Chinese-owned video-sharing platform that has grown in popularity largely off the back of its Gen Z user base.

According to its community guidelines, the company removes “content that depicts or promotes activities that may jeopardise youth well-being” as well as “content depicting, promoting, normalising or glorifying dangerous acts that may lead to serious injury or death”, listing “dangerous driving behaviour” as a specific example.

aWhile Boon says the social media giants are often quick to respond to requests from the commission or police, usually taking down videos within days, Barnett says they could be more proactive.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-18/a-dangerous-game-youth-crime-crisis-alice-springs/101735492

The politics of Xi Jinping’s covid retreat
China’s Communist Party prepares to spin its way out of a rout

Dec 15th 2022

Born as an underground movement, the Communist Party of China prefers to advance by stealth, revealing its ambitions only once it feels confident of success. True to its guerrilla roots, it is still more secretive in retreat. Whenever failures loom, a familiar response may be expected. Party leaders fall silent, propaganda takes a flag-waving turn, statistics become even less reliable than usual and security is tightened. These evasive manoeuvres can be seen now, as China abandons its “all-out people’s war” on covid.

As Chaguan writes this, it has been over a month since China heard fresh virus-fighting orders from its supreme leader, President Xi Jinping. In his last reported words on the subject, on November 10th, Mr Xi told the Politburo to stick “resolutely” with his costly containment strategy of “dynamic zero-covid”. Mr Xi’s absence from the front lines is all the more striking because in 2020, after China’s success in smothering an initial outbreak in the city of Wuhan, the party declared him “commander-in-chief” of this people’s war. Proud of the efforts of hundreds of millions of Chinese who stayed indoors to break chains of virus transmission (and gleeful at proving doubting foreigners wrong), official media declared that defeating a fierce, invisible enemy like covid requires the strong leadership of the Communist Party. Pandemic chaos in such democracies as America was called proof of Western decadence and callousness. In September 2020, speaking by video link from within China’s closed borders, Mr Xi informed the United Nations General Assembly that “covid-19 is a major test of the governance capacity of countries.”

Several times this year, prominent scientists who called for debate on exit strategies from zero-covid were accused of wanting to “lie flat”, using a slang term for defeatism. Now China is abruptly learning to live with the virus. Various lines of propaganda messaging are being tested to explain this about-face, emphasising the party’s wisdom and the Chinese people’s exceptional capacity for self-sacrifice and discipline. On December 12th the People’s Daily, a party mouthpiece, framed the arduous zero-covid campaign as a period of sagely waiting for the severity of the Omicron variant to decline, and for effective vaccines and medicines to emerge. Alas the latest sub-variants, though indeed milder than Delta, are still quite capable of wreaking havoc in China, where only a small minority are protected by recent doses of effective vaccines.

Party outlets have quoted citizens earnestly pledging to stay at home if they suffer mild symptoms so as not to “cause trouble for the country”, and telling reporters that after China’s government had taken care of them for the past three years, it was time they take primary responsibility for their own health and leave medical resources for those in need. After years of citing China’s low official death toll (which currently stands at around 5,200), the People’s Daily shifted to vaguer boasts about China having the lowest death toll of any major power. On December 14th, as waves of covid swept the country, authorities simply stopped reporting infections deemed “asymptomatic”, a hazy term sometimes used in China for any cases not confirmed with a chest scan.

Censors have moved to limit discussion of the change in policy. Indeed, pro-party nationalists have been silenced online for attacking critics of zero-covid, including fellow Chinese who staged protests in November in cities and on university campuses nationwide. Social-media platforms have banned the term tang fei, meaning “lying-flat mobs”, used by nationalists to criticise malcontents whom they blame for hastening zero-covid’s abandonment with their demonstrations. Despite this evidence of official sensitivity about anti-lockdown protests, it is misleading to draw a short, straight line between the most eye-catching demonstrations, such as one in Shanghai that saw young people chanting “Down with Xi Jinping”, and the ditching of zero-covid policies. Though shockingly sudden in its eventual execution, this is a retreat months in the making. Omicron variants are so fast-spreading that—as public-health scholars tell it—fresh waves of infections this autumn could only have been beaten back with nationwide lockdowns as harsh as those imposed on Shanghai’s 25m residents for more than two months this spring. The economic costs would have been brutal, and the country was exhausted. The police and security services know how to repress students chanting political slogans: many of those at protests in Beijing, Shanghai and elsewhere have been tracked down and detained or summoned by police for warnings. But discontent was broad, uniting such non-political types as migrant workers fleeing outbreaks in factories and homeowners rebelling against local lockdowns.

When scientific debate is disloyalty
The political stakes also changed after the 20th party congress in October, at which Mr Xi secured a third term and packed the Politburo Standing Committee with loyalists. An essay published in April in Study Times, a journal of the Central Party School, by Ma Xiaowei, the health minister, condemned “erroneous” thoughts of “co-existing with the virus”. Mr Ma cast zero-covid as a political imperative needed to avoid deaths, maintain social stability and thus ensure a successful party congress. Re-reading such words, it is reasonable to wonder if scientific debate about “zero-covid”, or even calls for a vaccine drive, had to be silenced before the congress, lest Mr Xi’s faith in containment be put in doubt.

To be clear, current events are a blow to Mr Xi. Even those stirring propaganda lines urging citizens to take personal responsibility for their health sit uneasily with his vision of pandemic-fighting as a chance to extend the party’s reach into every village and neighbourhood, and to mobilise the masses in a great collective endeavour. The party has recovered from routs before. Even now its chief ideologues will be discussing how to spin retreat as a victory, while censors and security services work to silence dissent. In the meantime, China’s people face a grim winter.

https://www.economist.com/china/2022/12/15/the-politics-of-xi-jinpings-covid-retreat?

Yous all thought Nepal had the double standard ¡

And yous were pretty much correct, Greater Northeast Nepal still is the subject of the double standard ¡

How Dare Large Economies Help Others With Medical Foreign Aid ¡

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-23/china-build-military-hospital-barracks-papua-new-guinea/101794868

SCIENCE said:

How Dare Large Economies Help Others With Medical Foreign Aid ¡

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-23/china-build-military-hospital-barracks-papua-new-guinea/101794868

There’s one difference.

With most foreign-aid programmes, the workers go home after the job is done.

With Chinese-government aid programmes, they always seem to have some reason to hang around for a long, long time. Always nice to have ‘presence’, isn’t it?

Without a Covid Narrative, China’s Censors Are Not Sure What to Do
The end of “zero Covid” has undermined years of official propaganda, and the vast censorship system is struggling to catch up.

By John Liu and Paul Mozur
Dec. 22, 2022

Since China dropped its strict “zero Covid” policy, a joke has been making the rounds on social media about the sudden shift.

Three men who don’t know one another sit in a prison cell. Each explains why he was arrested:
“I opposed Covid testing.”
“I supported Covid testing.”
“I conducted Covid testing.”

The joke has yet to be broadly censored. It is a sign of just how much the Chinese Communist Party, usually a master of messaging, is struggling to come up with a coherent explanation for the policy shift and a clear directive for what to do with an explosion of cases now threatening the country’s medical resources.

So dizzying was the switch that even two weeks later, the state’s powerful propaganda and censorship system has yet to catch up to the flood of confusion and criticism seeping through the country’s typically tight internet controls.

Apart from laying out the new Covid rules, Chinese official media still hasn’t offered much guidance from top leaders on the situation. The country’s hundreds of thousands of internet censors, experts say, haven’t gotten guidance on what to allow and what to delete — and may be confused, given that what was blocked a month ago is now official policy. Many Chinese have been asking why they put up with years of harsh lockdowns and travel restrictions, only for the leadership to abandon them and allow the virus to spread unabated.

For China’s leadership, maintaining public trust hinges, in part, on a difficult task: finding a narrative that makes sense of the reversal.

In the weeks since “zero Covid” ended, China’s all-encompassing propaganda and censorship machine has fallen into its old routine of deleting negative press and spreading “positive energy” posts that praise the struggles of individuals and the government. But experts said the three-year trauma caused by the stringent pandemic measures and the last-minute U-turn would prove hard for people to quickly move past.

“It will be impossible for everyone to forget completely. Many will remember ‘zero Covid’ deeply and clearly,” said Fang Kecheng, an assistant professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong who studies China’s propaganda. However, that may not lead to widespread loss of confidence in the government, he added, noting that “people still have ways to convince themselves that things don’t seem so bad now.”

Thus far, propagandists have hewed to past norms in handling the crisis. They have avoided excessive mentions of the policy shift, instead emphasizing social stability. State media has sympathetically called the situation “stressful” but otherwise portrayed it as a well-orchestrated decision to overcome a virus that is no longer as deadly as it once was.

Across the country, an acute shortage of medicine, videos of people crowding hospitals, and long lines outside crematories and funeral homes marked a stark contrast with the seven deaths reported by the government this week. On Tuesday, the health authorities explained that only deaths caused by coronavirus-induced pneumonia and respiratory failure would be attributed to Covid.

Anger soon erupted online, with many accusing the authorities of double standards based on their frequent and detailed reports of Covid death statistics from overseas, particularly Europe and the United States. Many used the hashtag #WhatIsTheCriteriaForDeathByCovid in complaints on Tuesday. By Wednesday, censors had begun to block such posts.

People wrote about their relatives’ deaths, urging others not to trust propaganda that Covid is now like a flu. A blood bank appealed to college students for urgent donations. Cancellations of travel reservations for the upcoming Chinese New Year holiday surged as people decided to stay home.

State media coverage of the country’s top leadership has steered clear of the outbreak. On Monday, a commentary on People’s Daily justified the new policy, saying it will bring about a “significant positive effect” on economic recovery. While the piece said “a lot of work is to be done,” it stopped short of acknowledging the chaos it created.

In some ways, the approach is similar to the one taken during the initial outbreak of the virus in Wuhan nearly three years ago. At the time, even as the crisis intensified, official Communist Party mouthpieces emphasized the government’s control of the situation and avoided content that could trigger alarm. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, disappeared from the public spotlight to insulate himself from potential criticism. Once the virus was contained, Mr. Xi appeared in the city triumphant.

This time, it may take longer for Chinese officials to regain the message over a medical crisis driven by a virus that has, in large countries like India and the United States, killed by the hundreds of thousands as waves of illness have overwhelmed medical facilities. Aside from general comments about coordinating Covid prevention measures, Mr. Xi has remained silent. He has said nothing directly about the recent surge in cases.

For now, experts said, both the censors and the propaganda officials appear to be scrambling to figure out what to do.

“I don’t think I’ve seen a planned or orchestrated propaganda plan coming out. It’s more because the general direction has changed, so the propaganda has to follow suit suddenly,” Mr. Fang said. One major test will come when the virus spreads to smaller, rural areas with insufficient medical resources, he said.

A small but vocal chorus online has called out the abrupt and disjointed policy changes. Asong Yu, a 30-year-old finance worker in northeastern China, has questioned in sardonic and indirect ways the sudden changes and the lack of explanation.

In one post, Mr. Yu shared a response by ChatGPT, the viral chatbot powered by artificial intelligence, to the prompt “Are there pigs that can do a 180?” He had particular vitriol for those he called “epidemic prevention enthusiasts,” nationalists who previously parroted the government’s position on “zero Covid,” only to be jilted by Beijing’s about-face. Online he called them “abandoned dogs being beaten by their owners.”

“The previous propaganda is completely opposite to the current one. I think, however stupid some people might be, they will have to wake up,” Mr. Yu said in an interview.

So far, Mr. Yu’s posts have avoided the censors’ knife. In part, that’s because there are no obvious ways to deal with such a major about-face. Censors must decide whether to delete some portion of official posts supporting “zero Covid” for years and how much to tolerate a new zeal for the lifting of lockdowns.

Some people online have already encouraged others to go out and get Covid to build up immunity. Some college students, for instance, have lamented their inability to catch it over the past month, worrying that they will get sick during graduate school entrance exams scheduled this week.

The sudden change in China’s policy has created chaos and confusion among the tech companies that hire their own censors, and the accounts supporting the party that toe the official line, said Eric Liu, a former censor for Weibo and now an analyst at China Digital Times, a news website tracking censorship in China.

“I have yet to see a very clear, hardhanded censorship order, so I think it has something to do with the chaos that they are contradicting themselves,” Mr. Liu said, pointing out that most likely Beijing has not figured out an official narrative. That, in turn, has prevented the Cyberspace Administration of China, the country’s internet regulator, from issuing uniform orders to censors.

“A regulated narrative will definitely happen, but we don’t know when it will happen,” he said.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/business/china-covid-censorship-propaganda.html?

Witty Rejoinder said:

Without a Covid Narrative, China’s Censors Are Not Sure What to Do
The end of “zero Covid” has undermined years of official propaganda, and the vast censorship system is struggling to catch up.

By John Liu and Paul Mozur
Dec. 22, 2022

“A regulated narrative will definitely happen, but we don’t know when it will happen,” he said.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/business/china-covid-censorship-propaganda.html?

maybe this will result in a slight shift in public obedience to the party. We are the small axe.

Analysis: As COVID soars, China has 2 chains of command
Premier Li Keqiang and new No. 2 Li Qiang both have hands on the steering wheel

KATSUJI NAKAZAWA, Nikkei senior staff writer
DECEMBER 22, 2022 04:00 JST

Katsuji Nakazawa is a Tokyo-based senior staff and editorial writer at Nikkei. He spent seven years in China as a correspondent and later as China bureau chief. He was the 2014 recipient of the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist prize.

After shifting away from a strict zero-COVID policy in November, China has seen a spike in COVID-19 cases. The spread has been faster than anticipated, almost bringing medical care and other crucial functions to a standstill.

Hospitals are overwhelmed. Elderly patients with fevers of nearly 40 C, or 104 F, have the choice of waiting six hours outside the hospitals or going home. Many choose the latter.

“One out of every two employees has now been infected and cannot come to work,” a representative at a Japanese-owned company with operations in Beijing and Shanghai said.

The Chinese government has not released detailed numbers of the infections. But judging from the information on the ground, the infection rate could be over 50% in the greater Beijing area. It is hard to find a family of three or four that is COVID-free. Some say that the rate exceeds 70% in the worst hit areas.

A man in his 50s living in the northeastern city of Shenyang said he and his family are now struggling with serious cases of COVID and all have had fevers of 39 C for several days. Yet, nearby pharmacies have run out of fever reducers, due to panic buying. They have also had no luck seeing doctors at overwhelmed medical institutions.

In the background, a line has formed as people wait to be admitted to a Beijing hospital on Dec. 13. The Chinese capital’s medical institutions have been overwhelmed by the recent coronavirus outbreak. © Kyodo
In the southern province of Guangdong, entire neighborhoods have fallen silent, with shops and restaurants unable to find the staff to run them, leaving no option but to close.

How did this happen? A Chinese source familiar with the situation gave an interesting analogy.

In warfare, when an army retreats, a rear-guard unit is left behind to hold off the chasing enemy. “China has now abandoned the zero-COVID policy without taking any such protective measures,” the source said. “All at once, everyone began to flee, with no orderly plan.”

The abandonment of the zero-COVID policy came after the “white-paper” protests across various cities. Yet, some say that COVID cases, especially asymptomatic ones, had already started to spread even before the protests.

There are several issues regarding the vaccines. The inactivated vaccine shots that the Chinese are being encouraged to receive were initially developed in response to the coronavirus that was found in Wuhan. The jabs are less effective against the currently prevailing omicron variant.

Then, there is the structural issue. The vaccination rate among elderly people, who are more likely to become severely ill, is especially low, because Chinese in their 60s and older grew up distrusting their government.

As zero-COVID restrictions were further eased at the beginning of this month, young people began crowding into shops and public venues. Cluster infections broke out at primary and middle schools, at elderly care centers, and elsewhere. The virus was then brought into homes.

Infectious disease expert Zhong Nanshan, long a supporter of the zero-COVID policy and who received from President Xi Jinping the Medal of the Republic, the highest state honor, for his contribution to fighting the pandemic, now says omicron “is no different from influenza” and “can be called the novel coronavirus cold.”

Zhong’s remarks have resulted in many people letting down their guard. His lack of consistency should have come as a surprise to many.

Another big issue is the chain of command over China’s COVID policy.

Confusing orders were delivered to local governments across the country, leaving bureaucrats panic-stricken, not knowing who to listen to and what to do. Some regions have not yet thoroughly eased restrictions as ordered by the central government.

One businessman this month traveled from a rural area to a big city by airplane after hearing about the easing.

But when he arrived at his destination airport, he was told he would not be allowed to enter the city, although he neither had COVID nor had been in contact with a patient. He was sent to quarantine at a deserted tourist spot up a mountain, hundreds of kilometers away.

Sources with knowledge of the inner workings of the Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in central Beijing, have started to analyze the reason of the chaos, albeit in hushed voices.

One pointed to the negative effects of “two command centers” that exist within the Chinese leadership.

Another said that the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Economic Work Conference, which was held on Dec. 15-16 to brainstorm on how to manage the economy next year, “should have devoted most of its discussions to various anti-coronavirus measures.”

A quiet anger can be detected in their voices. It is anger toward the careless way the situation has been handled.

A typical example is the read out of the Central Economic Work Conference. It merely notes the need for “better coordinating epidemic prevention and control with economic and social development,” and urges efforts to optimize epidemic response, with a focus on the elderly and those with underlying diseases.

It is almost admitting that nothing was decided on COVID.

The absence of coherent policy hints at the fact that the zero-COVID policy was abandoned quickly at Xi’s orders. The words of the leader, who acquired ultimate power at the party’s 20th national congress in October, has changed everything. But it is also sowing confusion.

Every five to 10 years, after China’s major leadership shuffles, tumultuous incidents can crop up in political voids. It looks like that has happened again.

Premier Li Keqiang and Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, the latter responsible for the government’s COVID response, are no longer part of the Communist Party’s powerful Central Committee. Having been sidelined at the party’s recent national congress, they will retire from their current posts next spring.

In normal times, Premier Li would already be a lame duck. But with new No. 2 Li Qiang, a close aide to Xi, having no experience in the central government and not knowing how to work the administrative machinery, Li Keqiang continues to have his hands on the steering wheel.

Li Qiang in October became a Politburo Standing Committee member and will probably be chosen as Premier Li’s successor in the spring.

He once served as the top official of Shanghai, Jiangsu province, and as a top-level official in Zhejiang province. The bureaucratic machinery in those and other regions, however, differs greatly from that in Beijing. He is probably perplexed by the difference.

This structure is a tragedy for Chinese people suffering from the coronavirus.

Symbolically, at the Central Economic Work Conference, Premier Li Keqiang first gave a speech. Separately, Li Qiang gave a summary of the conference.

Li Keqiang and Li Qiang. The COVID crisis and Li Qiang’s inexperience have made it impossible for Premier Li Keqiang to slide into the role of a lame-duck politician.
Local bureaucrats who receive orders from the central government feel it difficult to act on them since there are two command centers in Beijing — one led by Premier Li and the other by Li Qiang.

As it is unclear whose orders they should obey, the best way to protect oneself is to do nothing — a typical survival strategy among Chinese bureaucrats.

Optimists hope that herd immunity may be achieved soon since the number of COVID cases in China is growing so fast.

There is a possibility that COVID-19 cases in Beijing, Hebei province and surrounding areas will peak and begin to decline within this year, well before the Chinese New Year holidays, which begin in late January.

But this is merely an expectation.

China has to be wary of what other countries have gone through. Coming out of one outbreak doesn’t mean the pandemic is over; it only means one wave has petered out. When China emerges from this crisis, it could only be a matter of time before the next wave builds.

What is most terrifying is the odds of the virus mutating if several hundreds of millions of people are infected, then a new variant taking off on its own destructive path.

It is tough to predict what impact such a crisis will have on the Chinese and global economies.

According to shocking new projections announced last week by the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, COVID-19 cases might grow explosively in China throughout next year, resulting in more than 1 million deaths.

The projections also show that a third of China’s 1.4 billion people will have been infected by spring.

Chinese health authorities on Monday announced only two additional deaths. No one in China believes the toll is that low as many people have witnessed the deaths of elderly family members or neighbors.

In fact, there is information that at a famous Beijing university, more than 10 people have died since the start of December, including an elderly former professor, other teachers, university officials and their family members.

This information has been shared secretly only among people concerned in Beijing.

It is true that the omicron variant kills relatively few of the people it infects. But the variant will deal a heavier-than-expected blow to China due to the country’s large elderly population.

It is being said crematories in Greater Beijing are operating at full capacity but that some bodies are having to wait to be burned. The situation is serious.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-As-COVID-soars-China-has-2-chains-of-command?

Witty Rejoinder said:

Analysis: As COVID soars, China has 2 chains of command
Premier Li Keqiang and new No. 2 Li Qiang both have hands on the steering wheel

KATSUJI NAKAZAWA, Nikkei senior staff writer
DECEMBER 22, 2022 04:00 JST

Katsuji Nakazawa is a Tokyo-based senior staff and editorial writer at Nikkei. He spent seven years in China as a correspondent and later as China bureau chief. He was the 2014 recipient of the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist prize.

After shifting away from a strict zero-COVID policy in November, China has seen a spike in COVID-19 cases. The spread has been faster than anticipated, almost bringing medical care and other crucial functions to a standstill.

Hospitals are overwhelmed. Elderly patients with fevers of nearly 40 C, or 104 F, have the choice of waiting six hours outside the hospitals or going home. Many choose the latter.

“One out of every two employees has now been infected and cannot come to work,” a representative at a Japanese-owned company with operations in Beijing and Shanghai said.

The Chinese government has not released detailed numbers of the infections. But judging from the information on the ground, the infection rate could be over 50% in the greater Beijing area. It is hard to find a family of three or four that is COVID-free. Some say that the rate exceeds 70% in the worst hit areas.

A man in his 50s living in the northeastern city of Shenyang said he and his family are now struggling with serious cases of COVID and all have had fevers of 39 C for several days. Yet, nearby pharmacies have run out of fever reducers, due to panic buying. They have also had no luck seeing doctors at overwhelmed medical institutions.

In the background, a line has formed as people wait to be admitted to a Beijing hospital on Dec. 13. The Chinese capital’s medical institutions have been overwhelmed by the recent coronavirus outbreak. © Kyodo
In the southern province of Guangdong, entire neighborhoods have fallen silent, with shops and restaurants unable to find the staff to run them, leaving no option but to close.

How did this happen? A Chinese source familiar with the situation gave an interesting analogy.

In warfare, when an army retreats, a rear-guard unit is left behind to hold off the chasing enemy. “China has now abandoned the zero-COVID policy without taking any such protective measures,” the source said. “All at once, everyone began to flee, with no orderly plan.”

The abandonment of the zero-COVID policy came after the “white-paper” protests across various cities. Yet, some say that COVID cases, especially asymptomatic ones, had already started to spread even before the protests.

There are several issues regarding the vaccines. The inactivated vaccine shots that the Chinese are being encouraged to receive were initially developed in response to the coronavirus that was found in Wuhan. The jabs are less effective against the currently prevailing omicron variant.

Then, there is the structural issue. The vaccination rate among elderly people, who are more likely to become severely ill, is especially low, because Chinese in their 60s and older grew up distrusting their government.

As zero-COVID restrictions were further eased at the beginning of this month, young people began crowding into shops and public venues. Cluster infections broke out at primary and middle schools, at elderly care centers, and elsewhere. The virus was then brought into homes.

Infectious disease expert Zhong Nanshan, long a supporter of the zero-COVID policy and who received from President Xi Jinping the Medal of the Republic, the highest state honor, for his contribution to fighting the pandemic, now says omicron “is no different from influenza” and “can be called the novel coronavirus cold.”

Zhong’s remarks have resulted in many people letting down their guard. His lack of consistency should have come as a surprise to many.

Another big issue is the chain of command over China’s COVID policy.

Confusing orders were delivered to local governments across the country, leaving bureaucrats panic-stricken, not knowing who to listen to and what to do. Some regions have not yet thoroughly eased restrictions as ordered by the central government.

One businessman this month traveled from a rural area to a big city by airplane after hearing about the easing.

But when he arrived at his destination airport, he was told he would not be allowed to enter the city, although he neither had COVID nor had been in contact with a patient. He was sent to quarantine at a deserted tourist spot up a mountain, hundreds of kilometers away.

Sources with knowledge of the inner workings of the Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in central Beijing, have started to analyze the reason of the chaos, albeit in hushed voices.

One pointed to the negative effects of “two command centers” that exist within the Chinese leadership.

Another said that the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Economic Work Conference, which was held on Dec. 15-16 to brainstorm on how to manage the economy next year, “should have devoted most of its discussions to various anti-coronavirus measures.”

A quiet anger can be detected in their voices. It is anger toward the careless way the situation has been handled.

A typical example is the read out of the Central Economic Work Conference. It merely notes the need for “better coordinating epidemic prevention and control with economic and social development,” and urges efforts to optimize epidemic response, with a focus on the elderly and those with underlying diseases.

It is almost admitting that nothing was decided on COVID.

The absence of coherent policy hints at the fact that the zero-COVID policy was abandoned quickly at Xi’s orders. The words of the leader, who acquired ultimate power at the party’s 20th national congress in October, has changed everything. But it is also sowing confusion.

Every five to 10 years, after China’s major leadership shuffles, tumultuous incidents can crop up in political voids. It looks like that has happened again.

Premier Li Keqiang and Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, the latter responsible for the government’s COVID response, are no longer part of the Communist Party’s powerful Central Committee. Having been sidelined at the party’s recent national congress, they will retire from their current posts next spring.

In normal times, Premier Li would already be a lame duck. But with new No. 2 Li Qiang, a close aide to Xi, having no experience in the central government and not knowing how to work the administrative machinery, Li Keqiang continues to have his hands on the steering wheel.

Li Qiang in October became a Politburo Standing Committee member and will probably be chosen as Premier Li’s successor in the spring.

He once served as the top official of Shanghai, Jiangsu province, and as a top-level official in Zhejiang province. The bureaucratic machinery in those and other regions, however, differs greatly from that in Beijing. He is probably perplexed by the difference.

This structure is a tragedy for Chinese people suffering from the coronavirus.

Symbolically, at the Central Economic Work Conference, Premier Li Keqiang first gave a speech. Separately, Li Qiang gave a summary of the conference.

Li Keqiang and Li Qiang. The COVID crisis and Li Qiang’s inexperience have made it impossible for Premier Li Keqiang to slide into the role of a lame-duck politician.
Local bureaucrats who receive orders from the central government feel it difficult to act on them since there are two command centers in Beijing — one led by Premier Li and the other by Li Qiang.

As it is unclear whose orders they should obey, the best way to protect oneself is to do nothing — a typical survival strategy among Chinese bureaucrats.

Optimists hope that herd immunity may be achieved soon since the number of COVID cases in China is growing so fast.

There is a possibility that COVID-19 cases in Beijing, Hebei province and surrounding areas will peak and begin to decline within this year, well before the Chinese New Year holidays, which begin in late January.

But this is merely an expectation.

China has to be wary of what other countries have gone through. Coming out of one outbreak doesn’t mean the pandemic is over; it only means one wave has petered out. When China emerges from this crisis, it could only be a matter of time before the next wave builds.

What is most terrifying is the odds of the virus mutating if several hundreds of millions of people are infected, then a new variant taking off on its own destructive path.

It is tough to predict what impact such a crisis will have on the Chinese and global economies.

According to shocking new projections announced last week by the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, COVID-19 cases might grow explosively in China throughout next year, resulting in more than 1 million deaths.

The projections also show that a third of China’s 1.4 billion people will have been infected by spring.

Chinese health authorities on Monday announced only two additional deaths. No one in China believes the toll is that low as many people have witnessed the deaths of elderly family members or neighbors.

In fact, there is information that at a famous Beijing university, more than 10 people have died since the start of December, including an elderly former professor, other teachers, university officials and their family members.

This information has been shared secretly only among people concerned in Beijing.

It is true that the omicron variant kills relatively few of the people it infects. But the variant will deal a heavier-than-expected blow to China due to the country’s large elderly population.

It is being said crematories in Greater Beijing are operating at full capacity but that some bodies are having to wait to be burned. The situation is serious.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-As-COVID-soars-China-has-2-chains-of-command?

Leaked notes from Chinese health officials estimate 250 million Covid-19 infections in December: reports

Among the estimates cited in both reports, was the revelation that on Tuesday alone, 37 million people were newly infected with Covid-19 across China. That stood in dramatic contrast to the official number of 3,049 new infections reported that day.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/23/china/china-covid-infections-250-million-intl-hnk/index.html

Deaths Among CCP Elites Rise as COVID-19 Wave Hits China; China Claims Sufficient Drug Supply

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dYx2hQeLjpQ

ms spock said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

It is true that the omicron variant kills relatively few of the people it infects.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-As-COVID-soars-China-has-2-chains-of-command??

Leaked notes from Chinese health officials estimate 250 million Covid-19 infections in December: reports

Among the estimates cited in both reports, was the revelation that on Tuesday alone, 37 million people were newly infected with Covid-19 across China. That stood in dramatic contrast to the official number of 3,049 new infections reported that day.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/23/china/china-covid-infections-250-million-intl-hnk/index.html

they’re fucked

SCIENCE said:

ms spock said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

It is true that the omicron variant kills relatively few of the people it infects.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-As-COVID-soars-China-has-2-chains-of-command??

Leaked notes from Chinese health officials estimate 250 million Covid-19 infections in December: reports

Among the estimates cited in both reports, was the revelation that on Tuesday alone, 37 million people were newly infected with Covid-19 across China. That stood in dramatic contrast to the official number of 3,049 new infections reported that day.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/23/china/china-covid-infections-250-million-intl-hnk/index.html

they’re fucked

p_p, give SCIENCE his handle back!

sibeen said:

SCIENCE said:

ms spock said:

Leaked notes from Chinese health officials estimate 250 million Covid-19 infections in December: reports

Among the estimates cited in both reports, was the revelation that on Tuesday alone, 37 million people were newly infected with Covid-19 across China. That stood in dramatic contrast to the official number of 3,049 new infections reported that day.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/23/china/china-covid-infections-250-million-intl-hnk/index.html

they’re fucked

p_p, give SCIENCE his handle back!

oh c’m‘on we’ve always held that any idiots looking to Let It Rip® are getting themselves fucked

OFFICIAL: Men From CHINA Are Lazy Bastards

https://theconversation.com/women-work-harder-than-men-our-anthropological-study-reveals-why-196826

Our first finding was that women worked much harder than men, and contributed most of the fruits of this labour to their families. This was evidenced both by their own reports of how much they worked and by their activity trackers.

https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(22)01963-7

The Chinese Communist Party plans to avoid a zero-covid reckoning
Like Chairman Mao, Xi Jinping seems to believe that China’s rise trumps individual suffering

Jan 5th 2023

Across china, families are enduring avoidable misery and heartbreak, as loved ones succumb to a deadly—and predictable—wave of covid-19 infections for which their rulers failed to prepare. Some overseas analysts talk of a turning-point. They wonder if today’s policy disarray, which follows on the heels of anti-lockdown protests in late 2022, signals a crisis of legitimacy for President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party.

This is a grim moment for China’s people. For all the claims that infections have peaked in big cities like Beijing, there will, tragically, be more deaths when the virus finds older folk now sheltering at home, or living in rural villages. A shameful number of those deaths will be preventable. Yet it is possible that Mr Xi will pay no visible price for pandemic horrors on his watch.

Many outsiders were taken aback by the Chinese public’s broad tolerance of zero-covid controls, notably in the first two years of the pandemic. Even the months-long lockdown of nearly 25m people in Shanghai, in the spring of 2022, was shrugged off by many other Chinese. Zero-covid was, in essence, a giant utilitarian experiment. In a huge country with a weak health system, its harsh, often arbitrary controls did save lives. Most of the time, in most of China, life was relatively normal. The suffering of unfortunates living in closed cities or hauled off to quarantine camps was not much discussed or (owing to censors) widely known.

The best explanation for zero-covid’s unplanned end involves a similar weighing of numbers. A dangerously broad cross-section of the public grew sick of controls that no longer worked, as the virulence of the Omicron variant disrupted life and wrecked the economy in too many places, and oases of normality shrank. Protests offered proof of this exhaustion. But in truth authorities were losing control of covid before demonstrators hit the streets.

The party’s information monopoly helps it conceal how it wasted 2022, failing to raise vaccination rates or prepare hospitals. No opposition or free press exists to challenge the National Health Commission’s sudden claim, in the People’s Daily of January 3rd, that the country has 12.8 intensive-care beds per 100,000 people, though the same commission said in November that there were fewer than four such beds per 100,000. China calls two home-grown covid shots “full vaccination”; most Chinese do not know that a World Health Organisation boss last month called that dose “just not adequate”, especially for the over-60s.

Nationalism continues to generate bad policy. On January 3rd China’s foreign ministry rejected an offer by the European Union to donate advanced vaccines, tweaked to tackle Omicron. A spokesperson snapped that Chinese vaccine supplies are “ample”. A day earlier, China’s embassy in Paris challenged the notion that imported mrna vaccines are more effective than China’s shots (though they are and would save lives if used). Rehashing an anti-vaxxer talking-point, the embassy scorned Pfizer’s boss for catching covid, twice, after receiving his own company’s vaccines. Actually, nobody claims that mrna shots prevent mild infections.

The party has worked to portray outsiders seeking transparency as hostile and ill intentioned. While verifying reports of covid deaths far in excess of official statistics, an Economist colleague was scolded this week by a worker near a Beijing crematorium. With sincere anger, the man called death a private matter and, using a stock propaganda phrase, told the foreigner to “go report something involving positive energy”.

Public opinion is not monolithic. Online, cheerleading state-media reports about heroic doctors and nurses co-exist with widespread public cynicism about official pandemic statistics, for instance, and incredulity when many pharmacies and clinics recently ran out of even basic fever-reducing medicines.

Still, most urban Chinese under 40 have known life only in a country growing more prosperous and stronger, and that is a unifying experience. The party is tireless in harnessing such pride. Some months ago, the China Media Project at the University of Hong Kong, an invaluable propaganda-studies centre, spotted a revealing official commentary defending zero-covid. Reposted online by leading party media, it revived a long-forgotten argument advanced by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1953. Impatient with party elders fretting about high taxes levied on peasants to pay for China’s intervention in the Korean war, Mao dismissed the xiao renzheng, or small benevolence, of worrying about immediate concerns like taxes, next to the da renzheng, or great benevolence, of giving the masses a motherland that stood up to American imperialists. The commentary called the sacrifices of zero-covid an example of great benevolence in the people’s long-term interests.

An autocrat’s definition of benevolence
Mr Xi appears to subscribe to the same logic. In a year-end televised address, he nodded to “tough challenges” ahead in a new phase of covid-management, before pivoting to the glories of living in a rising China, hailing everything from the Beijing Winter Olympics of 2022 to the launching of new spacecraft and warships. He then praised early Communist Party revolutionaries for enduring hardships, and noted that one of his favourite phrases is: “Just as polishing makes jade finer, adversity makes one stronger.”

Mr Xi’s insouciance about suffering in a great cause is chilling, for the same logic might be used to justify any autocrat’s cruellest whim. It is also a bet that China’s national rise, his core claim to legitimacy, will continue. Expect the party to trumpet that the country is swiftly returning to economic growth as covid controls vanish, and to censor and demonise all those exposing its blunders. Already officials offer hollow boasts about new covid policies that “put the people first and put life first”, while busily hiding needless deaths. Mr Xi may yet face hard-to-see costs when it comes to public trust in his rule. But if the party retains absolute power after memories of covid fade, that is a bargain it will take.

https://www.economist.com/china/2023/01/05/the-chinese-communist-party-plans-to-avoid-a-zero-covid-reckoning?

Witty Rejoinder said:

The Chinese Communist Party plans to avoid a zero-covid reckoning
Like Chairman Mao, Xi Jinping seems to believe that China’s rise trumps individual suffering

Jan 5th 2023

Across china, families are enduring avoidable misery and heartbreak, as loved ones succumb to a deadly—and predictable—wave of covid-19 infections for which their rulers failed to prepare. Some overseas analysts talk of a turning-point. They wonder if today’s policy disarray, which follows on the heels of anti-lockdown protests in late 2022, signals a crisis of legitimacy for President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party.

This is a grim moment for China’s people. For all the claims that infections have peaked in big cities like Beijing, there will, tragically, be more deaths when the virus finds older folk now sheltering at home, or living in rural villages. A shameful number of those deaths will be preventable. Yet it is possible that Mr Xi will pay no visible price for pandemic horrors on his watch.

Many outsiders were taken aback by the Chinese public’s broad tolerance of zero-covid controls, notably in the first two years of the pandemic. Even the months-long lockdown of nearly 25m people in Shanghai, in the spring of 2022, was shrugged off by many other Chinese. Zero-covid was, in essence, a giant utilitarian experiment. In a huge country with a weak health system, its harsh, often arbitrary controls did save lives. Most of the time, in most of China, life was relatively normal. The suffering of unfortunates living in closed cities or hauled off to quarantine camps was not much discussed or (owing to censors) widely known.

The best explanation for zero-covid’s unplanned end involves a similar weighing of numbers. A dangerously broad cross-section of the public grew sick of controls that no longer worked, as the virulence of the Omicron variant disrupted life and wrecked the economy in too many places, and oases of normality shrank. Protests offered proof of this exhaustion. But in truth authorities were losing control of covid before demonstrators hit the streets.

The party’s information monopoly helps it conceal how it wasted 2022, failing to raise vaccination rates or prepare hospitals. No opposition or free press exists to challenge the National Health Commission’s sudden claim, in the People’s Daily of January 3rd, that the country has 12.8 intensive-care beds per 100,000 people, though the same commission said in November that there were fewer than four such beds per 100,000. China calls two home-grown covid shots “full vaccination”; most Chinese do not know that a World Health Organisation boss last month called that dose “just not adequate”, especially for the over-60s.

Nationalism continues to generate bad policy. On January 3rd China’s foreign ministry rejected an offer by the European Union to donate advanced vaccines, tweaked to tackle Omicron. A spokesperson snapped that Chinese vaccine supplies are “ample”. A day earlier, China’s embassy in Paris challenged the notion that imported mrna vaccines are more effective than China’s shots (though they are and would save lives if used). Rehashing an anti-vaxxer talking-point, the embassy scorned Pfizer’s boss for catching covid, twice, after receiving his own company’s vaccines. Actually, nobody claims that mrna shots prevent mild infections.

The party has worked to portray outsiders seeking transparency as hostile and ill intentioned. While verifying reports of covid deaths far in excess of official statistics, an Economist colleague was scolded this week by a worker near a Beijing crematorium. With sincere anger, the man called death a private matter and, using a stock propaganda phrase, told the foreigner to “go report something involving positive energy”.

Public opinion is not monolithic. Online, cheerleading state-media reports about heroic doctors and nurses co-exist with widespread public cynicism about official pandemic statistics, for instance, and incredulity when many pharmacies and clinics recently ran out of even basic fever-reducing medicines.

Still, most urban Chinese under 40 have known life only in a country growing more prosperous and stronger, and that is a unifying experience. The party is tireless in harnessing such pride. Some months ago, the China Media Project at the University of Hong Kong, an invaluable propaganda-studies centre, spotted a revealing official commentary defending zero-covid. Reposted online by leading party media, it revived a long-forgotten argument advanced by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1953. Impatient with party elders fretting about high taxes levied on peasants to pay for China’s intervention in the Korean war, Mao dismissed the xiao renzheng, or small benevolence, of worrying about immediate concerns like taxes, next to the da renzheng, or great benevolence, of giving the masses a motherland that stood up to American imperialists. The commentary called the sacrifices of zero-covid an example of great benevolence in the people’s long-term interests.

An autocrat’s definition of benevolence
Mr Xi appears to subscribe to the same logic. In a year-end televised address, he nodded to “tough challenges” ahead in a new phase of covid-management, before pivoting to the glories of living in a rising China, hailing everything from the Beijing Winter Olympics of 2022 to the launching of new spacecraft and warships. He then praised early Communist Party revolutionaries for enduring hardships, and noted that one of his favourite phrases is: “Just as polishing makes jade finer, adversity makes one stronger.”

Mr Xi’s insouciance about suffering in a great cause is chilling, for the same logic might be used to justify any autocrat’s cruellest whim. It is also a bet that China’s national rise, his core claim to legitimacy, will continue. Expect the party to trumpet that the country is swiftly returning to economic growth as covid controls vanish, and to censor and demonise all those exposing its blunders. Already officials offer hollow boasts about new covid policies that “put the people first and put life first”, while busily hiding needless deaths. Mr Xi may yet face hard-to-see costs when it comes to public trust in his rule. But if the party retains absolute power after memories of covid fade, that is a bargain it will take.

https://www.economist.com/china/2023/01/05/the-chinese-communist-party-plans-to-avoid-a-zero-covid-reckoning?

There’s reports that even the most wealthy aren’t able to get bed now. Wish we knew what was really going on.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nWDsV5rCEiM

good to see The Economy Must Growing encouraged by some healthy competitive rivalry

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-03/south-china-sea-beijing-china-taiwan-gas-fishing-military/101843870

propaganda

China tells big tech companies not to offer ChatGPT services
State media outlet blasts chatbot as spreading U.S. government ‘misinformation’

CISSY ZHOU, Nikkei staff writer

February 22, 2023 16:03 JSTUpdated on February 22, 2023 20:34 JST

HONG KONG — Regulators have told major Chinese tech companies not to offer ChatGPT services to the public amid growing alarm in Beijing over the AI-powered chatbot’s uncensored replies to user queries.

Tencent Holdings and Ant Group, the fintech affiliate of Alibaba Group Holding, have been instructed not to offer access to ChatGPT services on their platforms, either directly or via third parties, people with direct knowledge of the matter told Nikkei Asia.

Tech companies will also need to report to regulators before they launch their own ChatGPT-like services, the sources added.

ChatGPT, developed by Microsoft-backed startup OpenAI, is not officially available in China but some internet users have been able to access it using a virtual private network (VPN). There have also been dozens of “mini programs” released by third-party developers on Tencent’s WeChat social media app that claim to offer services from ChatGPT.

Under regulatory pressure, Tencent has suspended several such third-party services regardless of whether they were connected to ChatGPT or were in fact copycats, people familiar with the matter told Nikkei.

This is not the first time that China has blocked foreign websites or applications. Beijing has banned dozens of prominent U.S. websites and apps. Between 2009 and 2010, it moved to block Google, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. Between 2018 and 2019, it instituted bans on Reddit and Wikipedia.

The latest move by regulators comes amid an official backlash against ChatGPT. On Monday, state-owned media outlet China Daily said in a post on Weibo, China’s heavily censored equivalent of Twitter, that the chatbot “could provide a helping hand to the U.S. government in its spread of disinformation and its manipulation of global narratives for its own geopolitical interests.”

Sources in the tech industry say they are not surprised by such a clampdown.

“Our understanding from the beginning is that ChatGPT can never enter China due to issues with censorship, and China will need its own versions of ChatGPT,” said one executive from a leading tech company.

An executive from another leading Chinese tech player said that even without a direct warning his company would not make use of ChatGPT.

“We have already been a target of the Chinese regulator , so even if there were no such ban, we would never take the initiative to add ChatGPT to our platforms because its responses are uncontrollable,” the person said. “There will inevitably be some users who ask the chatbot politically sensitive questions, but the platform would be held accountable for the results.”

Since ChatGPT took the tech world by storm, Chinese tech giants, including Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu, have rushed to unveil their own plans for developing ChatGPT-like services. These companies have been cautious about wording their announcements, however, with all of them stressing that their services are ChatGPT-like but do not integrate ChatGPT itself.

Baidu has announced that it will complete internal testing of a ChatGPT-style project called “Ernie Bot” in March. The service may not initially be a chatbot but rather an embedded feature in some of the company’s products, people familiar with the matter at Baidu told Nikkei.

China’s clampdown on ChatGPT comes as tensions between the world’s two largest economies continue to escalate. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said earlier this week that new information suggests Beijing could provide “lethal support” to Russia in the Ukraine war, triggering concerns over a new cold war. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said the claims were false and accused Washington of spreading lies.

OpenAI, Alibaba, Tencent and Ant Group did not immediately respond to Nikkei Asia’s request for comment.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/China-tells-big-tech-companies-not-to-offer-ChatGPT-services?

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates
As recently as 2019, demographers at the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations were not expecting China’s population to start dropping until the early 2030s. But they did not anticipate today’s wholesale plunge in childbearing.

Considerable attention has been devoted to likely consequences of China’s coming depopulation: economic, political, strategic. But the causes of last year’s population drop deserve much closer examination.

China’s nosedive in childbearing is a silent alarm. It signals deep disaffection with the bleak future the regime is engineering for its subjects. In this land without democracy, the birth collapse can be read as a landslide vote of no confidence in President Xi Jinping’s rule.

Official Chinese government statistics are far from perfect (Premier Li Keqiang once called China’s economic numbers “man-made”), but they offer a serviceable approximation of recent birth trends.

According to the data, births in China have fallen steeply and steadily since 2016, year after year. In 2022, China had only about half as many births as just six years earlier (9.6 million vs. 17.9 million). That sea change in childbearing predated the coronavirus pandemic, and it appears to be part of broader shock, for marriage in China is also in free fall.

Since 2013 — the year Xi completed his ascent to power — the rate of first marriages in China has fallen by well over half. Headlong flights from both childbearing and marriage are taking place in China today.

Of course, fertility levels, and marriage rates, are dropping all around the world. But these declines tend to be gradual, occurring across decades. China has been hit by seismic demographic jolts. Birth shocks of this order almost never occur under stable modern governments during peacetime. Swift and sharp fertility crashes instead usually reflect catastrophe: famine, war or other shattering upheavals.

What does it take to drive down a country’s birth totals by almost 50 percent in the space of just a few years? Estimates from the U.N. Population Division to consider:

During China’s Mao-era famine, in which tens of millions perished, birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1957 (the last year before the Great Leap Forward) and 1961 (the depths of the starvation).
During the chaos of the Soviet collapse, Russian Federation birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1988 (the year before the Berlin Wall fell) and 1994 (when male life expectancy fell to a gruesome 57 years).
In Yugoslavia’s hellish breakup and ethnic cleansing, birth levels in Bosnia fell by about 40 percent between 1990 (the last year before Yugoslavia’s breakup) and 1995.
Even Pol Pot, architect of auto-genocide in Cambodia, could not quite manage to force that nation’s birth total down by half during the Khmer Rouge nightmare: According the UNPD, birth levels in Cambodia dropped by 48 percent between 1973 and 1977.

Yet China — amid social order and economic health, not apocalyptic upheaval — has just experienced its own harrowing birth plunge. Why?

The answer most likely lies in the dispirited outlook of the Chinese populace itself. Absent disaster, one of the most powerful predictor of fertility levels the world over — across countries, ethnicities and time — turns out to be the number of children that women (also men) happen to want. More than any other factor, human agency matters in national birth patterns, a truth that should come as no surprise.

So, yes, China’s birth decline since 2016 can be explained — but only by a revolutionary, wildfire change in national mood. It would take a sudden, pervasive and desperately pessimistic turn of mind.

In 2016, before the plunge, Chinese fertility was already well below the replacement rate of around 2.1 children per woman, the level needed for population stability. The UNPD reckons that the 2016 rate was 1.77, or 19 percent below the stability target.

The subsequent six-year Chinese birth swoon has dragged fertility down to an extraordinarily low level: If the 2022 birth tally is accurate, nationwide fertility would now be less than half the replacement rate. Even if the collapse is arrested and fertility remains at that level, each new generation in China will be less than half as large as the one before it.

Much of East Asia is beset by super-low fertility — not just China but also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But in China, it is occurring under a totalitarian regime exhorting its subjects to provide more issue for the empire.

The timing of China’s birth collapse matters: The downward spiral commenced immediately after the Chinese Communist Party suspended decades of coercive birth-control policy.

In 2015, Beijing’s population planners finally concluded that the consequences of their awful “one child policy” were inimical to state interests. So it was time to set population policy in reverse.

Note that the regime still claims authority over family size: “the birth of a baby,” in the words of the government-run publication People’s Daily, remains “a state affair.” But now Beijing wants more babies from its subjects. A dictatorship may use bayonets to depress birthrates — but it is much trickier to deploy police state tactics to force birthrates up.

Beijing has not yet figured out how to command the people to feel optimism about their personal futures — or thrill at the prospect of bringing more babies into a dystopian world of ubiquitous facial recognition technology, draconian censorship and the new high-tech panopticon known as the “social credit system.”

Instead, we see millions of young people joining spontaneous movements expressing alienation from work — tang ping (lying flat) — and from Chinese society itself — bai lan (let it rot). The Xi regime doesn’t know what to do about this new form of internalized civil disobedience.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates
As recently as 2019, demographers at the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations were not expecting China’s population to start dropping until the early 2030s. But they did not anticipate today’s wholesale plunge in childbearing.

Considerable attention has been devoted to likely consequences of China’s coming depopulation: economic, political, strategic. But the causes of last year’s population drop deserve much closer examination.

China’s nosedive in childbearing is a silent alarm. It signals deep disaffection with the bleak future the regime is engineering for its subjects. In this land without democracy, the birth collapse can be read as a landslide vote of no confidence in President Xi Jinping’s rule.

Official Chinese government statistics are far from perfect (Premier Li Keqiang once called China’s economic numbers “man-made”), but they offer a serviceable approximation of recent birth trends.

According to the data, births in China have fallen steeply and steadily since 2016, year after year. In 2022, China had only about half as many births as just six years earlier (9.6 million vs. 17.9 million). That sea change in childbearing predated the coronavirus pandemic, and it appears to be part of broader shock, for marriage in China is also in free fall.

Since 2013 — the year Xi completed his ascent to power — the rate of first marriages in China has fallen by well over half. Headlong flights from both childbearing and marriage are taking place in China today.

Of course, fertility levels, and marriage rates, are dropping all around the world. But these declines tend to be gradual, occurring across decades. China has been hit by seismic demographic jolts. Birth shocks of this order almost never occur under stable modern governments during peacetime. Swift and sharp fertility crashes instead usually reflect catastrophe: famine, war or other shattering upheavals.

What does it take to drive down a country’s birth totals by almost 50 percent in the space of just a few years? Estimates from the U.N. Population Division to consider:

During China’s Mao-era famine, in which tens of millions perished, birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1957 (the last year before the Great Leap Forward) and 1961 (the depths of the starvation).
During the chaos of the Soviet collapse, Russian Federation birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1988 (the year before the Berlin Wall fell) and 1994 (when male life expectancy fell to a gruesome 57 years).
In Yugoslavia’s hellish breakup and ethnic cleansing, birth levels in Bosnia fell by about 40 percent between 1990 (the last year before Yugoslavia’s breakup) and 1995.
Even Pol Pot, architect of auto-genocide in Cambodia, could not quite manage to force that nation’s birth total down by half during the Khmer Rouge nightmare: According the UNPD, birth levels in Cambodia dropped by 48 percent between 1973 and 1977.

Yet China — amid social order and economic health, not apocalyptic upheaval — has just experienced its own harrowing birth plunge. Why?

The answer most likely lies in the dispirited outlook of the Chinese populace itself. Absent disaster, one of the most powerful predictor of fertility levels the world over — across countries, ethnicities and time — turns out to be the number of children that women (also men) happen to want. More than any other factor, human agency matters in national birth patterns, a truth that should come as no surprise.

So, yes, China’s birth decline since 2016 can be explained — but only by a revolutionary, wildfire change in national mood. It would take a sudden, pervasive and desperately pessimistic turn of mind.

In 2016, before the plunge, Chinese fertility was already well below the replacement rate of around 2.1 children per woman, the level needed for population stability. The UNPD reckons that the 2016 rate was 1.77, or 19 percent below the stability target.

The subsequent six-year Chinese birth swoon has dragged fertility down to an extraordinarily low level: If the 2022 birth tally is accurate, nationwide fertility would now be less than half the replacement rate. Even if the collapse is arrested and fertility remains at that level, each new generation in China will be less than half as large as the one before it.

Much of East Asia is beset by super-low fertility — not just China but also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But in China, it is occurring under a totalitarian regime exhorting its subjects to provide more issue for the empire.

The timing of China’s birth collapse matters: The downward spiral commenced immediately after the Chinese Communist Party suspended decades of coercive birth-control policy.

In 2015, Beijing’s population planners finally concluded that the consequences of their awful “one child policy” were inimical to state interests. So it was time to set population policy in reverse.

Note that the regime still claims authority over family size: “the birth of a baby,” in the words of the government-run publication People’s Daily, remains “a state affair.” But now Beijing wants more babies from its subjects. A dictatorship may use bayonets to depress birthrates — but it is much trickier to deploy police state tactics to force birthrates up.

Beijing has not yet figured out how to command the people to feel optimism about their personal futures — or thrill at the prospect of bringing more babies into a dystopian world of ubiquitous facial recognition technology, draconian censorship and the new high-tech panopticon known as the “social credit system.”

Instead, we see millions of young people joining spontaneous movements expressing alienation from work — tang ping (lying flat) — and from Chinese society itself — bai lan (let it rot). The Xi regime doesn’t know what to do about this new form of internalized civil disobedience.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

Naughty China, horrible China, bad China. Bad, bad, bad, bad, bad China.

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates
As recently as 2019, demographers at the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations were not expecting China’s population to start dropping until the early 2030s. But they did not anticipate today’s wholesale plunge in childbearing.

Considerable attention has been devoted to likely consequences of China’s coming depopulation: economic, political, strategic. But the causes of last year’s population drop deserve much closer examination.

China’s nosedive in childbearing is a silent alarm. It signals deep disaffection with the bleak future the regime is engineering for its subjects. In this land without democracy, the birth collapse can be read as a landslide vote of no confidence in President Xi Jinping’s rule.

Official Chinese government statistics are far from perfect (Premier Li Keqiang once called China’s economic numbers “man-made”), but they offer a serviceable approximation of recent birth trends.

According to the data, births in China have fallen steeply and steadily since 2016, year after year. In 2022, China had only about half as many births as just six years earlier (9.6 million vs. 17.9 million). That sea change in childbearing predated the coronavirus pandemic, and it appears to be part of broader shock, for marriage in China is also in free fall.

Since 2013 — the year Xi completed his ascent to power — the rate of first marriages in China has fallen by well over half. Headlong flights from both childbearing and marriage are taking place in China today.

Of course, fertility levels, and marriage rates, are dropping all around the world. But these declines tend to be gradual, occurring across decades. China has been hit by seismic demographic jolts. Birth shocks of this order almost never occur under stable modern governments during peacetime. Swift and sharp fertility crashes instead usually reflect catastrophe: famine, war or other shattering upheavals.

What does it take to drive down a country’s birth totals by almost 50 percent in the space of just a few years? Estimates from the U.N. Population Division to consider:

During China’s Mao-era famine, in which tens of millions perished, birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1957 (the last year before the Great Leap Forward) and 1961 (the depths of the starvation).
During the chaos of the Soviet collapse, Russian Federation birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1988 (the year before the Berlin Wall fell) and 1994 (when male life expectancy fell to a gruesome 57 years).
In Yugoslavia’s hellish breakup and ethnic cleansing, birth levels in Bosnia fell by about 40 percent between 1990 (the last year before Yugoslavia’s breakup) and 1995.
Even Pol Pot, architect of auto-genocide in Cambodia, could not quite manage to force that nation’s birth total down by half during the Khmer Rouge nightmare: According the UNPD, birth levels in Cambodia dropped by 48 percent between 1973 and 1977.

Yet China — amid social order and economic health, not apocalyptic upheaval — has just experienced its own harrowing birth plunge. Why?

The answer most likely lies in the dispirited outlook of the Chinese populace itself. Absent disaster, one of the most powerful predictor of fertility levels the world over — across countries, ethnicities and time — turns out to be the number of children that women (also men) happen to want. More than any other factor, human agency matters in national birth patterns, a truth that should come as no surprise.

So, yes, China’s birth decline since 2016 can be explained — but only by a revolutionary, wildfire change in national mood. It would take a sudden, pervasive and desperately pessimistic turn of mind.

In 2016, before the plunge, Chinese fertility was already well below the replacement rate of around 2.1 children per woman, the level needed for population stability. The UNPD reckons that the 2016 rate was 1.77, or 19 percent below the stability target.

The subsequent six-year Chinese birth swoon has dragged fertility down to an extraordinarily low level: If the 2022 birth tally is accurate, nationwide fertility would now be less than half the replacement rate. Even if the collapse is arrested and fertility remains at that level, each new generation in China will be less than half as large as the one before it.

Much of East Asia is beset by super-low fertility — not just China but also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But in China, it is occurring under a totalitarian regime exhorting its subjects to provide more issue for the empire.

The timing of China’s birth collapse matters: The downward spiral commenced immediately after the Chinese Communist Party suspended decades of coercive birth-control policy.

In 2015, Beijing’s population planners finally concluded that the consequences of their awful “one child policy” were inimical to state interests. So it was time to set population policy in reverse.

Note that the regime still claims authority over family size: “the birth of a baby,” in the words of the government-run publication People’s Daily, remains “a state affair.” But now Beijing wants more babies from its subjects. A dictatorship may use bayonets to depress birthrates — but it is much trickier to deploy police state tactics to force birthrates up.

Beijing has not yet figured out how to command the people to feel optimism about their personal futures — or thrill at the prospect of bringing more babies into a dystopian world of ubiquitous facial recognition technology, draconian censorship and the new high-tech panopticon known as the “social credit system.”

Instead, we see millions of young people joining spontaneous movements expressing alienation from work — tang ping (lying flat) — and from Chinese society itself — bai lan (let it rot). The Xi regime doesn’t know what to do about this new form of internalized civil disobedience.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

Perhaps they want less children as child rearing is expensive and they prefer to spend the money on themselves

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

They almost wilfully brought it on themselves. 20 or 30 years ago China was improving by leaps and bounds. But that much freedom spooked the authorities and they had to turn back the clock.

Kothos said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

They almost wilfully brought it on themselves. 20 or 30 years ago China was improving by leaps and bounds. But that much freedom spooked the authorities and they had to turn back the clock.

I watched a Youtube doco last night on North Korea. What a hellhole that place is.

Cymek said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates
As recently as 2019, demographers at the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations were not expecting China’s population to start dropping until the early 2030s. But they did not anticipate today’s wholesale plunge in childbearing.

Considerable attention has been devoted to likely consequences of China’s coming depopulation: economic, political, strategic. But the causes of last year’s population drop deserve much closer examination.

China’s nosedive in childbearing is a silent alarm. It signals deep disaffection with the bleak future the regime is engineering for its subjects. In this land without democracy, the birth collapse can be read as a landslide vote of no confidence in President Xi Jinping’s rule.

Official Chinese government statistics are far from perfect (Premier Li Keqiang once called China’s economic numbers “man-made”), but they offer a serviceable approximation of recent birth trends.

According to the data, births in China have fallen steeply and steadily since 2016, year after year. In 2022, China had only about half as many births as just six years earlier (9.6 million vs. 17.9 million). That sea change in childbearing predated the coronavirus pandemic, and it appears to be part of broader shock, for marriage in China is also in free fall.

Since 2013 — the year Xi completed his ascent to power — the rate of first marriages in China has fallen by well over half. Headlong flights from both childbearing and marriage are taking place in China today.

Of course, fertility levels, and marriage rates, are dropping all around the world. But these declines tend to be gradual, occurring across decades. China has been hit by seismic demographic jolts. Birth shocks of this order almost never occur under stable modern governments during peacetime. Swift and sharp fertility crashes instead usually reflect catastrophe: famine, war or other shattering upheavals.

What does it take to drive down a country’s birth totals by almost 50 percent in the space of just a few years? Estimates from the U.N. Population Division to consider:

During China’s Mao-era famine, in which tens of millions perished, birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1957 (the last year before the Great Leap Forward) and 1961 (the depths of the starvation).
During the chaos of the Soviet collapse, Russian Federation birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1988 (the year before the Berlin Wall fell) and 1994 (when male life expectancy fell to a gruesome 57 years).
In Yugoslavia’s hellish breakup and ethnic cleansing, birth levels in Bosnia fell by about 40 percent between 1990 (the last year before Yugoslavia’s breakup) and 1995.
Even Pol Pot, architect of auto-genocide in Cambodia, could not quite manage to force that nation’s birth total down by half during the Khmer Rouge nightmare: According the UNPD, birth levels in Cambodia dropped by 48 percent between 1973 and 1977.

Yet China — amid social order and economic health, not apocalyptic upheaval — has just experienced its own harrowing birth plunge. Why?

The answer most likely lies in the dispirited outlook of the Chinese populace itself. Absent disaster, one of the most powerful predictor of fertility levels the world over — across countries, ethnicities and time — turns out to be the number of children that women (also men) happen to want. More than any other factor, human agency matters in national birth patterns, a truth that should come as no surprise.

So, yes, China’s birth decline since 2016 can be explained — but only by a revolutionary, wildfire change in national mood. It would take a sudden, pervasive and desperately pessimistic turn of mind.

In 2016, before the plunge, Chinese fertility was already well below the replacement rate of around 2.1 children per woman, the level needed for population stability. The UNPD reckons that the 2016 rate was 1.77, or 19 percent below the stability target.

The subsequent six-year Chinese birth swoon has dragged fertility down to an extraordinarily low level: If the 2022 birth tally is accurate, nationwide fertility would now be less than half the replacement rate. Even if the collapse is arrested and fertility remains at that level, each new generation in China will be less than half as large as the one before it.

Much of East Asia is beset by super-low fertility — not just China but also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But in China, it is occurring under a totalitarian regime exhorting its subjects to provide more issue for the empire.

The timing of China’s birth collapse matters: The downward spiral commenced immediately after the Chinese Communist Party suspended decades of coercive birth-control policy.

In 2015, Beijing’s population planners finally concluded that the consequences of their awful “one child policy” were inimical to state interests. So it was time to set population policy in reverse.

Note that the regime still claims authority over family size: “the birth of a baby,” in the words of the government-run publication People’s Daily, remains “a state affair.” But now Beijing wants more babies from its subjects. A dictatorship may use bayonets to depress birthrates — but it is much trickier to deploy police state tactics to force birthrates up.

Beijing has not yet figured out how to command the people to feel optimism about their personal futures — or thrill at the prospect of bringing more babies into a dystopian world of ubiquitous facial recognition technology, draconian censorship and the new high-tech panopticon known as the “social credit system.”

Instead, we see millions of young people joining spontaneous movements expressing alienation from work — tang ping (lying flat) — and from Chinese society itself — bai lan (let it rot). The Xi regime doesn’t know what to do about this new form of internalized civil disobedience.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

Perhaps they want less children as child rearing is expensive and they prefer to spend the money on themselves

Yes. Kids a good value for money IMO though.

ChrispenEvan said:

Kothos said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

They almost wilfully brought it on themselves. 20 or 30 years ago China was improving by leaps and bounds. But that much freedom spooked the authorities and they had to turn back the clock.

I watched a Youtube doco last night on North Korea. What a hellhole that place is.

Can imagine, was it a secretly recorded documentary ?
It’s nuclear weapons programme must divert a lot of resources that could fed its people

ChrispenEvan said:

Kothos said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

They almost wilfully brought it on themselves. 20 or 30 years ago China was improving by leaps and bounds. But that much freedom spooked the authorities and they had to turn back the clock.

I watched a Youtube doco last night on North Korea. What a hellhole that place is.

It is.

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates
As recently as 2019, demographers at the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations were not expecting China’s population to start dropping until the early 2030s. But they did not anticipate today’s wholesale plunge in childbearing.

Considerable attention has been devoted to likely consequences of China’s coming depopulation: economic, political, strategic. But the causes of last year’s population drop deserve much closer examination.

China’s nosedive in childbearing is a silent alarm. It signals deep disaffection with the bleak future the regime is engineering for its subjects. In this land without democracy, the birth collapse can be read as a landslide vote of no confidence in President Xi Jinping’s rule.

Official Chinese government statistics are far from perfect (Premier Li Keqiang once called China’s economic numbers “man-made”), but they offer a serviceable approximation of recent birth trends.

According to the data, births in China have fallen steeply and steadily since 2016, year after year. In 2022, China had only about half as many births as just six years earlier (9.6 million vs. 17.9 million). That sea change in childbearing predated the coronavirus pandemic, and it appears to be part of broader shock, for marriage in China is also in free fall.

Since 2013 — the year Xi completed his ascent to power — the rate of first marriages in China has fallen by well over half. Headlong flights from both childbearing and marriage are taking place in China today.

Of course, fertility levels, and marriage rates, are dropping all around the world. But these declines tend to be gradual, occurring across decades. China has been hit by seismic demographic jolts. Birth shocks of this order almost never occur under stable modern governments during peacetime. Swift and sharp fertility crashes instead usually reflect catastrophe: famine, war or other shattering upheavals.

What does it take to drive down a country’s birth totals by almost 50 percent in the space of just a few years? Estimates from the U.N. Population Division to consider:

During China’s Mao-era famine, in which tens of millions perished, birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1957 (the last year before the Great Leap Forward) and 1961 (the depths of the starvation).
During the chaos of the Soviet collapse, Russian Federation birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1988 (the year before the Berlin Wall fell) and 1994 (when male life expectancy fell to a gruesome 57 years).
In Yugoslavia’s hellish breakup and ethnic cleansing, birth levels in Bosnia fell by about 40 percent between 1990 (the last year before Yugoslavia’s breakup) and 1995.
Even Pol Pot, architect of auto-genocide in Cambodia, could not quite manage to force that nation’s birth total down by half during the Khmer Rouge nightmare: According the UNPD, birth levels in Cambodia dropped by 48 percent between 1973 and 1977.

Yet China — amid social order and economic health, not apocalyptic upheaval — has just experienced its own harrowing birth plunge. Why?

The answer most likely lies in the dispirited outlook of the Chinese populace itself. Absent disaster, one of the most powerful predictor of fertility levels the world over — across countries, ethnicities and time — turns out to be the number of children that women (also men) happen to want. More than any other factor, human agency matters in national birth patterns, a truth that should come as no surprise.

So, yes, China’s birth decline since 2016 can be explained — but only by a revolutionary, wildfire change in national mood. It would take a sudden, pervasive and desperately pessimistic turn of mind.

In 2016, before the plunge, Chinese fertility was already well below the replacement rate of around 2.1 children per woman, the level needed for population stability. The UNPD reckons that the 2016 rate was 1.77, or 19 percent below the stability target.

The subsequent six-year Chinese birth swoon has dragged fertility down to an extraordinarily low level: If the 2022 birth tally is accurate, nationwide fertility would now be less than half the replacement rate. Even if the collapse is arrested and fertility remains at that level, each new generation in China will be less than half as large as the one before it.

Much of East Asia is beset by super-low fertility — not just China but also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But in China, it is occurring under a totalitarian regime exhorting its subjects to provide more issue for the empire.

The timing of China’s birth collapse matters: The downward spiral commenced immediately after the Chinese Communist Party suspended decades of coercive birth-control policy.

In 2015, Beijing’s population planners finally concluded that the consequences of their awful “one child policy” were inimical to state interests. So it was time to set population policy in reverse.

Note that the regime still claims authority over family size: “the birth of a baby,” in the words of the government-run publication People’s Daily, remains “a state affair.” But now Beijing wants more babies from its subjects. A dictatorship may use bayonets to depress birthrates — but it is much trickier to deploy police state tactics to force birthrates up.

Beijing has not yet figured out how to command the people to feel optimism about their personal futures — or thrill at the prospect of bringing more babies into a dystopian world of ubiquitous facial recognition technology, draconian censorship and the new high-tech panopticon known as the “social credit system.”

Instead, we see millions of young people joining spontaneous movements expressing alienation from work — tang ping (lying flat) — and from Chinese society itself — bai lan (let it rot). The Xi regime doesn’t know what to do about this new form of internalized civil disobedience.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

China’s birthrate has increased at a similar rate to the rest of the world. Why they should now be concerned about a falling population is unbelievable and reflects the stupidity of the human race.

PermeateFree said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Opinion China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism
By Nicholas Eberstadt
February 28, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EST

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates
As recently as 2019, demographers at the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations were not expecting China’s population to start dropping until the early 2030s. But they did not anticipate today’s wholesale plunge in childbearing.

Considerable attention has been devoted to likely consequences of China’s coming depopulation: economic, political, strategic. But the causes of last year’s population drop deserve much closer examination.

China’s nosedive in childbearing is a silent alarm. It signals deep disaffection with the bleak future the regime is engineering for its subjects. In this land without democracy, the birth collapse can be read as a landslide vote of no confidence in President Xi Jinping’s rule.

Official Chinese government statistics are far from perfect (Premier Li Keqiang once called China’s economic numbers “man-made”), but they offer a serviceable approximation of recent birth trends.

According to the data, births in China have fallen steeply and steadily since 2016, year after year. In 2022, China had only about half as many births as just six years earlier (9.6 million vs. 17.9 million). That sea change in childbearing predated the coronavirus pandemic, and it appears to be part of broader shock, for marriage in China is also in free fall.

Since 2013 — the year Xi completed his ascent to power — the rate of first marriages in China has fallen by well over half. Headlong flights from both childbearing and marriage are taking place in China today.

Of course, fertility levels, and marriage rates, are dropping all around the world. But these declines tend to be gradual, occurring across decades. China has been hit by seismic demographic jolts. Birth shocks of this order almost never occur under stable modern governments during peacetime. Swift and sharp fertility crashes instead usually reflect catastrophe: famine, war or other shattering upheavals.

What does it take to drive down a country’s birth totals by almost 50 percent in the space of just a few years? Estimates from the U.N. Population Division to consider:

During China’s Mao-era famine, in which tens of millions perished, birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1957 (the last year before the Great Leap Forward) and 1961 (the depths of the starvation).
During the chaos of the Soviet collapse, Russian Federation birth levels fell by less than 40 percent between 1988 (the year before the Berlin Wall fell) and 1994 (when male life expectancy fell to a gruesome 57 years).
In Yugoslavia’s hellish breakup and ethnic cleansing, birth levels in Bosnia fell by about 40 percent between 1990 (the last year before Yugoslavia’s breakup) and 1995.
Even Pol Pot, architect of auto-genocide in Cambodia, could not quite manage to force that nation’s birth total down by half during the Khmer Rouge nightmare: According the UNPD, birth levels in Cambodia dropped by 48 percent between 1973 and 1977.

Yet China — amid social order and economic health, not apocalyptic upheaval — has just experienced its own harrowing birth plunge. Why?

The answer most likely lies in the dispirited outlook of the Chinese populace itself. Absent disaster, one of the most powerful predictor of fertility levels the world over — across countries, ethnicities and time — turns out to be the number of children that women (also men) happen to want. More than any other factor, human agency matters in national birth patterns, a truth that should come as no surprise.

So, yes, China’s birth decline since 2016 can be explained — but only by a revolutionary, wildfire change in national mood. It would take a sudden, pervasive and desperately pessimistic turn of mind.

In 2016, before the plunge, Chinese fertility was already well below the replacement rate of around 2.1 children per woman, the level needed for population stability. The UNPD reckons that the 2016 rate was 1.77, or 19 percent below the stability target.

The subsequent six-year Chinese birth swoon has dragged fertility down to an extraordinarily low level: If the 2022 birth tally is accurate, nationwide fertility would now be less than half the replacement rate. Even if the collapse is arrested and fertility remains at that level, each new generation in China will be less than half as large as the one before it.

Much of East Asia is beset by super-low fertility — not just China but also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But in China, it is occurring under a totalitarian regime exhorting its subjects to provide more issue for the empire.

The timing of China’s birth collapse matters: The downward spiral commenced immediately after the Chinese Communist Party suspended decades of coercive birth-control policy.

In 2015, Beijing’s population planners finally concluded that the consequences of their awful “one child policy” were inimical to state interests. So it was time to set population policy in reverse.

Note that the regime still claims authority over family size: “the birth of a baby,” in the words of the government-run publication People’s Daily, remains “a state affair.” But now Beijing wants more babies from its subjects. A dictatorship may use bayonets to depress birthrates — but it is much trickier to deploy police state tactics to force birthrates up.

Beijing has not yet figured out how to command the people to feel optimism about their personal futures — or thrill at the prospect of bringing more babies into a dystopian world of ubiquitous facial recognition technology, draconian censorship and the new high-tech panopticon known as the “social credit system.”

Instead, we see millions of young people joining spontaneous movements expressing alienation from work — tang ping (lying flat) — and from Chinese society itself — bai lan (let it rot). The Xi regime doesn’t know what to do about this new form of internalized civil disobedience.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/?

China’s birthrate has increased at a similar rate to the rest of the world. Why they should now be concerned about a falling population is unbelievable and reflects the stupidity of the human race.

I suppose they are thinking in terms of increasing economic and military might 25 to 50 years down track and if they have less people it doesn’t work.
Other considerations don’t matter to them

Cymek said:

ChrispenEvan said:

Kothos said:

They almost wilfully brought it on themselves. 20 or 30 years ago China was improving by leaps and bounds. But that much freedom spooked the authorities and they had to turn back the clock.

I watched a Youtube doco last night on North Korea. What a hellhole that place is.

Can imagine, was it a secretly recorded documentary ?
It’s nuclear weapons programme must divert a lot of resources that could fed its people

Yes, it was a group of french tourists.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enm5T1yPI4M

Link

Witty Rejoinder said:

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

Woodie said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Enterprise_Institute

Link

ChrispenEvan said:

Woodie said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Enterprise_Institute

Link

Quite conservative it seems.

Woodie said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

Witty Rejoinder said:

Woodie said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

woodie.

oh what the fuck wait they were just telling us two months ago that CHINA were basically in the stone age compared to even the Sentinelese and now this

China on track to dominate development of critical future technologies at expense of US, ASPI report says

Damn¿¡

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-02/china-critical-future-technologies-west-aspi-report/102041318

ChrispenEvan said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Woodie said:

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

woodie.

木头

ChrispenEvan said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Woodie said:

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

woodie.

No I meant that Woodie like PF should let rip…

Witty Rejoinder said:

ChrispenEvan said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

woodie.

No I meant that Woodie like PF should let rip…

inscrutable, you are.

ChrispenEvan said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

ChrispenEvan said:

woodie.

No I meant that Woodie like PF should let rip…

inscrutable, you are.

https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/InscrutableOriental

All in all, this trope can be described as the Eastern counterpart to Germanic Depressives. Any kernel of truth in the stereotype can be attributed to the one universal social mannerism throughout East and Southeast Asia of “maintaining face”, and which British people would understand: Don’t make a fuss.

Woodie said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

That much is true.

Kothos said:

Woodie said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

That much is true.

The ‘Washington Post’ is centre left if that matters…

Witty Rejoinder said:

Kothos said:

Woodie said:

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

That much is true.

The ‘Washington Post’ is centre left if that matters…

Centre-left for an American rag owned by Rupert Murdoch?

Witty Rejoinder said:

Woodie said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

I am amazed that over most of the world the press, big business and politicians go apocalyptic that human populations in developed countries are likely to fall, whilst totally ignoring the fact of their meteoric rise over the last 50 or so years that far exceeds anything that has gone before, which in turn has created the really big problems of our survival as a species. Don’t they look back more than 10 years or are they blinded by the vison of their fat bank accounts. These super greedy people should just get their snouts out of the trough for a minute to see what they are doing to the planet and realise things have to change!

PermeateFree said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Woodie said:

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

I am amazed that over most of the world the press, big business and politicians go apocalyptic that human populations in developed countries are likely to fall, whilst totally ignoring the fact of their meteoric rise over the last 50 or so years that far exceeds anything that has gone before, which in turn has created the really big problems of our survival as a species. Don’t they look back more than 10 years or are they blinded by the vison of their fat bank accounts. These super greedy people should just get their snouts out of the trough for a minute to see what they are doing to the planet and realise things have to change!

o’c‘m’on everyone knows that the only way to have a high standard of living is to ensure that the slaves from shithole cuntries are breeding as fast as possible to provide us with cheap labour that can be trodden down under our feet to sustain our lifestyles

SCIENCE said:

ChrispenEvan said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

woodie.

木头

LOLOL

Kothos said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Kothos said:

That much is true.

The ‘Washington Post’ is centre left if that matters…

Centre-left for an American rag owned by Rupert Murdoch?

Ummm…

SCIENCE said:

…the one universal social mannerism throughout East and Southeast Asia of “maintaining face”, and which British people would understand: Don’t make a fuss.

Unless it’s something to do with the South China Sea, or the Taiwan Strait, or Taiwan itself, or Tiananmen, or reneging on Hong Kong guarantees, or the drug habits of Chinese athletes, in which case it’s cut loose, do your nut, crack a sad big time, go ‘nanas, chuck a wobbly, be ‘furious’.

PermeateFree said:

Witty Rejoinder said:

Woodie said:

These so called “Institutes” have nothing to with being a seat of learning or of being balanced analysis.

They are usually politically and idealogically based “think tanks” that are paid/funded to come up with something that suits their funding’s ideology and narrative.

This particular institute is funded to the tune of $45M US a year. You can donate here if you wish. https://www.aei.org/donate/

I cannot find list of declared donors.

Any actual criticism of the article? Don’t be shy, PF let rip…

I am amazed that over most of the world the press, big business and politicians go apocalyptic that human populations in developed countries are likely to fall, whilst totally ignoring the fact of their meteoric rise over the last 50 or so years that far exceeds anything that has gone before, which in turn has created the really big problems of our survival as a species. Don’t they look back more than 10 years or are they blinded by the vison of their fat bank accounts. These super greedy people should just get their snouts out of the trough for a minute to see what they are doing to the planet and realise things have to change!

It does seem they are upset a cheap disposable work force might be reduced

Cymek said:

It does seem they are upset a cheap disposable work force might be reduced

No-one wants to work any more in China, too?

PermeateFree said:

I am amazed that over most of the world the press, big business and politicians go apocalyptic that human populations in developed countries are likely to fall, whilst totally ignoring the fact of their meteoric rise over the last 50 or so years that far exceeds anything that has gone before, which in turn has created the really big problems of our survival as a species. Don’t they look back more than 10 years or are they blinded by the vison of their fat bank accounts. These super greedy people should just get their snouts out of the trough for a minute to see what they are doing to the planet and realise things have to change!

They don’t know how to manage the reduction. Modern economies are predicated on continual growth, whether it be in resources or population or whatever.

captain_spalding said:

Cymek said:

It does seem they are upset a cheap disposable work force might be reduced

No-one wants to work any more in China, too?

People in rich countries use around 4 times more resources than people in poor countries. There’s no way out going that way.

captain_spalding said:

Cymek said:

It does seem they are upset a cheap disposable work force might be reduced

No-one wants to work any more in China, too?

Probably not
It does all feed into the economy must grow, everything must stay the same regarding monetary policy.
China isn’t really any worse than those they are usurping, just have the advantage of modern technology.
Nations that crave power will do anything to get and maintain it, genocide is on the cards

Kothos said:

PermeateFree said:

I am amazed that over most of the world the press, big business and politicians go apocalyptic that human populations in developed countries are likely to fall, whilst totally ignoring the fact of their meteoric rise over the last 50 or so years that far exceeds anything that has gone before, which in turn has created the really big problems of our survival as a species. Don’t they look back more than 10 years or are they blinded by the vison of their fat bank accounts. These super greedy people should just get their snouts out of the trough for a minute to see what they are doing to the planet and realise things have to change!

They don’t know how to manage the reduction. Modern economies are predicated on continual growth, whether it be in resources or population or whatever.

Which is why things have to change, but the people who could do the changing are not listening.

PermeateFree said:

captain_spalding said:

Cymek said:

It does seem they are upset a cheap disposable work force might be reduced

No-one wants to work any more in China, too?

People in rich countries use around 4 times more resources than people in poor countries. There’s no way out going that way.

well that’s good that’s because the rich they’re responsible Must Growers Of The Economy, that’s why the poor cuntries need to grow their population 4 times faster

Kothos said:

PermeateFree said:

I am amazed that over most of the world the press, big business and politicians go apocalyptic that human populations in developed countries are likely to fall, whilst totally ignoring the fact of their meteoric rise over the last 50 or so years that far exceeds anything that has gone before, which in turn has created the really big problems of our survival as a species. Don’t they look back more than 10 years or are they blinded by the vison of their fat bank accounts. These super greedy people should just get their snouts out of the trough for a minute to see what they are doing to the planet and realise things have to change!

They don’t know how to manage the reduction. Modern economies are predicated on continual growth, whether it be in resources or population or whatever.

No they aren’t.

SCIENCE said:

PermeateFree said:

captain_spalding said:

No-one wants to work any more in China, too?

People in rich countries use around 4 times more resources than people in poor countries. There’s no way out going that way.

well that’s good that’s because the rich they’re responsible Must Growers Of The Economy, that’s why the poor cuntries need to grow their population 4 times faster

Then let her rip and the devil take the hindmost, which is the most likely scenario.

The Rev Dodgson said:

Kothos said:

PermeateFree said:

I am amazed that over most of the world the press, big business and politicians go apocalyptic that human populations in developed countries are likely to fall, whilst totally ignoring the fact of their meteoric rise over the last 50 or so years that far exceeds anything that has gone before, which in turn has created the really big problems of our survival as a species. Don’t they look back more than 10 years or are they blinded by the vison of their fat bank accounts. These super greedy people should just get their snouts out of the trough for a minute to see what they are doing to the planet and realise things have to change!

They don’t know how to manage the reduction. Modern economies are predicated on continual growth, whether it be in resources or population or whatever.

No they aren’t.

¿ref

SCIENCE said:

The Rev Dodgson said:

Kothos said:

They don’t know how to manage the reduction. Modern economies are predicated on continual growth, whether it be in resources or population or whatever.

No they aren’t.

¿ref

observation.

The Rev Dodgson said:

SCIENCE said:

The Rev Dodgson said:

No they aren’t.

¿ref

observation.

sorry the True Geniuses only accept RCTs for any and every thing

but your point is fair, we too would like clarification on what it means when one says

Modern economies are predicated on continual X

for whatever X is selected

SCIENCE said:

The Rev Dodgson said:

SCIENCE said:

¿ref

observation.

sorry the True Geniuses only accept RCTs for any and every thing

but your point is fair, we too would like clarification on what it means when one says

Modern economies are predicated on continual X

for whatever X is selected

because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.

ChrispenEvan said:

SCIENCE said:

The Rev Dodgson said:

observation.

sorry the True Geniuses only accept RCTs for any and every thing

but your point is fair, we too would like clarification on what it means when one says

Modern economies are predicated on continual X

for whatever X is selected

because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.

If we don’t have continual economic growth, job creation, increased profit, it’s considered bad.

Cymek said:

ChrispenEvan said:

SCIENCE said:

sorry the True Geniuses only accept RCTs for any and every thing

but your point is fair, we too would like clarification on what it means when one says

Modern economies are predicated on continual X

for whatever X is selected

because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.

If we don’t have continual economic growth, job creation, increased profit, it’s considered bad.

ah poor old Donald so maligned and misunderstood